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Foreword
This volume, which is a compilation of Professor Lee's 37 years of Freeman
columns is obviously fascinating, creative, style dening, and just Classic
Dwight Lee.

That is not to imply that Dwight Lee has any class, but in-

stead that he has established a class all by himself.
Educated in the Virginia Political Economy tradition, Professor Lee views
virtually all human action, in both the public and private sectors, through the
lens of the economist, with individuals choosing among alternatives based upon
their varying perceptions of costs and benets. Through Dwight's lens, Adam
Smith is alive, well, and ubiquitous, if not a little tortured.
Clearly rooted in its microeconomic foundations, Dwight's Reader begins
with creative applications of the analytical tools that have, to a great extent,
dened his entire career. Cost and choice, supply and demand, specialization,
trade and exchange, comparative advantage, marginalism, prices and market
interferences, and a little public choice.
would argue that was quite enough.

That's about it!

But Professor Lee

And, he would be right.

If his career

collection of columns gives the impression Dwight is, at best, only a 12 trick
pony, his creativity and analytical ability have demonstrably spun those few
tricks into a successful 37-year circus attracting and fascinating many followers
and, indeed, impersonators all along the way.
Having illustrated his basic analytical toolkit in the rst 19 columns, Professor Lee applies those tools in the remaining 50 to topics as far ranging
as Morality and Markets, Market Processes, Constitutions, Government and
Markets, International Trade, Social Welfare, and Environmental Policy. The
section on Morality and Markets proved to be a relative masterstroke eventually spawning continuing research and commentary around the world with
European scholars republishing and commenting widely upon this thread in
multiple languages and cultures.

His columns on Morality have also added

signicant credence to Professors Lee's frequently stated axiom that economic
analysis allows one to acquire insights into activities without having rsthand
experience.
Lee's frequent creative application and, indeed, reapplication of the same

analytical tools to problems varying only the slightest in nature, especially in
the environmental policy section, stand as published proof that he was in fact
the greenest economist ever to come out of Virginia Political Economy. He
was obviously an avid supporter of recycling long before recycling was cool.
Over this 37-year contribution, Professor Lee has creatively broadened the
horizons of economists while elucidating their relatively complex and boring
ideas to a much larger and more critical public audience. For Dwight, academically based journalism was strategically necessary, morally obligatory, and just
a lot of fun. The economics profession, readers of this volume, and the public,
owe him a signicant debt of gratitude for these gifts.

Dr. J.R. Clark
Probasco Distinguished Chair of Free Enterprise
The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
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Cooperation, Good Intentions, and Incentives

May 1, 1998

Although each of my

Freeman

columns will stand alone, let me emphasize

at the outset that economics is far more than a series of unrelated concepts.
Economics provides a coherent and powerful framework for seeing order in
the seemingly unrelated actions of hundreds of millions of individuals as they
struggle to improve their lot in life.
Improving our circumstances is always a struggle because of the fundamental problem of scarcity.
scarcity.

All economic concepts are rooted in the problem of

No matter how productive we become, there always will be limits

on what we can accomplish. Each individual confronts the fact that he must
choose among many dierent ways to use his time and talents, and he makes
those choices to achieve his particular purposes. No one else can know as much
about another person's purposes as that person himself. So while we may not
understand the actions of others, we can be condent that they are doing the
best they can to realize their objectives; from their own perspectives, they are
acting rationally.

The Power of Economics
But economics is more than just a consideration of how individuals improve
their well-being. The power of economics comes from the fact that the implications of scarcity and rational decision-making allow us to understand how
certain social institutions make productive cooperation possible among large
numbers of people, each of whom is concerned primarily with achieving a better
life. This explanatory power goes back to Adam Smith, who elaborated on the
connections between the invisible hand and the Wealth of Nations. It was
Smith who rst explained systematically how the social institutions of the free
market encourage the creation of wealth by motivating people concerned with
their own interests to behave in ways that best serve the interests of others.
In some respects, the economics profession has made little progress since
Adam Smith. Economists have been ineective at communicating to the public

the tremendous benets we all realize from the cooperation promoted by the
free market, or the threat to that cooperation from the political inuence of
organized interest groups. In part, this failure can be explained by the diculty
of the task.

The benets of the market are spread so wide in the form of

lower prices, improved products, and better opportunities that they tend to
go unnoticed or be taken for granted. Because the benets are primarily the
indirect and unintended consequences of the actions of millions of individuals,
people fail to connect those benets to their source.
In contrast, political benets tend to be concentrated in visible ways and
are easily connected to the intentional actions of particular people, while the
damage done is spread over the entire economy and dicult to trace back to its
cause. But economists could have done more to promote a widespread understanding and appreciation of economic fundamentals. Even in their teaching,
professional economists tend to focus on the trees of technical details while
overlooking the impressive forest of market cooperation and coordination.
But in other ways, economists have made much progress since Adam Smith.
While technical economic concepts can divert
economists into analytical minutia, when appropriately used, these concepts
improve our economic understanding in important ways. For example, the concept of comparative advantage extends Adam Smith's insight into the benets
of free trade. The concept of marginalism (which, among other things, drained
the labor theory of value swamp in which Smith and Karl Marx became
mired, Marx more so than Smith) explains a wide range of economic activity
that most people nd puzzling. Those, and many other economic concepts can
help economists better explain the power of the market to promote a pattern of
social cooperation impossible under any other arrangement. Communicating
this power as widely as possible is one of the most important contributions
economists can make. I shall connect the discussion in each column back to
the goal of social cooperation.

The Problem of Achieving Cooperation
Despite the common belief that economists are interested only in narrow material concerns, they are primarily concerned with explaining how the spontaneous market process expands the opportunity for people to achieve their
objectives, no matter what they are, through cooperation with one another.
Whether your goal is accumulating personal wealth, protecting the environment, or assisting the needy, you will be more successful if you can enlist the
cooperation of others.
But how do you enlist this cooperation, given the variety of conicting
goals people are intent on pursuing?

Reformers usually believe that social

cooperation depends on appealing to people to put aside their narrow personal
ambitions (such as amassing personal wealth) and concentrate on promoting
broad social goals (such as protecting the environment or helping the needy).
Achieving more social cooperation requires more virtuous people.
economist Ludwig von Mises explained in

4

Human Action

(page 2):

The great

If social conditions did not fulll the wishes of the reformers, if their
utopias proved unrealizable, the fault was seen in the moral failure
of man. Social problems were considered ethical problems. What
was needed in order to construct the ideal society, they thought,
were good princes and virtuous citizens. With righteous men any
utopia might be realized.
In contrast, good economists realize that, regardless of one's idea of virtue,
cooperation through the division of labor and exchangethe kind that people
engaged in long before there were economists and moral philosophersis what
creates a better society.

Good Intentions Are Not Enough
Without denying the desirability of people behaving virtuously, economists
see it as largely unrelated to social cooperation on a broad scale. Attempts to
change behavior with conventional moral appeals are sometimes frustrated, and
even if people were persuaded to put the interests of the larger community
ahead of their own, the problem of knowing how best to do so would remain.
Economists recognize that people will behave consistently in ways that are
simultaneously self-interested and socially cooperative only when market incentives are permitted to reward that behavior. But this means that not just
any incentives will do; they have to be incentives that embody information on
the best course of action. Next month I will examine the eect of incentives
on human action.

5

Specialization and Wealth

August 1, 1998

Last month I explained how a remarkable degree of social cooperation
emerges through market communication. This month, let's consider some of
the advantages we realize from that cooperation. At a general level these advantages are obvious. It simply makes sense that we can produce more if our
actions are in harmony than if we are working at cross-purposes. But to really understand economics, we must consider the link between cooperation and
productivity in detail.
Wealth seldom comes as manna from heaven.

It has to be produced by

applying human eort, intelligence, and patience to natural endowments that
yield their bounty reluctantly.

This should be obvious.

But one measure of

the success of the marketplace at improving our productive powers is that
it has become all too easy for people to assume that wealth is part of the
natural order of things. Academics and policy wonks consider the distribution
of wealth to be the primary issue, while dismissing any concern that their
policy prescriptions could hamper its production. They drone on and on about
the causes of poverty (or the improper distribution of wealth), apparently
unaware that determining the causes of wealth is the serious challenge. The
success of capitalism has blinded a remarkable number of otherwise intelligent
people to the simple truth that distribution comes before production only in
the dictionary.

Specialization's Special Role
When economics emerged as a separate academic discipline in the late eighteenth century, it was obvious what the economic problem was. Adam Smith
titled his economics book An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations, and his concern with explaining wealth is apparent from the very
rst page.
Smith begins by observing: The greatest improvement in the productive
powers of labour...seem[s] to be the eects of the division of labour. He illus-

trates the importance of specialization, or the division of labor, by considering
the advantage of having each worker in a pin factory concentrate on a particular step in production rather than producing a pin from beginning to end.
Through specialization workers can become more skillful, use machinery that
increases their productive powers, and avoid the loss of time from constantly
changing activities. These advantages are rather obvious, but the increase in
productivity is far greater than one would expect.

According to Smith, ten

pin-makers, by specializing in dierent tasks, can produce about forty-eight
thousand pins a day. But if each attempted to perform every task in pin production, Smith doubted that they could each make twenty pins a day, or two
hundred among them.
But it takes more than extra output to create a real increase in productivity.
A specialist produces much more of a product, or part of a product, than
he wishes to consume himself.

Producing lots of output is not productive

unless it ends up in the hands of those who value it.

So the advantage of

specialization can be realized only to the degree that people can cooperate,
with each specializing in the production of something that others want in order
to be able to acquire what he wants from the specialized production of others.
The only way for this cooperation to occur, and thus the only way to realize
the productivity of specialization, is through exchange.
Adam Smith recognized the crucial connection between exchange and productivity when he observed that the extent of this division [of labor] must
always be limited by...the extent of the market. If you can exchange only with
those in a small village, your ability to specialize productively is extremely
limited. For example, how many could aord to pursue careers writing novels,
painting landscapes, or mastering musical instruments, no matter how great
their talents, with only a few people to appreciate and reward their accomplishments? In such settings, most people tend to become a jack-of-all trades,
but master of none. The more limited the market, the more limited the productive potential of specialization.

Expanding the Market
The link between specialization and the size of the market provides another
explanation of the importance of market cooperation based on private property and voluntary exchange. Cooperation is possible without markets, at least
without markets as we normally think of them. Family members cooperate on
the basis of intimate knowledge and shared concerns. Members of small rms
can work cooperatively in response to a common objective and peer pressures.
The same can be said for churches, clubs, and other relatively small social organizations. The cooperation within families, rms, and social organizations can
be explained as the result of exchange relationships. (Gary Becker's writings
on the family and the depiction of the rm as a nexus of contracts are good
examples of such explanations.) But such relationships, because they depend
on personal association and common objectives, are limited to relatively small
groups.
A key to the productivity of the market is that it greatly extends the range
7

of cooperation, and therefore greatly increases our ability to specialize productively. Obviously the expansion of markets has depended on improvements
in transportation and communication networks. But without the information
communicated through market prices, and the cooperation motivated by these
prices, improvements in transportation and verbal and written communication
would be insucient to realize much of the advantage of specialization. Brazilians could communicate their desire for more denim clothing with a steady
barrage of faxes, e-mails, and telephone calls to clothing manufacturers in every country in the world, with it being possible to ship the clothing to them
overnight from anywhere on the globe. But without the information communicated by changes in relative market prices, Brazilians would be unable to
motivate cotton growers, agricultural chemical producers, dye manufacturers,
textile workers, truck drivers, airline pilots, merchants, and countless others to
coordinate their specialized eorts to make sure that the denim clothing was
made available in Brazil in the desired quantities and preferred styles.

The Impersonal Market
The market is often criticized as impersonal.

It can be, but that's why it

so greatly extends the range of cooperative specialization. People don't have
to know, or care for, those they are cooperating with, or those whom their
cooperative eorts are serving, when they respond to market prices.
The market does far more to foster multicultural cooperation and global
harmony than can ever be achieved by the personal eorts of government
diplomats.

It is the cooperation and harmony of the marketplace, and the

specialization that it allows, that explain the creation of wealth.
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Demand and Supply

October 1, 1998

No series on the basic notions of economics can continue long without introducing demand and supply. These concepts, as illustrated with demand and
supply curves, are fundamental to how economists understand economic behavior. In particular, with the use of demand and supply curves, I can supplement
in concise and powerful ways my previous discussion of the communication,
cooperation, and coordination of the marketplace.

The Basics of Demand and Supply
Although a complete discussion of demand and supply curves has to consider
a number of complexities and qualications, the essential notions behind these
curves are straightforward. The demand curve is based on the observation that
the lower the price of a product, the more of it people will demand.

There

may be occasional exceptions to this behavior (and indeed economists have
developed the theoretical possibility of such an exception), but they are so
few and transient that economists refer to the negative relationship between
price and quantity demanded as the law of demand. Because of the law of
demand, demand curves (such as D in the gure) are always shown as downward
sloping, with the price on the vertical axis and the quantity demanded (over
some period) on the horizontal axis.
The basic notion behind the supply curve is that the higher the price of
a product, the more of it producers will supply. In other words, as with the
curve S in the gure, supply curves are upward sloping. A justication for this
upward-sloping relationship between price and quantity supplied is that the cost
of producing additional units of the product increases as more is produced. So
it takes a higher price to motivate additional output. But this is not necessarily
the case when there is time for new rms to enter an industry, or for existing
rms to expand their plant size. Such long-run adjustments to a higher price
can permit more of the product to be made available at the original cost (or even
a lower cost), in which case the supply is horizontal (or negatively sloped). But

over periods of time that can extend to several months or more, it is reasonable
to assume that supply curves slope upward.
Obviously, a lot of things aect the amount of a product that will be demanded and supplied besides its price. But for any set of demand and supply
curves, all of these other inuences are held constant, since the purpose of the
analysis is to allow us to concentrate on the eects of the product's price on
the amount demanded and supplied.

Communicating through the Market
The simple diagram here allows us to consider the most important insight from
demand and supply analysis, which is how people coordinate their decisions by
communicating through market prices.

Assume that we start o with a price for denim jeans given by P1 in the
gure. The most important thing about that price from an economist's perspective is that it fails to coordinate the decisions of suppliers and consumers.
At price P1 suppliers are willing to supply only QS pairs of jeans, but consumers want to buy QD pairs. Consumers will be frustrated because they are
unable to obtain all the jeans they want at the prevailing price, and in response
to this frustration they will start bidding up the price of jeans relative to the
price of other products. By doing so, they communicate to suppliers that they
want more resources devoted to the production of additional jeans because they
are worth more than what those resources are currently producing elsewhere.
Suppliers respond appropriately to this information by moving up the supply
curve, increasing the availability of jeans.
But the increase in price does more than communicate information from
consumers to suppliers. It also is the means by which consumers communicate
valuable information to one another. As consumers bid up the price of denim
jeans, they are telling each other that these jeans are in short supply and that
everyone should economize on their use, take better care of the ones they have,
use substitute clothing, and so on. And consumers respond appropriately to
this information by backing up the demand curve as they reduce the number
of jeans they demand. This process continues to increase the price of denim
jeans until it reaches P* in the gure, the price determined by the intersection
10

of the demand and supply curves.

This price is often called the equilibrium

price, because at P* there is no pressure for the price either to increase or
decrease. (Our discussion could have started at a price greater than P* and
the communication would have taken the form of price decreases.) At P* we can
clearly observe the miracle of market communication and cooperation. Millions
of people pursuing their private advantages as consumers and producers, with
almost no direct knowledge of, or interest in, the concerns and circumstances of
others, are led to a completely coordinated pattern of decisions by responding to
the information contained in market prices. Each consumer decides to consume
an amount perfectly compatible with the amounts that all other consumers are
deciding to consume and all producers are deciding to supply.

It's the Process
The equilibrium price, along with the equilibrium quantity Q* in the gure, is
typically presented as the most important feature of demand and supply analysis. But seldom do real-world markets ever get to equilibrium. The world is
constantly changing, and demand and supply curves constantly shift. Equilibrium is a moving target. The most important insight from demand and supply
analysis is that the market process is constantly directing people to accommodate one another in ways that move them toward the coordination represented
by equilibrium, and not just for one product, such as denim jeans, but for thousands of products. Things may not stay still long enough for equilibrium to be
reached in any market. But freedom and market communication accomplish a
pattern of cooperation that can never be duplicated by the coercion of central
planning.
One of the best ways to appreciate the coordination and cooperation of
market communication is by considering the problems that arise when political
authorities censor it with price controls. In my next three columns, I'll use the
demand-and-supply framework to examine those problems in detail.

11

Price Ceilings Cause Shortages and Higher Costs

November 1, 1998

The coordination of demand and supply, which we discussed last month,
does not occur automatically. It is an example of Adam Smith's invisible hand,
which leads people interested only in pursuing their own interests to make
choices that promote the interests of others as well. But the invisible hand, as
amazing as it is, works only under certain conditions. Without property rights,
a defense against the violation of those rights from both external and internal
threats, a predictable judiciary, a stable monetary system, and a limited government, the voluntary exchange on which social coordination depends quickly
breaks down.
Government has important roles in protecting private property, preventing
capricious judicial decisions, and protecting the monetary unit against debasement. But these functions can be performed eectively only by a limited government. Once government goes beyond protecting voluntary exchange as an
impartial referee and attempts to determine particular outcomes, it disrupts
the social cooperation that is the surest means to generally desirable outcomes.
Examples of disruptive government incursions into market activity are unfortunately frequent. A particularly harmful form of government meddling is the
attempt to outlaw market prices.
When most people think of market prices they don't think of the communication and cooperation those prices allow. Consumers typically see prices as
too high and therefore an impediment to their desire for more things. Suppliers
see the same prices as too low. What happens when the government responds
to consumer pressures by imposing a maximum legal price on a product below
the price the market would set? The unfortunate, and ironic, result of a price
ceiling is to increase the cost of products to consumers.

In the accompanying gure the demand curve, D, and supply curve, S,
determine a price P*, which the market tends toward. As I discussed in last
month's column, P* motivates suppliers to make available exactly that amount,
Q*, that consumers want at that price.

This ability of millions of people to

coordinate their decisions with one another is the result of the information
they communicate through market prices. Now consider what happens when
the government imposes a price ceiling below P*, say at PC.
At that price suppliers are willing to make available only QS units of the
product, while consumers are anxious to buy QD units. The result is a shortage,
as consumers cannot get as much of the product as they want. Shortagethe
inability to buy a product although one has the money in handis dierent
from scarcity, which we can dene as the inability of people to have as much as
they would like at a zero price. Scarcity is an unavoidable feature of the real
world; shortages are not. Any shortage would be eliminated by the price generated by market communication, so shortages are always created by government
restrictions on market prices.
Advocates of price ceilings claim that they lower the cost of the product
for consumers.

This claim seems plausible since the price consumers pay is

PC after the ceiling is imposed instead of P*. But you can't lower the cost to
consumers by restricting the price communication that allows them to secure
the maximum cooperation from suppliers. Indeed, price ceilings increase the
consumers' cost.

Since the height of the demand curve tells us how much

consumers are willing to pay for another unit of the product, we can see from
the gure that when only QS units of the product are available, consumers are
willing to pay Pm rather than do without. And just because they can't legally
pay that amount in dollars doesn't mean they won't pay it in other ways.
For example, one way consumers compete during shortages is on the basis of
rst-come, rst-served. According to Hedrick Smith's book The Russians, the
average housewife in the former Soviet Union spent 14 hours a week queuing up
for products because of the shortages created by pervasive price ceilings. How
long will people queue up for an additional unit of a price-controlled product?
Until the cost of doing so is equal to the dierence between what they are
willing to pay, PM, and the price ceiling, PC. So the total monetary and time
cost will tend toward Pm, which is more than consumers would pay without
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the price ceiling.

The consumers pay more, but notice, the suppliers don't

receive more. The higher amount consumers pay does nothing to communicate
to suppliers that more should be made available.
Another common cost-increasing response to price ceilings is reduced quality. While suppliers cannot legally benet from the excess demand (QD  QS)
by raising the price above PC, they can reduce the quality of the product,
which reduces their costs. The reduction in quality can take many forms, and
is often tied in with the queuing just discussed.
Rent controls cause a deterioration in the quality of apartments.

When

landlords have more demand than they can satisfy, and are unable legally to
charge higher rents, they reduce costs by doing less to maintain their apartments. New York City once tried to solve this problem with its rent-control law
by exempting tenants from paying the rent if their apartments were damaged.
Not surprisingly, tenants began breaking windows and ripping up carpets to
avoid paying the rent.
Of course, some consumers come out ahead under price ceilings. With lots
of people anxious to buy at the controlled price, it doesn't cost suppliers much
to discriminate against certain people. Those whom suppliers favor often get
products at lower prices without long waits. For example, celebrities and the
politically well-connected have no trouble obtaining rent-controlled apartments
in New York City, while others end up doing without.
But most consumers are harmed by price ceilings. This is hardly surprising
since price ceilings prevent consumers from communicating with suppliers in
ways that motivate the best possible response to their demands.
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Price Floors, Surpluses, and the Minimum Wage

December 1, 1998

Last month I discussed the distorting eects of government-imposed price
ceilings. Not content to limit the disruptive impact on economic decisions to
price ceilings, governments are also quite willing to impose oors under which
prices cannot legally fall. Like price ceilings, price oors disrupt market cooperation and have consequences quite dierent from those advertised by their advocates. Before considering an example of price oorsminimum wageslet's
examine the problem in general terms.

Creating Surpluses

The standard downward-sloping demand curve, D, and upward-sloping supply curve, S, are shown in the nearby gure. As discussed in my column on
demand and supply two months ago, these two curves determine an equilibrium
price, P*, that coordinates the decisions of all consumers and suppliers. At P*
consumers want to purchase exactly the amount that suppliers want to sell.
Despite the amazing coordination that results from the equilibrium price,
politicians are often convinced by organized interests that some suppliers should

receive higher prices. Interestingly, as we shall see, those who lobby for higher
prices are not always the ones who will receive them.

But regardless of the

source of the pressure, the political response is often to impose a price oor,
such as PF in the gure.
With PF being the lowest price that can be legally charged, suppliers are
anxious to sell QS units of the product. But at PF, consumers are willing to
buy only QD units. The result is a surplus given by the dierence between QS
and QD. The appropriate response to a surplus is some combination of reduced
supply and increased consumption. In a free market, suppliers communicate
their frustration at not being able to sell all they would like by lowering the
price they charge.

As the price declines below PF, consumers increase their

consumption and suppliers reduce their production. This mutual adjustment
continues until the price reaches P*, where producer and consumer decisions
are perfectly coordinated. But the price oor, PF, blocks that communication
between suppliers and consumers, preventing them from responding to the
surplus in a mutually appropriate way.

Suppliers Can Be Worse O
Consumers are clearly made worse o by price oors. They are forced to pay
higher prices and consume smaller quantities than they would with free-market
prices. But price oors can also make suppliers worse o. Some suppliers can
benet from a price oor if they can sell all, or most, of the quantity they would
like at that price, but then other suppliers will be even less able to sell as much
as they desire.
Only if all suppliers of a product can sell as much as they want at the
price oor is it possible for them to be better o as a group, and then only
temporarily. Farmers favored price supports for crops because the federal government stood ready to purchase the supply that farmers couldn't sell at the
above-market price.

But even in this case, the benet to suppliers was only

temporary since competition among farmers increased the cost of doing business. For example, the lure of above-market prices prompted farmers to bid up
the price of land. That is, the price of land incorporated the benets of the price
supports. Those who owned good farmland before the programs started won
windfall benets, but those who entered farming afterward and paid inated
land prices did not.

The Minimum Wage
A good example of how price oors can harm the very people who are supposed
to be helped by undermining economic cooperation is the minimum wage. Legislating a minimum wage is commonly seen as an eective way of giving raises
to low-wage workers. Unfortunately, it, like any price oor, creates a surplus.
In this case, it is a surplus of workers (suppliers of labor), more of whom are
willing to work in minimum-wage jobs than there are employers (demanders)
willing to hire at that wage. We call a surplus caused by the minimum wage
unemployment.
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A wage oor hits workers with limited skills, primarily young people. According to The Economist, in 1997 the average unemployment rate among
workers under 25 was three times greater than the average unemployment rate
among those 25 or older (June 27, 1998). Young people are best able to improve
their economic prospects by developing skills that increase their productivity.
For those with the fewest advantages, the best hope is work experience and onthe-job training. The minimum wage reduces the number of people employers
will hire for what is essentially training.
Consider also that the minimum wage reduces the cost of discriminating
on non-economic grounds in hiring. With more young people applying for jobs
than employers want to hire, and with no legal way of paying a lower wage, it
costs nothing to exclude some applicants from consideration. If an employer
has a choice between hiring the mayor's son or a poor kid from the other side
of the tracks who would be willing to work for less, the mayor's son is almost
sure to get the job.
The young person from an auent family can expect to have connections
that make it possible for him to get a minimum-wage job before heading o
to college, or a part-time minimum-wage job while in college.

The poor kid

whose education in an inner-city public school makes going to college unlikely,
and whose best hope for gaining skills is job experience, is less likely to get a
job because of the minimum wage. This kid would have a far better chance
if he could communicate his willingness to work by accepting the lower wage
that is now outlawed. It should surprise no one that the unemployment rate
for nonwhite teenagers is several times the rate for white teenagers.
The political demand for the minimum wage does not come from low-wage
workers. Today labor unions are the most active supporters of increasing the
minimum wage. Unskilled nonunion workers can compete with skilled union
workers only by oering their services for less. Increasing the minimum wage
limits this competition, allowing union workers to demand higher wages than
would otherwise be possible.
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Opportunities and Costs

March 1, 1999

My previous columns have been devoted to an overview of how markets work
by facilitating social cooperation: providing people with the information and
motivation to pursue their own advantages in ways that best create opportunities for others. My emphasis has been on the forest rather than the individual
trees of economic understanding.

Now I shall begin looking at some of the

key concepts essential to applying economic reasoning to all human activity. I
begin with opportunity cost.

Limits and Opportunities
Economics has been called the Dismal Science because it studies the most
fundamental of all problemsscarcity. Because of scarcity we all face the dismal
reality that there are limits to what we can do. No matter how productive we
become, we can never accomplish and enjoy as much as we would like. The only
thing we can do without limit is desire more. Because of scarcity, every time
we do one thing, we necessarily have to forgo doing something else desirable.
So there is an opportunity cost to everything we do, and that cost is expressed
in terms of the most valuable alternative that is sacriced.
Eliminate the opportunity to choose among alternatives and there are no
costs. But the pervasiveness of costs suggests that the dismal reality of limits
is only one side of a coin with a brighter side.

The limits of scarcity create

costs only when there are opportunities. Eliminate the opportunity to choose
among alternatives and there are no costs.

If, for example, I am forced to

live in a particular house, take a particular job, marry a particular woman,
and consume a set bundle of goods, I incur no costs when I do those things.
So the bright side of costs is the opportunities that create them. Expand our
opportunities, and the costs of everything we do increase.
Although we commonly see cost as something to avoid, in fact we are better
o living in an economy where we are forced to confront the cost of everything
we do. I personally might be better o if I could consume products without

having to consider their costs because I could shift them to others. But any
advantage I could realize would be more than oset if others could ignore the
costs of their activities and shift them to me. As a result, we would all lack the
information and motivation to choose wisely. Only when the costs of choices
are imposed on those who make those choices can we best use the opportunities
available.
This is one way of explaining the advantage of market prices. The prices
people pay in the marketplace reect the opportunity costs of their choices.
You cannot generally purchase a good or service in a free market for less than
others are willing to pay for it, or for less than the amount spent to make it
available, which is an important part of the social cooperation that emerges
out of market transactions.

Special Interests Don't Want Costs Considered
Unfortunately, many economic decisions are made, not in a market setting in
response to market prices, but by government in response to political considerations.

This creates opportunities for the politically inuential to acquire

benets paid for by the general public. Invariably, those seeking political benets downplay the costs in the hope of justifying larger expenditures; they
commonly argue that some things are so important that costs shouldn't even
be considered.
Educators argue that education is too important to be considered in terms
of costs; environmentalists argue that saving the earth is so imperative that
environmental programs should be implemented regardless of the costs; recipients of medical research grants argue that human health trumps any crass
consideration of costs; and people supported by the National Endowment for
the Arts claim that the value of art goes to the very soul of what it means to be
human and is contaminated when compared with dollars and cents. (That's
a close paraphrase of a statement on arts funding that I heard on National
Public Radio.)
All these statements are best understood as attempts by organized groups
to capture more public money. To consider costs has nothing to do with exaggerating the importance of money.

Money provides a convenient way of

expressing costs, but money is not the cost of anything. When I put down a
ten-dollar bill to pay for a meal, the money may appear to be the cost, but the
real cost is the opportunity costthe subjective value I forgo by spending the
money on the meal rather than spending it on the most valuable alternative.

Silly Claims
To claim that we shouldn't consider the cost of doing some things is equivalent
to claiming that we should do those things without considering the alternatives.
That such a transparently silly claim continues to be used in special-interest
pleading illustrates the power of deception over logic in political debate. Not
considering the alternatives to doing something would make sense only if it were
always more valuable than anything else. But this means that we should devote
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all of our resources to this one thing. If it were really true that ne orchestral
music, for example, was so valuable that costs shouldn't be considered, then
everyone should go homeless and hungry and spend all of their time listening
to orchestras in the nude. This is obviously silly, but not one bit sillier than
claiming that something is so important that it is inappropriate to consider its
cost.
To claim that we shouldn't consider the cost of doing some things is equivalent to claiming that we should do those things without considering the alternative. As soon as two or more groups claim that their program should be funded
without considering costs, the relevance of costs should be obvious. Educating
our youth and curing our sick cannot both be too important to consider cost,
not in a world of scarcity. The cost of doing more to educate our youth is doing
less to cure our sick, and vice versa. To ignore the cost of one is to treat the
other as unworthy in comparison.
Of course, the reality of scarcity, and the opportunity costs that result, intrudes into the political process despite the special-interest rhetoric disparaging
considerations of cost. Comparisons have to be made among competing alternatives, so opportunity costs are considered in the political process. Unfortunately, imperfections and biases in the political process prevent the opportunity
cost of government action from being adequately considered. The result is what
one should expect when alternatives are poorly considered. Waste occurs as
decisions direct resources out of more valuable and into less valuable activities,
and often into activities counterproductive to the stated objectives.
Market prices do not perfectly reect opportunity costs, but one can appreciate how close they get by considering the perversities that arise because
political decisions often ignore most of the costs of a policy. I shall consider
this problem next month as a way of further illustrating the importance of
opportunity costs in understanding economics.
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In the Absence of Private Property Rights

July 1, 1999

We commonly benet from things we neither understand nor appreciate.
Obviously there are advantages in beneting from a wide range of things without having to give them much thought. But the danger is that such neglect can
often cause us great harm. Good health is an example. For most people, good
health is easy to take for granted, and this often results in harmful patterns of
behavior. In the case of health, however, most people know something about
the risks of unhealthy behavior, and recognize the advantage of healthy habits
even if they don't practice them.
Unfortunately, this is not true for maintaining a healthy economy.

The

productivity and cooperation essential to economic
progress depend on things that are not only easily neglected, but also commonly denounced. Private property is a good example. Instead of recognizing
private property as the foundation of economic cooperation and progress, people commonly see it as the source of economic problems actually caused by the
lack of well-dened and enforced private-property rights.

Pollution and Private Property
Pollution is widely blamed on capitalism, with its emphasis on prots and
private property. According to this view, private property rights should be restricted to prevent rms and individuals from putting their private gain ahead
of the public's interest in a clean environment.

But pollution is actually a

problem caused by too little reliance on property rights, not too much. Pollution problems should teach us how much we benet from private property by
illustrating the inevitable breakdown in social cooperation in its absence.
Pollution problems would not exist if we could divide up the atmosphere,
rivers, and oceans into separate units owned and controlled as private property.
There would still be pollution, but not excessive pollution.

If I wanted to

discharge pollutants into the air that belonged to others, they would prevent
me from doing so unless I paid them a price that covered the cost my pollution

imposed on them. So I would pollute only as long as the value I realized from
discharging an additional unit of pollutant was at least as great as the cost
to others. Private property and the market prices that result would motivate
people to take into consideration the environmental concerns of others.
Pollution problems exist because without private property in air sheds and
waterways there are no market prices to make polluters mindful of the cost of
their polluting activities. The result is that people pollute excessively; pollution
continues even though the benets from additional pollution are less than the
costs.
Although we cannot easily imagine treating the atmosphere and waterways
as private property, the lack of cooperation that underlies pollution problems
would extend to all aspects of human action if private property were absent.
Instead of seeing pollution problems as an indictment of private property, these
problems should give us an appreciation of the wonderful advantages we realize
from private property. And once the power of private property to promote cooperation is realized, one can see how pollution policy can be improved through
the creative establishment of private property.
Instead of having political authorities dictate how, and how much, polluters have to reduce their discharges (as they do now), it would be far better
to create a form of private property in the use of the environment for waste
disposal. This private property would take the form of transferable pollution
permits specifying how much their owners could legally pollute. These permits
would establish the total allowable pollution, but not how much each polluter
reduces his discharges or how he does so. With transferable permits, market
prices would emerge that force polluters to consider much of the cost of their
discharges.

Those who could reduce discharges cheaply would reduce a lot,

releasing permits to be used by those facing higher cleanup costs. The result
would be a pattern of pollution reduction that yields any given level of environmental quality at far less cost than the command-and-control approach that
dominates current policy. (A more detailed discussion of the advantages of such
a market-based approach to pollution control has to await a future column.)

Private Property and Patience
Another common misconception is that the prots from private property motivate people to ignore the long-run consequences of their actions. Actually, the
lack of private property is the biggest threat to future concerns. Consider the
captain of a whaling ship who has a whale in the cross hairs of his harpoon.
The captain is about to pull the trigger when his rst ocer points out that
the whale is pregnant and if they let it live there will be two whales within
a few months. Will the captain save the whale on hearing this information?
Not likely. He will correctly conclude that since he has no property right in
the whale, if he doesn't kill it today someone else soon will.

Being patient

and allowing the whale to give birth requires an immediate sacrice, without
permitting him to benet from that sacrice in the future. If somehow whales
were privately owned, it would then pay the captain to take the future value
of the whale and her ospring into consideration, since that future value would
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be his opportunity cost of killing the whale today.
It is no wonder that many species of wild animals are overexploited, and in
some cases threatened with extinction. The situation is very dierent with domestic animals that are privately owned. There is no worry that chickens, pigs,
cows, or goats will be driven to extinction. The future value of these animals is
fully considered by owners who can prot from maintaining them. Indeed, the
more of these animals we kill, the more of them we have. In the United States
alone, approximately 25 million chickens are killed and eaten every day. It has
been said that the dierence between chicken hawks and people is that when
chicken hawks eat more chickens there are fewer chickens, but when people eat
more chickens there are more chickens.

The more fundamental dierence is

that people establish private property rights and, as a result, take the future
into consideration; chicken hawks don't.
Unfortunately, legislation such as the Endangered Species Act attempts to
protect species by undermining private property rights, thereby reducing the
motivation of land owners to provide suitable habitat for wildlife, endangered
or not.
Private property allows us to solve problems by taking into consideration
the present and future concerns of others.

Unfortunately, people with good

intentions but little economic understanding often call for solving problems
stemming from inadequate private property by subverting rights to private
property with political restrictions and mandates.
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Comparative Advantage

October 1, 1999

One of the most powerful and straightforward economic concepts is comparative advantage. As important and simple as this concept is, however, it
seldom seems to inform public discussions of international trade. Almost everyone knows that we can't compete with countries that have cheap laborif
we have free trade with such countries either wages will be driven down or
many workers will lose their jobs. As Will Rogers once observed, It's not what
people don't know that is the problem, it is what they do know that's not true.
Understanding comparative advantage has the same eect on concerns about
free trade as water had on the Wicked Witch of the West. Free trade with other
countries (regardless of how much or little their workers are paid) doesn't increase unemployment or lower wages. Indeed, one of the best ways of increasing
the wages of U.S. workers is by allowing them to compete with workers (even
very low paid workers) in other countries through free trade.

Absolute Versus Comparative Advantage
The most straightforward case for free trade is that countries have dierent
absolute advantages in producing goods. For example, because of dierences
in soil and climate, the United States is better at producing wheat than Brazil,
and Brazil is better at producing coee than the United States.

Obviously

both countries are better o when Americans produce wheat and exchange a
portion of it for some of the coee that Brazilians produce.
But does this mean that a country with an absolute advantage in the production of a good should always produce that good rather than import it? No,
as the English economist David Ricardo rst explained in the early 1800s. A
country can have an absolute advantage in the production of a good without
having a comparative advantage. Comparative advantage is what determines
whether it pays to produce a good or import it.
Assume that there are only two goods, cars and computers, and one productive resource which is some composite of land, labor, and capital. Assume

also that producing 100 cars requires two units of the productive resource (PR)
in the United States and four units in Brazil, and producing 1,000 computers
requires three units of PR in the United States and four in Brazil. Thus:

U.S.

Brazil

100 cars

2

4

1,000 computers

3

4

Americans have an absolute advantage in producing both cars and computers.
It may seem that Americans can realize no gain by trading with Brazilians.
Why not produce both cars and computers here?

Because it costs more to

produce computers in the United States than in Brazil. All costs are opportunity costs. The cost of producing computers is the cars that could have been
produced. Using the three units of PR required to produce 1,000 computers in
the United States requires sacricing the production of 150 cars. Using the four
units of PR required to produce 1,000 computers in Brazil requires sacricing
only 100 cars.
So even though Americans have an absolute advantage in producing computers, Brazilians have a comparative advantage. Compared to what has to be
sacriced, Brazil produces computers for only two-thirds as much as it costs
in the United States. The United States, of course, has a comparative advantage over Brazil in the production of cars. Producing 100 cars here costs 666
computers, while producing 100 cars in Brazil costs 1,000 computers.
Clearly the United States benets from specializing in cars, which it produces more cheaply than Brazil, and trading with Brazil for some of the computers it produces more cheaply. If, for example, the United States produced
both cars and computers it might devote 70 units of PR to car production and
30 units to computer production, yielding 3,500 cars and 10,000 computers. If
Brazil produced both products, it might devote 56 units of PR to car production and 24 to computer production, yielding 1,400 cars and 6,000 computers.
On the other hand, by specializing in their comparative advantages, the United
States can produce 5,000 cars and Brazil can produce 20,000 computers, or a
total of 100 additional cars and 4,000 additional computers. The United States
could trade 1,450 cars to Brazil for 12,500 computers and have 50 additional
cars (3,550) and 2,500 more computers (12,500), while Brazil would have 50
more cars (1,450) and 1,500 more computers (7,500). Trade is productive since
it generates more output of both products.

Low Wages Don't Mean Low Cost
Notice that in determining that it is less costly to produce cars in the United
States and computers in Brazil, we never mentioned how much U.S. or Brazilian
workers are paid. Workers in the United States will be paid more than those in
Brazil because they are more productive in our example. So in terms of output,
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lower wages don't mean lower costs. Indeed, asking whether U.S. or Brazilian
workers are less costly ignores the relevant question: less costly doing what?
U.S. workers are less costly at producing cars, but Brazilian workers are less
costly at producing computers. This is true no matter what U.S. and Brazilian
workers are paid.
Moreover, free trade does not cause unemployment in either the United
States or Brazil. True, free trade eliminates U.S. jobs in the computer industry
and Brazilian jobs in the car industry, but it increases U.S. jobs in the car
industry and Brazilian jobs in the computer industry.
Furthermore, the jobs that free trade eliminates are lower-paying jobs than
the ones it creates.

Without free trade, the United States and Brazil would

each employ workers who produce both cars and computers. This means that
many workers in each country would be doing jobs in which they do not have
a comparative advantage, and therefore in which they are less productive than
they could be. With free trade these workers would be directed into more jobs
where they are more productive and receive higher pay, since the compensation
workers receive ultimately depends on how productive they are.
The concept of comparative advantage is deceptively simple. Tiger Woods
surely has the potential of being one of the best caddies in the world.

How

many people could give you better advice on lining up a putt or selecting a
club? He has an absolute advantage. But everyone knows that the opportunity
cost to Tiger Woods of becoming a caddie is too high to make that a sensible
option. He would be sacricing the return from being a professional golfer, the
activity in which he has a strong comparative advantage. Understanding why
Tiger Woods doesn't become a caddie is enough to understand why high-paid
U.S. workers benet when free trade puts them in competition with lower-paid
foreign workers.
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Comparative Advantage Continued

November 1, 1999

The concept of comparative advantage, which I began discussing last month,
is a straightforward application of opportunity cost and is almost embarrassingly simple. Certainly people have no trouble understanding and recognizing
the importance of this concept in their own personal lives. For example, if you
were the best brain surgeon in town and also the best at shining shoes, you
would not try to be both a brain surgeon and a shoe shiner.

Compared to

other shoe shiners, you would be at a tremendous disadvantage shining shoes
because of the value of your time performing brain surgery.
People are very good at nding and pursuing their comparative advantages.
This doesn't mean that people are always good at what they do. We have all
seen people working at jobs they can't do well.

It could be, of course, that

they have made a mistake and will quickly move on to something they do
better. But that clumsy waiter who keeps spilling hot soup on his customers
may have a comparative advantage at being a waiter. He could be even worse
at everything else.

So just as you can be really good at something without

having a comparative advantage in it, you can have a comparative advantage
at something you don't do very well.
While people seem to understand comparative advantage when making personal choices, they often put this understanding on hold when accepting arguments against international trade. For example, last month I explained why the
widely accepted argument that countries with low-paid workers will be able to
outcompete us in all goods is wrong. I shall now consider a related, and widely
accepted, argument against free trade, and explain the fallacy it contains by
modifying the example in last month's column.

Being the Best May Not Be Good Enough
A common complaint by domestic producers is that foreign rms that suddenly
begin outcompeting them must be selling below cost. They can often support
their case by pointing out that the foreign rms were previously uncompetitive

and have not improved their eciency one bit. So how can these rms possibly be competitive now? It may seem strange that rms unable to compete
earlier are suddenly able to without becoming more productive. But it is not
strange at all. Foreign rms don't have to become more productive to acquire
a comparative advantage over domestic rms.
Consider the table on the next page, which contains last month's example (ignore the number in parentheses for now). Americans have a comparative
advantage only in car production even though they are absolutely more productive than Brazilians at producing both cars and computers. The opportunity
cost of producing 100 cars is 666 computers in the United States and 1,000
computers in Brazil.

But the other side of this coin is that Americans have

a comparative disadvantage in producing computers, which means Brazilians
have a comparative advantage in computer production. While it costs 150 cars
to produce 1,000 computers in the United States, it costs only 100 cars in
Brazil.
So, as explained last month, both countries are better o when Americans
specialize in cars, Brazilians specialize in computers, and they trade with each
other. Free trade moves resources into each country's comparative advantage,
thereby increasing total output.
But assume that an entrepreneur develops a better way of manufacturing
computers in the United States: it now requires only 1.5 units of productive
resources to produce 1,000 computers. U.S. car manufacturers are just as productive absolutely as before, and no productivity improvements are made in
Brazil. But now, the comparative advantage in the United States has shifted to
computers, with the absolute advantage in cars becoming a comparative disadvantage. It now costs 1,333 computers to produce 100 cars in the United States
as opposed to only 1,000 in Brazil. Under free trade U.S. computer manufacturers are able to outcompete car manufacturers for resources as consumers in
both countries nd it cheaper to buy computers from the United States and
cars from Brazil.

Both countries are now better o than before, since trade

allows the benet from more ecient computer production to be fully realized.

U.S.

Brazil

100 cars

2 units of resources

4

1,000 computers

3 (1.5)

4

True, U.S. unemployment may increase temporarily, as workers in the declining car industry move to jobs in the expanding computer industry.

And

U.S. car manufacturing will lose money, an unmistakable incentive to move
resources to more productive uses. So expect U.S. car manufacturers and their
labor unions to complain that the competition putting them out of business
cannot possibly be fair because they are still two times more productive than
Brazilian car manufacturers. Obviously the Brazilians must be selling below
costdumping cars in America. But Brazil does not have to sell cars below
cost to outcompete U.S. car producers. Americans may be twice as productive
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manufacturing cars than Brazilians, but it is now 2.66 times more productive manufacturing computers. So the opportunity cost of producing cars in
Brazil has become lower than in the United States. There is no legitimate complaint about Brazilian competition. In fact, the real competition is not coming
from Brazil at all, but from other Americans. Brazil has done nothing new in
our example. The competition facing U.S. car producers is coming from the
more productive opportunity the U.S. computer industry is oering workers
and resource owners. Car producers simply cannot aord to pay workers (and
resource owners) enough to cover their increased opportunity cost given their
comparative advantage in producing computers.

Self-Serving Claims
We can now see the self-serving silliness in the claim by industries having to
lay o workers because of foreign imports that free trade will cause massive
unemployment.

If this were true, the opportunity cost of workers would be

reduced by trade and they could be protably re-employed at low cost by the
declining industry.

The problem declining industries have with free trade is

that trade increases employment opportunities, not that it diminishes them.
Our discussion of international trade has ignored many real-world complexities.

For example, we observe countries producing and importing the same

product, as opposed to our example where countries import only what they
don't produce. To explain how both producing and importing the same product is consistent with pursuing one's comparative advantage we will have to
examine the concept of marginalism, which will be done in a subsequent column. But our discussion goes a long way to dispel common myths about the
dangers of free trade.
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The Hidden Cost of Taxation
March 1, 2000

In my last column I pointed to the harm government typically does when it
attempts to promote prosperity by creating jobs. Such attempts always distort
the market cooperation that directs people into those jobs in which they create the greatest value. But government does have legitimate, though limited,
functions, and performing them requires hiring people. If government connes
itself to its legitimate role and performs eciently, government employees will
produce more value than they can in alternative jobs. Unfortunately, government neither limits itself to its legitimate functions, nor performs eciently.
I shall consider one reason for this government failure, a reason based on a
distortion in the political process. Because the costs of taxation are never fully
considered in political decisions, those decisions are biased in favor of excessive
taxing and spending.
The costs of taxation are dispersed widely. Everyone pays taxes, so when a
general tax is increased it is spread over so many people that no one individual
will nd the increase very burdensome.

Conversely, if the tax is decreased,

no one may perceive a signicant benet. And even if some people do notice
the costs of a tax increase, or the benets of a decrease, an eort to organize
other taxpayers (given their large numbers, geographic dispersion, and diverse
interests) to take eective political action would be dicult.

This helps ex-

plain why the costs of taxation are largely ignored politically. Politicians can
nudge certain taxes up without hearing from taxpayers, except for some brief
grumbling.
Of course, not everyone is politically passive about tax burdens.

Rela-

tively small groups with an intense interest in the burden of particular taxes
are well positioned to inuence policy on those taxes.

The federal tax code

is full of highly specic loopholes for particular industries, and often for particular companies. Also, some general tax breaks, like interest deductions on
mortgages, are seen as promoting a desirable objective (home ownership), are
easily noticed as signicant by taxpayers, and also benet an organized interest
(homebuilders). Thus they are politically popular.

But the tax loopholes permeating almost all tax systems add to insidious
dead weight costs of taxation, which result from distorted economic decisions
caused by all taxes, but aggravated by tax loopholes. These costs are insidious
because besides being widely dispersed, they go undetected even by those who
suer from them. The result is an even greater bias toward excessive taxing
and spending.

The Tax Wedge
All taxes drive a wedge between what buyers pay and sellers receive. Consumers
pay more than producers receive because of sales taxes, and employers pay more
than employees receive because of income taxes.

Thus some production and

eort worth more than it costs is not provided, and the value sacriced is the
dead-weight cost of taxation.

This deadweight cost is greater when the tax

system contains loopholes. When some products or activities are taxed more
heavily than others, people will favor those taxed less even when they are less
valuable than those more heavily taxed. For example, when much of the cost of
a house is deducted from taxable income but not the cost of clothing, people will
sacrice clothing to buy a larger house, even though they value the clothing
more than the additional housing space.

When the prots in one industry

are taxed less than the prots in other industries, people will continue adding
to investments in the low-tax industry even though the additional investment
would create more value in other industries.
Dead-weight costs of taxation go unnoticed, even by those who pay them,
because instead of taking from people what they already have, they take from
people what they would have had, but never get. No one sees the extra value
that would have been created by economic decisions that would have been made
without taxes. The problem here is similar to the one that governments create,
and take advantage of, with tax withholding. When taxes are deducted directly
from our paychecks, few of us pay much attention to just how much we are
paying. Indeed, people often get excited when they overpay their taxes through
withholding and get a refund at the end of the year. The tax withdrawals were
hardly noticed (and neither is the interest lost because the government had the
money), but the refund is obvious and seems to be a gift from the government.
Even though unnoticed, the dead-weight costs of taxation are real and signicant. It has been estimated that the dead-weight costs of the federal government's raising an additional dollar equal 39 cents.1 So for the federal government to obtain an additional dollar, taxpayers have to sacrice $1.39$1.00
taken from them directly, plus another 39 cents in value they could have had
but never will. But because people are unaware of these dead-weight costs, the
political process ignores them, and government decisions that appear ecient
actually destroy wealth.
Consider a government program to create jobs that pay $10 million a year
in salaries. Assume that the government workers who receive these salaries will
create a service worth $12 million a year. This program will be heralded as an
economic success, yielding $2 million above its costs (I assume that the only
input into the program is labor). But the program is a loser, as is obvious once
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the dead-weight costs of taxation are recognized.

Based on the above dead-

weight costs estimate, it will cost approximately $13.9 million dollars to raise
$10 million in tax revenue-$10 million in direct tax payments, plus another $3.9
million in value sacriced because of the economic distortions caused by those
tax payments. So instead of being an economic success, the program destroys
$1.9 million dollars' worth of value a year.

The Seen and Unseen
All public policies have both seen and unseen eects.

Frederic Bastiat, the

nineteenth-century French economist, pointed to many of the economic errors
people make by focusing on the seen and ignoring the unseen.2 Although Bastiat did not discuss the unseen dead-weight costs of taxation (he did point
out that politicians tend to ignore even the direct costs of taxation), there
are few better examples of his general point than taxing and spending. The
benets of government spending are easily seen, and often concentrated on
organized-interest groups that exaggerate them to politicians.

But the costs

of funding the spending, especially the dead-weight costs, are largely unseen.
The result is that the political process overemphasizes the benets of spending,
under-emphasizes the costs, and consistently expands spending to economically
destructive levels.
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Freedom of the Price
May 1, 2000

Last month I explained why our liberties will be steadily eroded without a
genuine commitment to liberty in general.
Fortunately some liberties are widely recognized as crucial and have inuential interests protecting them from political violation. An interesting example is
freedom of speechfreedom against government censorship. Recent examples
of the censorship of politically incorrect speech have occurred on, of all places,
state college campuses, and too much of this censorship remains, even if unocially, despite court decisions outlawing it. But the freedom to communicate in
speech and writing is for the most part protected. If the government attempts
to censor the news media (even in the name of national security) there is an
immediate and powerful outcry from journalists.

(Remember the Pentagon

Papers.) We can be proud of our long tradition of freedom of the press and
appreciative of the journalism profession for helping protect that freedom. At
best, however, journalists deserve only two cheers for resisting censorship, since
they not only condone, but often report sympathetically on, a very pernicious
type of censorship.
As valuable as the communication of the news media is, it is less valuable
than communication through market prices.

As I have explained in earlier

columns, the global cooperation that provides our wealth and protects our
freedoms would be impossible without the information and motivation communicated through market prices. Yet governments routinely distort this communication with policies that force prices above or below what they would be
in a free market. This price censorship violates our right of free expression as
much as government's dictating the content of daily newspapers and TV news.
Minimum-wage laws censor unskilled youth who would like to communicate
with potential employers:

I have few skills and college is not feasible, so I

am willing to work for little now while I have few nancial responsibilities to
acquire the on-the-job training that will allow me to be more productive later.
Agricultural price supports victimize all families by censoring the ability of

farmers to communicate with them.

Without that censorship dairy farmers,

for example, would communicate that they are willing to make more milk
available to children (and adults) by lowering milk prices. This censorship is
particularly harmful to poor families because they devote a larger percentage
of their budgets to basic foods than do wealthy families.
The censorship of rent control prevents people from communicating their
desire for housing space through higher prices. The result is that people who
would be willing to provide additional housing don't have adequate information on how valuable the housing is and little motivation to provide the right
amount even if they did. Rather than helping the poor, who are supposedly
the beneciaries of rent control, the available housing space generally goes to
well-connected nonpoor families; the poor end up with less housing than they
would have been willing to pay for in an open market and are often relegated
to the squalor of public housing. If journalists were as informed as they want
us to believe, and as socially concerned as they claim, they would help the poor
by attacking price censorship with the same fervor as they do press censorship.
Journalists can ll newspapers and news broadcasts with stories of jobless
teenagers, write compellingly of the need to increase the availability of food
to the nation's poor, and urge landlords to make more low-income housing
available. But the eectiveness of this free expression is nil compared to the
free expression that would allow lower wages, lower food prices, and higher
housing prices.
I am not arguing that we should be complacent about low wages and farm
incomes, or high rents. But we should recognize that low wages and incomes
and high rents are only the symptoms of the problems that should concern us.
Low wages inform us that productive skills are lacking; low farm incomes send a
message that some farmers would create more value elsewhere in the economy;
and high rents tell us that housing space should be expanded.

We may not

like the news communicated through market prices, but that is no reason for
censoring it. No one would suggest that we censor news of natural disasters,
political scandals, or outbreaks of disease. We may not like to hear such news,
but suppressing it would reduce our ability to respond in ways that reduce
the costs of such unfortunate events. Similarly, censoring price communication
reduces the information and incentive needed to respond appropriately to the
problems created when our eorts and resources are not being directed to their
most urgent employments.

Harming the Poor
Some will object that the freedom of price communication puts those with
few nancial resources at a disadvantage.

If this argument were correct, it

would also be true that the traditional freedom of expression discriminates
against those lacking education and the ability to express themselves.

But

no one is put at an absolute disadvantage by the freedom to communicate
either through prices or words.

Obviously those who are knowledgeable and

articulate benet from free speech, but can anyone believe that censoring verbal
and written communication would help the ignorant and inarticulate? The best
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hope for acquiring knowledge and developing intellectual skills is through the
free ow of spoken and written information. Similarly, the best hope for the
poor is through the free ow of market communication, which informs them
of their best opportunities, motivates them to increase their productivity by
taking advantage of those opportunities, and keeps others responsive to their
preferences and concerns.
No one would argue that price communication is always completely honest
and accurate.

But who is prepared to argue that distortions and misrepre-

sentations are not easily found in newspapers, magazines, books, and TV and
radio programs?

Such imperfections can never be eliminated, but the most

eective way of moderating them is not through censorship but through the
competition of free expression, as any self-respecting journalist will quickly inform you. But any journalist informed enough to warrant self-respect should
also recognize that the most eective way of moderating the imperfections in
price communication is by allowing more competition in price communication,
not by stiing that competition with price censorship.
Journalists should understand the importance of freedom in communication.
And certainly no group is as quick to defend that freedom, or more articulate at
making the case for it, than journalists. But if journalists were fully committed
to freedom of communication, they would nd price censorship just as abhorrent
as press censorship.
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It's the Margin That Counts

June 1, 2000

Economists, like everyone, have opinions about how the world should be.
And it would be disingenuous to claim that economists never let their opinions inuence their conclusions and recommendations. But the power of economics is in fundamental concepts that prevent economists from letting their
imaginations obscure reality.

They may wish that scarcity didn't exist, that

agonizing tradeos could be avoided, that people would subordinate their private interests to the public interest, or that world peace and global cooperation
could be achieved by all joining hands and singing We Are the World. But
economists don't let such fantasies pollute their analysis because they take seriously scarcity, opportunity cost, self-interest, imperfect knowledge, market
prices as necessary for social cooperation, and economic failure as necessary for
economic success.
This attachment to reality strikes some as defeatist, as too hasty to dismiss proposals for making the world a better place. There is no denying that
economists dismiss many proposals to improve the world. But economists see
their realism as essential for genuine improvements. As Nobel-Prize winning
economist F. A. Hayek observed, For it has always been the recognition of the
limits of the possible which has enabled man to make full use of his powers.

1

Perpetual-motion machines would be wonderful things, and it's too bad everyone doesn't have one. But the defeatist attitudes of physicists discourage
work on them."
One of the most useful economic concepts is marginalismthe eect of
incremental, or small, changes.

Marginalism shows how economic reasoning

allows us to accomplish more by accepting limits on what can be accomplishedby focusing on marginal (some will say mundane) adjustments to
make things better, rather than on more heroic attempts to solve problems
totally and completely. It also shows that what many people see as objection-

1 F.A. Hayek, Law,

Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 3: Rules and Order (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 8.

able outcomes and actions are actually reasonable accommodations to scarcity
and that attempts to correct them are harmful. I illustrate marginalism with
two examples. In following months I shall discuss how failure to understand
marginalism reduces the good we can do, and often ends up being deadly.

Diamonds and Water, Wrestlers and Nurses
We have all heard arguments like these: Something is wrong with the economy
when professional wrestlers are paid a lot more than nurses. Food is far more
important than golf, so we are making a big mistake by converting so much
prime agricultural land to golf courses. If you are going to do a job, do it as
well as you possibly can. Most people enjoy their work and don't have to be
bribed with bonuses and merit pay to get them to perform well. Some things,
such as human life, are simply too valuable to put a price on.
Each of these sounds plausible.

But all of them are awed because they

ignore the importance of marginal considerations, and if we acted on them we
would end up reducing the good that can be accomplished.
For years economists and others were perplexed that the price of diamonds
is far greater than the price of water, even though water is far more valuable
than diamonds. This diamond-water paradox wasn't resolved until the 1870s
when the Austrian economist Carl Menger and the British economist William
Jevons independently recognized the dierence between marginal value and
total value. Price reects the value people place on one more unit of something
(its marginal value), not the value of all of it (its total value). The total value
of water is obviously much greater than the total value of diamondswe would
pay orders of magnitude more to avoid living in a world without water than
we would to avoid living in a world without diamonds. But because water is so
plentiful (except in unusual circumstances), the amount people are willing to
pay for one more gallon is close to zerothe marginal value of water is low. On
the other hand, diamonds are so rare that people are willing to pay thousands
of dollars for one more.
This brings us to wrestlers and nurses. Because so few have the physical
attributes to satisfy the demand for wrestling performances, people are willing
to pay a lot to attract one more person with those attributes into the ring.
Many more have the attributes to satisfy our demand for nurses, and so people
are willing to pay a lot less to attract one more person into nursing. Although
the total value of nurses is far greater than the total value of wrestlers, the
marginal value of nurses is far less. And it is the marginal value of people in an
occupation, not total value, that is important in determining salaries in that
occupation.
So there is nothing remarkable about professional wrestlers' earning a lot
more than nurses, although some consider it objectionable.

But what some

really see as objectionable in the large ratio of wrestlers' to nurses' earnings is
that people with disagreeable preferences have the freedom to communicate
those preferences through market prices. There is nothing wrong with trying
to reduce the earnings gap between dierent occupations by trying to change
peoples' preferences.

But if people try, as some do, to reduce earning gaps
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with government controls over wages and salaries, they are trying to distort
the price communication that benets us all.

Unintended Consequences
Government could mandate higher salaries for nurses, for example. This would
send a signal that the marginal value people receive from nurses has increased,
and more people should train to become nurses.

Few professional wrestlers

will want to shift into nursing, but many other people will. Unfortunately, the
higher salary communicates the wrong information. While telling more people
to become nurses, the higher salaries are telling consumers that the marginal
cost of nurses is greater than their marginal value, and so fewer should be
employed. The result would be that few newly trained nurses will nd jobs,
some practicing nurses will lose their jobs, and consumers will have fewer nurses
than they want at market salaries, that is, salaries that reect their marginal
value.
Because people fail to distinguish between marginal value and total value,
they believe nurses (and those in many other occupations) are suering an
injustice and recommend solutions that harm everyone, particularly nurses.
Several more columns will be required to adequately explain the concept
of marginalism and to provide examples of the mistakes people make when
they confuse marginal value and total value.

In the next column I shall use

marginalism to provide comfort to those who worry that we are running out of
agricultural land.
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Running Out of Agricultural Land

July 1, 2000

Fear that we are running out of important resources is perpetual. Oil is a
favorite thing to worry about; landll space is another, and trees yet another. I
could continue listing things (coal, copper, iron ore, even tin) that people have
worried would soon be exhausted, and I plan to discuss the persistent fear of
resource exhaustion in future columns. In most cases the fear is baselessfueled
by organized interests hoping to capture advantages by scaring the public, by
sloppy journalism, and by a general lack of basic economic understanding.
Where concern is appropriate, the problem is invariably the lack of private
property rights in the threatened resource.
To see the role of property rights in preventing the depletion of resources,
consider the following question: have we ever run out of a nonrenewable resource? I have asked dozens of audiences this question and have never found
anyone who can name one.

But aren't nonrenewable resources the ones we

are most likely to run out of ?

After all, they are nonrenewable.

More puz-

zling, we have run out ofdriven to extinctiona number of animals, which
are renewable. Aren't these the resources we should be least likely to run out
of ?. The puzzle is resolved by recognizing that nonrenewable resources just sit
there; they don't run around, so it is easy to establish private property rights
over them. As I discussed in earlier columns, people conserve resources they
own by taking their future value into account. Many animals, because of their
fugitive nature, are dicult to own as private property, and so people have
little motivation to consider their future value. So despite their renewability,
some of these animals have been extinguished.
Creating scares that we are running out of nonrenewable resources would
be far more dicult if people understood the power of private property to
motivate the proper consideration of our resources' future value. But in this
column I consider another reason people mistakenly fear we are running out of,
or dangerously depleting, resourcesfailure to distinguish marginal value from
total value, a distinction I introduced last month.

Disappearing Farmland
I had just begun my rst teaching job at the University of Colorado in 1972
when I was asked to participate in a debate on the problem of disappearing farmland.

Despite my compelling arguments (several in attendance who

agreed with me before the debate still agreed with me afterward) that decreasing farmland was the result of market forces working properly, concern over
lost farmland has continued. For example, Lester Brown of Worldwatch Institute puts out an annual report predicting that food supplies will fall behind
population growth, a problem he sees caused partly by the loss of farmland to
development. In my local newspaper, columnist Tom Teepen recently warned,
Development is taking up farmland, forest and other open space in this decade
at twice the rate of the 1980s...Between 1992 and `97 some 16 million acres went
to development.

1

It is true that in the United States fewer acres are used for agriculture
today than in the past, although the loss is far less than what Worldwatch
and United States Department of Agriculture report.

2

But this loss of

farmland is not a crisis or even a cause for concern. Instead, it is good news.
First, with less land being used for farming, more land has reverted to open
space and forest. You won't hear this from the crisis crowd, but there is more
3

forestland in the United States now than 80 years ago . Second, farmland has
been paved over for shopping centers and highways, converted into suburban
housing tracts, covered with amusement parks, developed into golf courses, and
otherwise converted because consumers have communicated through market
prices that development is more valuable than the food that could have been
grown on the land.

Food or Golf
Why would consumers willingly sacrice food for golf courses, shopping centers, and parking lots? Isn't food more valuable than golng or parking? Of
coursein total value. If the choice is between eating and no golf or playing
golf but no eating, even the most avid golfer would choose eating.

But eco-

nomic choices are not all-or-none choices. Instead, we make decisions at the
margin, deciding if a little more of one option is worth sacricing a little bit of
another. And at the margin it isn't clear that food is more valuable than golf
or many other things we can live without. Golfers are communicating through
greens fees that another golf course is at least as valuable as the additional food
sacriced.
At the margin, golf is certainly more valuable than food would be if millions
of acres of farmland had not been lost to development. In 1900 most of the
horsepower used on the farm was really horse power, or mule power, and tens

1 Tom

Teepen, Facts Justify Criticism of Suburban Sprawl, Atlanta Journal and Con-

stitution, December 26, 1999, p. D4.

2 In

chapter 2 of Hoodwinking the Nation (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers,

1999), the late Julian Simon gives examples of exaggerated claims by organizations, including
the USDA, that benet from the perception that farmland loss is a serious problem.

3 Gregg

Easterbrook, A Moment on the Earth (New York: Viking, 1995), pp. 10-13.

40

of millions of acres were needed to grow the food for these animals. Trucks,
tractors, harvesters, and other gasoline-powered farm machinery have eciently
substituted for these animals and the acres needed to feed them. Also, much less
land is needed now to feed the same number of people because improvements in
fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, seeds, and weather forecasting allow more food
to be grown per acre, and improvements in harvesting, packaging, storage, and
transportation allow more of what is grown to get to the dinner table. If we still
devoted as much land to farming as we did in 1900, with today's technology
we would be knee-deep in cantaloupe. In this situation, how valuable would
another few acres of cantaloupe be compared to another golf course that could
be constructed on those acres?
We don't have nearly as much farmland as we did in 1900 because as food
production increases, its marginal value decreases relative to that of houses,
shopping centers, golf courses, and more. Consumers communicate this change
in relative value with purchases that cause food prices to decline relative to the
prices for other uses of farmland. This motivates a decrease in farmland that
continues as long as the marginal value of land is greater in nonfarm uses than
in agricultural production.
But don't expect the farmland "crisis" to disappear. Public agencies hoping
for bigger budgets, and private organizations hoping for more research funding
or larger subsidies, are always anxious to identify crises to scare the public.
Crisis creation wouldn't be so easy if more people understood the dierence
between total value and marginal value.
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Marriages, Mistresses, and Marginalism

August 1, 2000

Distinguishing between marginal and total values is crucial to understanding
many human activities and decisions.

Almost all the decisions we make are

made at the margin, but there are exceptions. We are sometimes faced with
decisions that force us to compare the total value of one option to the marginal
value of another.

These decisions can be far more agonizing than decisions

made entirely at the margin, which require sacricing a little bit of one thing
to have a little bit more of another.
Consider love and marriage, a topic not commonly thought to be one that
economics has much to say about. But decisions that lead to love, marriage, and
sometimes divorce always involve choices between competing alternatives, and
therefore involve costs and benets. These costs and benets are personal and
subjective, but so are all costs and benets. And if people consider the relevant
costs and benets when making relatively trivial decisions, say on whether to
acquire or discard a pair of socks, then surely we should expect them to consider
the costs and benets of vital decisions such as getting married or divorced.

Wives and Mistresses
My wife reads these columns, so I want to emphasize that economic analysis allows one to acquire insights into activities without having rsthand experience.
Also, nothing important would be altered if I reversed the sexes' roles.
After a few years of marriage a husband has had lots of experience with his
wife. He has seen her almost every day, most of their time together being spent
in rather routine activities. He knows her habits, so most of her behavior is
predictable and not very exciting or even particularly interesting. He spends
hours with her and never says a word to her or notices her presence, even
if the football game is less interesting than the beer commercials.

And she

experiences him in much the same way, so her responses to him typically lack
enthusiasm, which reinforces his own lack of enthusiasm. In other words, before
long the husband doesn't nd his wife very valuable at the margin.

In contrast, the woman he meets at work or on a business trip seems far
more interesting. He has not known her long, and likely doesn't see her often,
so she is less predictable and more exciting than his wife. Also, he likely sees
her in more interesting situations than in a messy kitchen with screaming kids.
And if his interest in her is reciprocated, it will probably be with far more
eagerness than he has experienced at home in a long time.

If she becomes

his mistress, with occasional liaisons in romantic settings, he can nd himself
exhilarated at the thought of the next encounter.

His mistress is far more

valuable to him than his wife at the margin.
The passion of the love aair causes the husband to think about leaving
his wife for his mistress. But leaving his wife involves a dierent calculus from
comparing the value of a little more time with his wife with that of a little
more time with his mistress. A divorce is not a decision made at the margin
but one that forces the husband to confront competing total values. Here the
advantage can easily shift to the wife. Her marginal value may be small, but
her total value can be very large. The husband's relationship with his children,
his parents, and many of his friends; his standing in the community; his sense of
permanence and place; and his nancial prospects are all inextricably connected
with his wife and marriage. Plus there is the genuine fondness he likely has for
his wife and their shared memories and experiences.
The wife is like water and the mistress like diamonds.

Given a marginal

choice between the two, the husband readily sacrices a little time with the
wife for a little more with the mistress. But when the choice is between the
total value of the wife and the total value of the mistress, the wife wins.
Obviously the analogy of the wife as water and the mistress as diamonds
is not perfect.

Men do leave their wives.

A marriage can fail because the

wife (remember, the sexes can be reversed) ceases to provide value both at the
margin and in total.

But the important distinction between total value and

marginal value explains why so many men who are genuinely enthralled by
their mistresses give them up rather than sacrice unexciting marriages.

Hurting Those We Love the Most
As this discussion indicates, there can be a lot of pain in a marriage, even a
strong marriage. Obviously in many strong marriages there is little pain, and
certainly this is what most of us would consider the ideal.

But there is an

old saying that we hurt the ones we love the most, and marriages (especially
strong marriages) are often good examples of this.
We often do things to aggravate and hurt those we love that we would
never consider doing to casual acquaintances.

The distinction between total

and marginal value is important here. Those we love (who provide us with a
lot of total value) are generally those who love us (we provide them a lot of total
value), so we can impose some marginal costs on them with hurtful comments
and behavior without eliminating all the total value they receive from us. If we
did the same thing to casual acquaintances at work, for example, our total value
to them would quickly become negative and we would nd ourselves isolated or
worse. Of course, even with loved ones, there are limits to how much pain they
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will take from you, but the stronger the marriage the more latitude there is.
In a weak marriage there will not be much pain, at least for long, since there
is little total benet sacriced by divorce.
To reinforce the point, consider how much aggravating behavior parents will
endure from their children. There is probably no love stronger than that which
parents have for their children. And children often take advantage of this love
by behaving in ways that inict tremendous pain on their parents.
I am not recommending that you take advantage of the love people have for
you by behaving badly. Far from it. Neither am I arguing that economics gives
a complete explanation of the behavior observed in marriages and families.
That behavior is inuenced by many factors best considered by those trained
in other elds. But unless you distinguish between total and marginal eects
of behavior, you will leave unopened an important window of understanding
on marriage and families.
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Take This Job and Shove It, at the Margin

September 1, 2000

Many believe that pay is overemphasized and much too unequal in market
economies. Supposedly, most people enjoy working, and so while they have to
be paid to survive comfortably, they don't have to be bribed with bonuses tied
to performance to do a good job. Indeed, psychological experiments indicate
that the intrinsic interest people have in doing a task declines when they are
paid for doing it.
And why the large dierences in the amounts dierent people are paid?
Since people enjoy working, big pay dierences aren't needed to overcome the
unpleasantness of working, at least not in most jobs.

Anyway, how can you

explain that people who have the most enjoyable jobs (such as professional
athletes, successful entertainers, and corporate executives) typically receive far
larger incomes than those who have the least enjoyable jobs (such as custodians, trash collectors, and coal miners)? Also, the argument continues, pay
dierentials reduce productivity by shifting the emphasis in the workplace from
cooperation to competition.
Those arguments can be persuasive at rst glance, as they are in a very
readable book by Ale Kohn.

1

But the case is seen to be seriously awed

when examined with an understanding of basic economic concepts, such as
marginalism.
Economists are often criticized for assuming that workers have to be paid
because people like leisure and dislike work. For example, Kohn (p. 131) claims,
Economists have it wrong if they think of work as a `disutility'... something
unpleasant that we must do in order to be able to buy what we need, merely
as a means to an end. In fact, economists have no problem admitting that
most people enjoy their work. But they also recognize some other important
2

considerations regarding work.

1 Ale Kohn, Punished by Rewards (Boston: Houghton Miin Company, 1993).
2 See Richard B. McKenzie and Dwight R. Lee, Managing Through Incentives (New

York:

Oxford University Press, 1998), chapter 20, for a more detailed discussion of the argument
in this column.

If a person enjoys one job, he will also enjoy others. So what job should
he take? Clearly his preferences for the type of work he most enjoys should be
considered. But so should the preferences of consumers who will value the contribution of a worker more in some jobs than in others. Fortunately, consumers
can communicate their preferences eectively through their purchases, which
translate into greater demand and higher incomes for workers who produce
the most valued products. This communication would be censored by government policies that arbitrarily reduced the pay dierentials generated in labor
markets.

Such censorship would reduce not only the value of what workers

produce, but their freedom. Workers can be allowed to choose a job that is less
productive, but more enjoyable, only when they are held accountable through
lower pay for the reduction in value created for consumers.
In the psychological experiments cited by Kohn that show interest in performing a task declining when people are paid, it makes little dierence what
tasks are being performed. In the economy, attracting workers into the right
jobs is crucial and requires pay dierentials that critics like Kohn nd objectionable. Even if the pay dierentials generated by the market do reduce the
performance of workers (a doubtful proposition, as we are about to see), it is
better having people working at less than full capacity at valuable tasks than
at full capacity at useless tasks.
Economists also recognize that while people generally enjoy their work in
total, most jobs are a pain at the margin. Even if you get tremendous satisfaction from your job, the marginal satisfaction can be very low, in fact negative.
Well before the work day is over, most of us are tired of the grind and would
love to leave work early and do something else. We would like to tell the boss,
Take this job and shove it, at the margin. People put in eight hours of diligent
eort because there is a nancial inducement to do so.
In fact, the ability of consumers to communicate their preferences to workers through dierential pay acts to guarantee that workers receive marginal
disutility from their jobs. The value a worker is contributing to consumers
by remaining on the job is positive even though the marginal value he receives
from working longer has declined to zero and is about to become negative.
Since consumers can communicate through additional pay that the value to
them is greater than his cost of staying on the job, he continues working. The
additional pay compensates him for the marginal disutility of working as long
as that disutility is less than the marginal value he is creating.
Even popular entertainers and athletes, who receive enormous total satisfaction from their jobs, perform in late-night shows, take road trips, and put in
extra hours rehearsing and practicing when they would rather be doing something else.

But because their performance is valued so highly by consumers

who communicate that value with extremely lucrative compensation, they put
in the extra hours.
I am not claiming that compensation is always tied directly to worker output. That is not always practical. But even when employees are being paid
about the same, even though some are better workers than others, long-term
considerations can still connect pay to performance. Those who miss too much
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work are dismissed; less productive workers are more likely to be laid o in
business downturns; and more productive workers are more likely to be given
better work schedules and promoted. Responding to consumers eectively requires that rms have compensation arrangements that, over time, connect pay
to contribution.

Importance of Cooperation
Obviously cooperation is important in the workplace. But few things can reduce cooperation more than the perception that compensation isn't tied to
contribution. There is a strong temptation for workers to shirk, at the margin
(and it can be a wide margin), even when they enjoy their jobs, if they don't
see a nancial reward for diligent eort.

Even assuming that most workers

were willing to put in a full day of responsible work without the incentive of
pay, a few will always take advantage of the opportunity to shirk if there is no
penalty. This will be noticed by the dependable workers, who nd their eort
harder and less productive because of the shirking of the few, and who will
begin to feel like suckers since they are receiving no more than the slackers. So
a few more will decide it is better to be a shirker than a sucker, increasing the
temptation of the rest to slack o. The result is a destructive cycle of shirking
that undermines productive cooperation among workers.
I am not arguing that money is the only thing that motivates workers. Also
important are such things as respect from supervisors, an uplifting sense of
mission, and a feeling of comradeship. But the eectiveness of these considerations will soon crumble without a reasonable connection between pay and
performance.
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More on Marginalism

January 1, 2001

There are so many economic issues that cannot be understood properly
without recognizing the importance of marginal considerations that I could
continue writing columns on marginalism indenitely. Indeed, marginal analysis will reappear both explicitly and implicitly in my future columns.

But

this month I will wrap up my emphasis on marginalism with some additional
observations on this crucial economic concept.
We have all heard the advice, If a job is worth doing, it's worth doing
right. There is wisdom in this advice if we are careful about what is meant
by doing a job right. People sometimes suggest that if a job is worth doing,
it's worth doing perfectly.

But this advice, by ignoring the importance of

marginal considerations, is a prescription for waste and ineciency, as anyone
who attempted to put it into practice would soon discover.

No matter how

much time is spent doing a job, it can almost always be done a little better by
spending more time on it. But at some point the value of doing the job a bit
better is less than the value of diverting a little more time to another activity.
So even if perfection were possible, it would not be sensible. Instead of doing
any one thing as well as possible, you are far better o doing several things not
so well.
In general, you will accomplish the most by doing what
economists call equating at the margin. This means allocating your time over
several activities so that the marginal value created from more time on each is
the same for all. If your time isn't being allocated this way, then the marginal
time spent on some things creates more value than on others. In this case, you
can create more value in the same amount of time by shifting time into the
higher-marginal-value activities and out of the lower-marginal-value activities.
As this shift takes place, the marginal value of time in the former activities
declines and the marginal value of time in the latter activities increases. Only
when the marginal value of time in all activities is the same are you taking
advantage of all opportunities to create more value for the time spent.

So if a job is worth doing, it's worth doing right is good advice as long as
we keep in mind that doing a job right doesn't mean doing it as well as you
can. Don't do your best at anything, equate at the margin instead may not
be very inspiring, but it's good advice. Fortunately, it is advice that few need,
since it is what we tend to do anyway.

It should be emphasized that since

all value is ultimately based on our subjective evaluations, the patterns of
activities that equate at the margin vary enormously over dierent individuals.
But all people's behavior reects the advantages of doing less than their best
at everything they do as they constantly adjust the margins toward equality.

Doing Well in School
Consider the objective of doing well in school.

I often hear my colleagues

complaining that their students are not taking their course work seriously. I
often join in these complaints.

We are convinced that many of our students

would get more out of our courses if they attended lectures and read the texts
more diligently. We are surely right in this, but as economists we shouldn't be
surprised at, or critical of, our students' behavior. Being a good student can
be important in achieving one's objectives, but so are lots of other things, such
as working part-time, making friends, developing social skills, or just hanging
out and having fun. Spending more time on class assignments adds value, but
it necessarily means less time for other valuable activities. And long before a
student has done the best job possible in his or her course work, the marginal
value of time spent studying will have fallen below the marginal opportunity
costthe marginal value sacriced in other pursuits.
So the student who did his absolute best in class is getting less value from
the additional minute spent studying than he would if he spent that minute
doing something else. He increases the value realized from his time by equating
at the margin reducing the time spent studying until study time has the
same marginal value as time spent doing other things.

Even if the student

is a complete nerd, he will still tend toward equating at the margin over his
dierent courses since he will learn the most by learning less than possible in
each course taken.

Don't Try to Do Too Much
I need to emphasize that equating at the margin only applies when the
marginal value of time in every activity eventually begins declining relative
to the marginal value of time spent in other activities. This is a plausible assumption, as is seen by considering what people would do if it were not true. If
the marginal value of time a person spent, say, bowling increased indenitely
relative to other things, then we would expect to see him spending all his time
bowling, since the more time spent bowling the more valuable another minute
spent bowling would be compared to another minute doing anything else. This
obviously doesn't describe how people behave. Even the most dedicated bowler
(or bird watcher, golfer, etc.) eventually takes time out for a beer, a burger,
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and bed. In other words, the marginal value of bowling declines relative to the
marginal value of alternatives, and the bowler equates at the margin.
But it is important to realize that we get better at doing many things as
we spend more time on them, which means that the marginal value of time in
these activities does increase up to some point. This suggests that we don't
want to try to do too many things, never becoming very good at any of them.
There is real advantage in choosing a relatively few things that we have talent
for, or which we really enjoy (talent and enjoyment generally go together), and
developing skill in them, which increases our enjoyment even more.

But no

matter how much we enjoy an activity, or how good we are at it, eventually the
marginal value of doing it begins to decline relative to other things, and so we
will want to equate at the margin over a number of activities. And although
this means that we will end up doing nothing as well as we possibly could, we
can still be extremely good at what we do.
Let me conclude by emphasizing that equating at the margin is not an
excuse for shoddy and careless work. Not doing your absolute best at any one
thing is quite consistent with doing everything you do very well. Furthermore,
not doing your absolute best at anything is not the same as not doing your
absolute best overall. The point is that being as successful as possible in general
requires being somewhat less successful than possible in everything we do.
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Markets and Marginalism

February 1, 2001

To do your best in your personal activities, you have to equate at the
margin, which, as I explained last month, means allocating your time over
dierent activities so that the marginal value of time in every activity is the
same.

The importance of equating at the margin extends beyond individu-

als doing as well as possible personally; it is also crucial to the success of the
general economy. And because of the information and incentives transmitted
through market prices, people and businesses, responding to their private concerns, are led to cooperate in ways that are constantly moving margins toward
equality throughout the economy. A discussion of this process provides additional insight into the advantages we all realize from the communication and
cooperation motivated by market prices.
There are a large number of rms in the economy, each concerned primarily
with increasing prots. But the decisions these rms make aect all the others.
For example, the more that one rm produces, the more scarce resources it
has to use and the less other rms can produce.

Ideally, each rm will pro-

duce whatever amount it chooses in a way that minimizes the sacriced value
elsewhere in the economy. Achieving this ideal requires an enormous amount
of information on such things as weather conditions, resource discoveries, hostilities between countries, productive technologies, and the particular circumstances and subjective preferences of millions of workers, resource owners, and
consumers.
No government agency could ever acquire and constantly update all this
information and use it properly.

Fortunately, this information is communi-

cated through market prices, with the input prices that rms pay reecting the
marginal value of those inputs in their best alternative uses. So with each rm
motivated to choose the input combination that minimizes its cost of producing
a given amount of output (which requires equating the marginal productivity
per dollar cost of all inputs)

1 For

1

, it also chooses the input combination that pro-

example, if the marginal productivity for $1 of input X is 2 while the marginal

duces that output at a minimum sacrice of value elsewhere in the economy.
This equating at the margin reects an impressive amount of coordination,
with each rm responsive to the value of inputs to others.

Outputs and Marginal Adjustments
But it is not enough that each rm minimize the value lost (the cost) from
producing its output to make the best use of our limited resources.

Each

rm could be producing its output at the lowest cost, with the combination of
all rms' outputs being too costly. For example, we could produce dozens of
disposable diapers daily for every American with the least-cost combination of
inputs.

This is obviously too many disposable diapers because the marginal

costs (even though as low as possible) of diapers would be far greater than
their marginal valuethe value sacriced to produce one more diaper is greater
than the diaper is worth. Producing the combination of all goods that creates
the greatest value for the resources used requires not only that each good be
produced at least cost, but that each good be produced only up to the point
where its marginal value equals its marginal cost.
Again, equating at the margin generates the most valuable combination of
products over all rms. And by simply responding to market prices, each rm
has access to all the necessary information. The price of a rm's product reects
its marginal value, and input prices determine the rm's marginal production
costs. This information, when used by rms trying to make as much prot as
possible, results in that combination of outputs that creates the most value.
Each rm increases its prots by expanding output as long as the price it
receives for its product is greater than its marginal cost (the value sacriced by
1

reducing the amount produced by other rms).

So when all rms produce the

amount where price equals marginal cost, each rm is maximizing its own prot
and the value of the combination of goods produced is maximized.

Because

market prices coordinate production decisions, these decisions are equated at
the margin over all rms, and it is impossible to increase the value of the
combination of goods produced by expanding the output of some rms and
reducing the output of others.

The Big Advantage Is Liberty
I have discussed a level of perfection never reached in the real world.

The

relevant margins never reach complete equality because the countless number
of preferences, circumstances, and technologies aecting the value of inputs and
outputs constantly changes. But market prices constantly change to provide
productivity for $1 of input Y is only 1, then the rm could expand its use of input X by $1
(increasing output by 2 units), reduce its use of input Y by $2 (reducing output by 2 units),
therefore maintaining the same output at a cost of $1 less.

1 This

statement has to be qualied if the rm is a monopolist because price and marginal

revenue diverge, as explained in every microeconomics text.

But unless perpetuated by

government, this monopoly distortion is rather benign when considered over time. Indeed,
dynamic economy eciency is increased when rms can strive for, and temporarily achieve,
monopoly power.
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information on new conditions and to reward behavior that pushes the margins
toward equality. That reduces the cost and increases the value of what is being
produced. These market adjustments do a far better job maximizing the value
of economic decisions by keeping all decision-makers responsive to others than
any group of government planners could ever do.
But the greatest advantage of the market is the liberty it allows. People can
pursue their individual values and concerns instead of being herded into broad
categories by remote authorities and told how to behave to promote some vision
of the general good. For example, a business may not maximize prots because
the owner wishes to employ disadvantaged youth or take time o for volunteer
work.

Or a worker may choose not to take the highest-paying job because

he doesn't want to move away from a sick parent.

People make these types

of decisions every day, and the values they reect can never be communicated
through the political process and properly responded to by political authorities.
But people can communicate their values and concerns through the eect their
decisions have on market prices. And when people do so, they can be condent
that others will consider those concerns in their own decisions. The result is
a pattern of mutual adjustment and coordination that creates far more wealth
and opportunity than could ever be achieved by central direction.
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Economic Eciency

March 1, 2001

Economic eciency is the standard that economists use to evaluate a wide
range of things. Economists who favor markets argue that they generate outcomes more ecient than do socialism or government regulation. As we shall
see in the next few months, economists don't like pollution because it is inecient.

This emphasis on eciency seems strange, if not reprehensible, to

many people. They are convinced that economists are so narrowly focused on
eciency that they ignore the truly important things in life. Who but someone
lacking completely in a sense of what makes life meaningful doesn't recognize
that pollution is bad because it harms the environment? We should get rid of
it whether or not it is ecient.
This criticism is unwarranted, though understandable. Eciency is a tricky
concept.

Once it is understood what economists mean when they refer to

eciency, it becomes clear that it is a much broader, and more desirable, goal
than many people realize.

Technical versus Economic Eciency
People often think of eciency as an objective ratio of inputs to outputs. For
example, they sometimes argue that the internal-combustion engine is inecient because only a small percentage of the energy in the gasoline is converted
into motion. Furthermore, the argument continues, it is possible to build engines that convert a larger percentage of gasoline energy into motion.

But

such objective measures of technical eciency are meaningless by themselves
because they leave out the relative values people place on things, values that
are necessarily subjective.

Even the argument that the internal-combustion

engine is inecient depends on valuing motion, which people do. But motion
is not the only thing they value. For example, much of the energy in gasoline
is converted into heat, some of which can be channeled inside the car. So even
if all the energy in gasoline could be converted into automotive motion (which

it can't), people in cold climates would be willing to sacrice some of this technical eciency to heat their cars. This reduction in technical eciency would
increase economic eciency, which involves making marginal sacrices of one
thing (motion) to obtain marginal increases in something people value more
(heat).
One might argue that we should make engines as technologically ecient
as possible since, even if we did, there would still be enough heat generated
to warm a car.

But this ignores the subjective value people place on lots

of things that must be sacriced to increase technical eciency.

Sure, new

engines might convert more of the energy in gasoline into motion, but doing so
would require diverting resources away from producing other things of value.
Long before technical eciency was maximized, the marginal cost of improving
that eciency would exceed the marginal value. This would reduce economic
eciency because it requires sacricing more value (marginal cost) than is
realized (marginal value).
Fortunately, market prices provide the information and motivation required
to achieve economic eciency. For example, engine producers increase prots
by improving the technical eciency of engines until the marginal revenue
from the improvement declines to the marginal cost. Since marginal revenue
tends to reect how much consumers value additional improvement, and the
marginal cost reects the value of the goods and services sacriced to make
additional improvement (since input prices reect their value in alternative
uses), engine producers increase their prots by improving engines only as long
as they add more value than is sacriced. That's not technically ecient, but
it is economically ecient because it increases the total value realized from
scarce resources.
Our discussion of economic eciency should provide comfort to those who
worry that we are wasting resources by using more than we need. We do use
more of some resources than we need, but that is not wasteful if it allows us to
create more value. In the engine example, using additional gas in technically
inecient engines frees resources to create more value than the gas is worth.
This is not fundamentally dierent from leaving a light on in the bathroom
because I am watching an exciting golf match on TV, something many would
say is wasteful. But it's not! Sure, I'm using more electricity than I need, but
by doing so I'm using my time for something I value more than the electricity
I could save. (If not I would have left the program and turned o the light.)
Electricity provides another good example of increasing economic eciency
by doing something easily seen as wasteful. Almost 20 percent of the hydroelectricity used in the United States is produced by pump-storage, the use of
electricity to pump water uphill into a reservoir so the water can be released to
generate electricity. It takes signicantly more electricity to pump the water
uphill than is generated when the water runs back downhill, so pump-storage
is clearly not technically ecient.

But pump-storage is widely used because

it increases economic eciency and avoids waste. The value of a kilowatt of
electricity depends on when it is available. Late at night, additional electricity
is worth much less than it is during the day and into the early evening.
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So

electricity can be used to pump water uphill from midnight until early morning
with little value sacriced. That lost value is more than made up by the value of
the electricity produced by releasing the water during the day when electricity
is very valuable. Pump-storage reduces the amount of electricity available to
consumers, but it increases economic eciency and reduces waste by shifting
availability from periods when it is worth less to periods when it is worth more.

Freedom and Eciency
People often argue that wide-ranging government restrictions on our freedom
are necessary to promote eciency. But economic eciency is impossible without freedom because it is not the narrow concept many accuse it of being. It is
about increasing value as determined by the diverse and subjective preferences
of hundreds of millions of individuals.

The only way people can eectively

communicate information about their values to those best able to respond is
through the freedom to engage in market transactions for whatever and with
whomever they choose.

This freedom, for example, allows a person to take

what seems to be a less-productive (and lower-paying) job than he could have
because he enjoys the work, or prefers the location, or feels a duty to care for
elderly parents, or numerous other reasons that can be fully known only to
those faced with the particular tradeos involved.

The freedom to take the

lower-paying job, and to make any other choice in a free market, is essential for
economic eciency because value is determined by far more than just money
and narrow material considerations.
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Prisoners' Dilemmas and Cooperation

February 1, 2002

Economics is largely about how people cooperate so each can best pursue his or her objectives, whatever they may be. Decentralized market-based
economies are wealthier than those based on central direction because markets
facilitate the communication of the information and motivation necessary for
people to cooperate, while central direction always censors that communication.
Even market-based economies sometimes lack markets for important resources
and the result is waste and ineciency due to the absence of cooperation. For
example, the pollution problems I discussed in previous columns are caused by
the lack of markets in the use of the environment for disposing waste. Without those markets people don't consider the concerns of others when deciding
how much to pollute. Creating articial markets is the best way of facilitating
the cooperation needed to reduce pollution to acceptable levels as cheaply as
possible.
But no matter how well markets work, and how extensively they are operating, we remain in a world of scarcity, with people wanting more than they
have and often seeing ways to acquire more by behaving in noncooperative
waysways that create more losses for others than gains for themselves. There
is almost always a tension between cooperative and noncooperative behavior, and this column examines that tension in the context of a simple model
widely known as the prisoners' dilemma. By looking at this dilemma we can
understand the interaction between politics and economics and the tendency
for government action to encroach on market action even though the result is
destructive of wealth and, more important, liberty.

To Confess or Not to Confess
The problem I am about to illustrate is very general, but it takes its name from
an example involving two prisoners known to have committed a serious crime
but who can be convicted only of a relatively minor crime without a confession
from at least one of them. The prisoners are separated and each told the same

thing: If you confess to the serious crime, you will receive a sentence of ten
years if your accomplice also confesses, but only two years if he doesn't. But
if you refuse to confess to the serious crime you will receive a sentence of 15
years if your accomplice does confess and three years (for the minor crime) if
he also refuses.
The possibilities the prisoners face are shown in the nearby payo matrix,
where the rst number in each cell is the sentence Prisoner A receives and the
second number the sentence Prisoner B receives. As easily seen, the collective
interest of both prisoners is best served when neither confesses, in which case
they will serve a total of only 6 years.

The worst thing for their collective

interest is for both to confess, since this results in their serving a total of 20
years. Yet no matter what each thinks his accomplice will do, the best thing
for him to do is confess. For example, if A thinks B is not going to confess, then
if he doesn't confess he gets 3 years, but only 2 years if he does confess. Or if
A thinks B is going to confess, then if he doesn't confess he gets 15 years, but
only 10 years if he does confess. And the same situation faces B. So from the
perspective of each, the best thing to do is confess even though this leads to the
worst outcome from the perspective of both. The action that is individually
rational is collectively irrational.

Player

Player

A

B

Don0 tConf ess

Conf ess

Don0 tConf ess

3years/3years

15years/2years

Conf ess
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10years/10years

The prisoners' dilemma is an example of the tension between cooperation
and noncooperation that is unavoidable. For example, pollution problems are
prisoners' dilemmas. We would all be better o if everyone cooperated by polluting less. But for each of us it makes more sense not to do so. Regardless of
what others do, it doesn't pay me to reduce my pollution, since the benet will
go primarily to countless others, while I incur all the cost and inconvenience.
The reader is encouraged to construct a payo matrix like the one above showing the payos to two individuals from the four dierent pollution-reduction
possibilities (with a higher number representing a higher payo rather than
a longer sentence).* The point of pollution policy is to change the payos to
eliminate the prisoners' dilemma by making it pay for each individual to reduce
pollution no matter what others do. Creating markets in pollution permits does
exactly this, which is not surprising since markets excel at promoting cooperation by eliminating prisoners' dilemmas.
Consider how eliminating markets destroys cooperation by
putting everyone in a huge prisoners' dilemma.

Marxist ideology claimed to

substitute the rule From each according to his ability, to each according to his
need for the exploitation of the market.

Forgetting that without markets

we cannot determine what people's abilities and needs are, such a rule can be
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implemented only with brutal force, because without force the rule creates a
prisoners' dilemma:

having lots of needs and no ability is the only sensible

choice for each person. Whether each person thinks that others will produce
to the best of their ability or live o the eorts of others, the rational action is
the latter. But obviously this leads to a situation that is collectively irrational,
with few abilities being used and few needs being satised.
But surely not everyone will shirk since many, probably most, of us want
to do our part by being a productive member of society.

True, at least ini-

tially. But even if only a few people exploit the prisoners' dilemma initially,
soon others will see that they are being treated as suckers by the shirkers. As
the number of shirkers increases, it becomes increasingly obvious that cooperation is for suckers, and the productive process unravels. Without markets to
eliminate this prisoners' dilemma by rewarding cooperation, only government
force can prevent a breakdown in productivity. But while government can force
people to work, it cannot provide either the information or motivation people
need to work in their most productive activities and to do so with the creative
zeal and cooperative attitude that is characteristic of market activity.
A destructive prisoners' dilemma is eliminated by the information and motivation provided by markets. But the prisoners' dilemma comes in many forms
and, as a practical matter, markets do not eliminate them all.

Because of

this, the prisoners' dilemma is commonly used to justify government and the
coercive power it exercises. I will discuss this justication next month.

59

Markets and Morality

The Market for Honesty

February 1, 1999

The recurring theme of all my columns has been that economics is a study
of how people cooperate with each other and that market economies succeed
because of the incredible amount of cooperation they promote. Market cooperation, like all cooperation, depends on a high level of honesty. People who
cannot trust each other cannot cooperate with each other, certainly not for
long.

And with the market, it's not just a matter of trusting a few people

whom we know and care about. Market cooperation depends on our being able
to trust large numbers of people, most of whom we will never know.
Consider the behavior of business people. If the proverbial man from Mars
observed our business activity, he would surely conclude that business people
are extraordinarily honest. For example, they sell precious gems that really are
precious to customers who cannot tell the dierence between diamonds and cut
glass. They promise not to raise the price of a product once customers commit
themselves and make switching to another product costlyand they keep the
promise. They make good-faith promises that the business they own, but are
about to sell, will continue to give their customers good service. The examples
could be continued indenitely since honesty and trust are essential for all but
the simplest business transactions.
I am not naïve enough to argue that business people are never dishonest.
Just like people in all walks of life, some will cheat, lie, and steal to snatch
short-run advantage.

But they are not nearly the scoundrels as presented

in the media and popular entertainment. According to one study, almost 90
percent of all business characters on television are portrayed as corrupt.1 In
fact, business people can be depended on to act more honestly than most.
This is not because business people are inherently more virtuous than others
(though there is no reason to believe they are less virtuous), but because the
free market penalizes those who do not provide consumers with things they
valueand consumers value honesty.
The reason the market penalizes dishonesty is obvious at one level. Those
who fail to provide the quality they promise, and charge for, may prot in the

short run, but not in the long run. But even in the short run there are gains
from honest dealing, and those who can credibly promise to deal honestly can
capture some of those gains. So business people are strongly motivated to put
themselves in situations in which dishonest behavior is quickly penalized. By
doing so they are better able to entice customers with assurance of everyday
honest dealing.

Committing to Continuity
Consider the fear of dishonesty that can arise when it is believed that a business
is about to shut down, say, because the proprietor is getting old. Even if such
a proprietor has no intention of cheating customers, they will have reason to
worry without some credible assurance of the proprietor's long-run interest
in the business.

An owner can often provide this assurance by bringing his

ospring into the business (Samson and Sons or Delilah and Daughters).
Not surprisingly, research shows that children of single proprietors are three
times more likely to follow in their parents' lines of work than the children of
others.

Even large corporations, with lives that extend far beyond those of

any of their managers, often depend on single proprietorships to represent and
sell their products. This explains why Caterpillar, for example, has a school
on running Caterpillar dealerships for the sons and daughters of the owners of
those dealerships.
To consider another example of the importance of business continuity in
promoting honesty, ask yourself where you would rather shop for an expensive
piece of jewelry, a jewelry store with a well-advertised brand name and ornate
xtures, or a sidewalk vendor operating out of a Volkswagen van parked at the
curb? What could the store do with its brand name and xtures if it went out
of business? Not much, and this tells customers that the store has a lot to lose
by misrepresenting its merchandise to capture short-run prots. It has made a
commitment to staying in business by being honest.

Embracing Competition
Intel, having received a patent on its 286 microprocessor in the early 1980s,
immediately gave up its monopoly by licensing a competitive rm to also sell the
microprocessor. Why would any company give up a legal monopoly? Because
of the importance of honesty. Intel was willing to sell its new microprocessor
to computer manufacturers at a reasonable price, and promised to do so. But
the manufacturers were afraid that once they committed to using the new
microprocessor (making expensive changes in their production process that
would be dicult to reverse), Intel could exploit its long-term patent monopoly
by raising the price. Intel could make a credible promise that it would maintain
competitive prices by giving up its monopoly.

Committing itself to honest

dealing was more important to Intel, and more protable in the long run, than
exploiting a monopoly position in the short run.2
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Selling and Repairing
It is dicult for consumers to determine the quality of automobile repair. They
can generally tell if the work eliminated the problem: the car starts, the rattle
is gone, the oil light is o, and so on.

But few people know if the repair

shop charged them for only the repairs necessary, or if it charged them for lots
of parts and hours of labor when all the mechanic did was tighten a screw.
One way repair shops can reduce the payo from dishonest repair charges is
through joint ownership with the dealership selling the cars being repaired. In
this way the dealer makes future car sales largely dependent on honest repair
work.

Dealerships depend on repeat sales from satised customers, and an

important factor in how satised people are with their car is the cost of upkeep
and repairs. The gains a dealership could realize from overcharging for repair
work would be quickly oset by reductions in car sales.
Automobiles are not the only product for which it is common to nd repairs
and sales tied together in ways that provide incentives for honest dealing. Many
products come with guarantees and warranties entitling the buyer to repairs
and replacement of defective parts for a specied period.

These guarantees

provide condence in the seller's honesty when advertising the quality of his
product.
Some will always go for the short-run gain through deceit and dishonesty.
But the greater the freedom of others to compete with credible commitments
to honesty, the less dishonesty pays even in the short run.

The cooperation

that characterizes the free market would never be possible without the high
level of honesty and trust motivated by market competition.
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In my last column I discussed the bias toward excessive government caused
by the dead-weight costs of taxation. Because these costs go unseen, while the
benets from government spending are readily apparent, government expands
beyond reasonable limits.
Unfortunately, the unseen cost of taxation is only one factor pushing for too
much government. Much of the cost of government is in lost libertydecisions
on how we live our lives are increasingly made by government authorities.
And just as with the dead-weight costs of taxation, the costs of gradually
losing our liberties go largely unseen. On the other hand, benets (typically
temporary and small) from restricting liberty are easily seen.
a political bias that steadily erodes our liberty.

The result is

Pragmatic politics, free of

ideological considerations, with each issue decided solely on its perceived costs
and benets, gives free rein to this bias against liberty. Only with a genuine
ideological commitment to liberty, one that creates serious obstacles to all
proposals for sacricing it to some public objective, can we halt, and hopefully
reverse, the erosion.

The Hidden Cost of Restricting Liberty
All government actions, whether taxing income, restricting imports, controlling
prices, regulating businesses, or subsidizing agricultural production, reduce our
liberty to some degree. Of course, some restrictions are necessary for maintaining the social order on which other liberties depend.

Trac laws, sanctions

against criminal activity, and the requirement to pay enough taxes to defend
our borders come to mind. However, beyond some minimum level the loss of
liberty begins imposing costs without osetting social benets.
But even when a government restriction on liberty imposes large net costs
on society, it still creates benets commonly captured by a relative few. An
example is an import restriction, which concentrates benets on those in the
protected industry by restricting consumers from buying from those who oer

them the best deal. As discussed in earlier columns, consumers lose far more
than those in the protected industry gain. But because the reduction in liberty spreads cost over all consumers, the political process easily overlooks it.
Likewise, government regulations that restrict people from going into certain
occupations are advertised as necessary to protect consumers from the unqualied. Yet these restrictions reduce the competition faced by existing members
of the protected occupation (who lobby for the restrictions), with the benets they receive more than oset by the costs to those whose freedoms are
restricted. But again, the costs are widely spread and largely unnoticed.
The costs of restricting our liberties are easily ignored not only because they
are spread widely over the general public, but also because they are indirect and
delayed. Often the greatest advantage we realize from freedom is its availability
to others.

For example, only a relatively few people will choose to become

entrepreneurs. But most of the benets from entrepreneurial freedom take the
form of better products and lower prices for untold millions of consumers who
will never start companies themselves. As F. A. Hayek observed, The benets
I derive from freedom are thus largely the uses of freedom by others, and mostly
of the uses of freedom that I could never avail myself of.

1

So most of those

harmed by the erosion of a freedom will notice no additional restriction on their
own freedom and remain unaware of the harm they are suering.
Also, freedom is vitally important because we have no idea how it will be
used.

No one can condently predict the advances that will be made in the

future if people are free to try things most would never consider trying. Quoting
Hayek again, If we knew how freedom would be used, the case for it would
largely disappear.

2

So most of the cost of restricting freedom today will be

doing without things we otherwise would have had tomorrow. The cost is not
only delayed, but almost impossible to recognize when it does arrive because
it comes as the absence of things we never knew we could have had.
Finally, our liberty is seldom lost all at once. Instead, it is nibbled away
a little at a time. Supposedly, if you place a frog in a pan of water and heat
it up gradually, the frog will remain in the water completely unaware of the
increased temperature until it boils to death.

Similarly, as our liberties are

eroded slowly, one by one, we hardly notice the loss.

Commitment to Liberty
Because we overlook the costs of eroding liberties, the bias in favor of excessive government is more pronounced and harmful than indicated in previous
discussions. Even if all the nancial costs of expanding government were fully
considered, there would still be too much government if the personal costs of
restricting our liberties were ignored.

Unfortunately, when government pro-

posals are considered, many of the nancial costs and almost all the costs of
reduced liberty are politically ignored. The minor benets to a few trump the

1 F.

A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960),

p. 32.

2 Ibid.,

p. 31.
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far greater loss of the liberty by the many in case after case. Seldom does anyone oppose a particular program because it will erode our liberty; and when
someone does, he is typically dismissed as an ideological crackpot. But unless
we restore a broad and deeply felt ideological commitment to liberty in general,
the value of the particular liberties lost to each government expansion will do
nothing to retard that expansion, and our liberty will be surely and steadily
sacriced to the special-interest inuence of ordinary politics.
Quite apart from the value of liberty as an end in itself, genuine commitment
to liberty is essential for sound, long-run economic policy. The importance of
freedom to the innovations and technological improvements on which all economic progress depends cannot be overemphasized. Consider that the national
income of the U.S. economy is now a little over $8.5 trillion annually. If average
economic growth is reduced from 2.5 to 2 percent per year because of liberties
eliminated by government action, in 25 years the national income will be $1.81
trillion less per year than it would have been. That amounts to a loss of approximately $6,830 for every American, a loss that almost no one will notice
and which would be dicult to connect to the erosion of liberty even if it is
noticed. What will be noticed, and appreciated, are the benets of particular
government activities, even though the entire country is far worse o because
of many of them.
The advantage of a commitment to liberty, with respect rather than ridicule
accorded those who champion it, is that it would replace the political pragmatism of case-by-case considerations with an ideological rule of restraint that
would better promote the long-term interests of all.

The problem with po-

litical pragmatism is that it doesn't work, not if the objective is to serve the
general interest.
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Marginalism and the Morality of Pricing Human Lives

October 1, 2000

When I ask students in my large economics classes if some things are just
too important to put a price on, someone always answers, human life. This
seems like a reasonable answer. After all, how many people would sacrice their
lives for cash, no matter how much was oered? What is the point of being
a rich corpse?

But economists reject the notion that human life is priceless.

They put a price on human life, not because they are uncaring, callous, and
completely lacking in moral sensitivity, but because they have a professional
interest in understanding human action and because they understand that there
is nothing morally lacking about pricing human life.
All of us put a price on our own lives every day with the choices we make and
the actions we take. And pricing human life provides information that can save
large numbers of lives, certainly not an immoral activity. Unfortunately, the
moral superiority that so many people feel when expressing outrage at pricing
human life helps keep in place government policies that cause many people to
die needlessly.
Recognizing that prices reect the marginal value of things is the key to
understanding why economists put prices on human life. The price of asparagus
gives us information on the value of one more pound of asparagus, not the value
of the entire crop. Similarly, when economists talk about the price of human
life, they are referring to the marginal value of lifethe value of a slightly
longer life expectancynot the total value. The total value we put on our lives
is extremely high (in most cases innite), so we would not agree to be killed
for any amount of money. Yet we put a very low marginal value on our lives.
We routinely do things that reduce our life expectancy by marginal amounts
in return for rather minor conveniences and pleasures. We often stay up too
late, eat and drink too much, fail to get enough exercise, and drive too fast.
When we do so, we are putting a price on our lives, and a pretty low price. Just
how much is it worth to eat that extra cream pu or drink that extra beer?
You would probably forgo the cream pu for $10, but not to avoid reducing

your life expectancy by a marginal amount. If so, the implication is clearthe
marginal value, or price, you place on your life is no more than $10.

The Risks of Government Policies to Reduce Risks
There is nothing wrong or irrational about putting a low marginal value on
our lives. We face tradeos in everything we do, and living a meaningful and
satisfying life requires doing things that reduce how long we can expect to
live. It is sensible to avoid paying very much to avoid very small risks and the
corresponding reductions in life expectancy.
In many situations we can choose how much to pay to avoid risks.

We

can choose to sacrice time by slowing down a little, taking a somewhat less
dangerous job that pays a little less, or buying a slip-resistant rubber mat for
the bathtub (bathtubs are dangerous places). Government policy attempts to
reduce many risks we face, but we have little choice in how much we pay for
the risk reduction we receive. The justication for government action is that
the risks are general, like the risks from pollution, and it would be dicult,
if not impossible, for individuals to protect themselves acting alone. This is a
reasonable justication for some risks, although it cannot be used for many government regulations, such as those requiring seat-belt use or outlawing smoking
in all bars. But even when government action is justied, it doesn't make sense
to enact regulations that make people pay more to reduce risks than the reduction is worth. Unfortunately, this is common practice.
According to many studies of how much people pay for safety devices and
how much income they sacrice to take safer jobs, they are willing to spend
from $3 million to $7 million to save a life. Yet many government regulations
impose a far greater cost per life saved. For example, Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) regulations on benzene storage are estimated to cost $260 million
per life saved; EPA regulations on contaminated land disposal over $4.5 billion
per life saved; and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
regulations on formaldehyde over $92.7 billion per life saved.* The problem
with the high regulatory cost of saving a life is not only that these costs are
far higher than the amount individuals would pay, but that these regulations
increase the number of lives lost.
* The gures in this and subsequent paragraphs come from W. Kip Viscusi,
The Dangers of Unbounded Commitments to Regulate Risks, in Robert W.
Hahn, ed., Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996), pp. 135-66.
Such costly policies may reduce some risks, but they also reduce wealth,
and there is plenty of evidence of a positive relationship between wealth and
life expectancy. Obviously healthy people are more productive and therefore
wealthier. But cause and eect also goes the other way; studies show that costly
policies, by reducing our wealth, also reduce life expectancy, with an estimated
one life lost for every $10 million to $50 million in regulation costs. Using the
$50 million estimate, this implies that saving one life with the formaldehyde
regulation would cause the loss of over 1,854 lives due to reduced wealth.
Another problem with extremely costly regulations to reduce risk brings us
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back to the importance of marginal considerations. When the marginal cost
of saving life is higher with one regulation than with another, it is possible to
save more lives at the same cost by reducing the high-marginal-cost regulation
and expanding the low-marginal-cost regulation. For example, if the EPA landdisposal regulation (which saves fewer than three lives) were scrapped, and just
a small portion of the $4.5 billion in saving were used to expand low-marginalcost-per-life-saved regulation, thousands of additional lives could be saved and
there would be a net reduction in government regulation.

In addition, by

reducing costly regulations, more resources would be available for the creation
of wealth and this would save even more lives.
By refusing to put a price on human life government regulators can justify
regulations with extremely high costs for a life saved. Despite the supercial
morality suggested by this save-a-life-at-any-cost approach to regulation, the
result is more lives lost than if the marginal cost of saving lives were consideredif a price were put on human lifewhen we legislate and implement
regulations.
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The Economics of Caring and Sharing

June 11, 2011

If we were to apply the unmodied, uncurbed rules of the microcosmos (i.e., of the small band or troop, or say our families) to the
macro-cosmos (our wider civilization), as our instincts and sentimental yearnings often make us wish to do, we would destroy it.
Yet if we were always to apply rules of the extended order to our
more intimate groupings, we would crush them.
F. A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism

The widespread belief that markets are immoral is a major reason they
are so poorly understood and so rarely appreciated. This belief is not easily
overcome. The fundamental problem is that our instinctive sense of morality,
which I shall call magnanimous morality (the morality of caring and sharing),
makes it easy to see markets as morally awed. Furthermore, the explanation
economists give for what they see as the major advantage of markets reinforces
the instinctive tendency to see them as immoral.

Unless economists recog-

nize the source of this hostility and acknowledge it is based on a praiseworthy
moralitybut one not fundamental to the success of marketsthere can be
little progress overcoming the view that markets are immoral. This would be
a shame since there is a strong moral case to be made for markets.
Markets are based on a morality, which I shall call market morality, that
helps to direct our actions into a global pattern of mutual assistance which appears to result from magnanimous morality but in fact could never be achieved
by that morality.

Because market morality lacks instinctive appeal, there is

widespread support for attempts to create a more moral economic order by
substituting magnanimous morality for market morality.

Such attempts un-

avoidably erode the benets from both moralities and lower the overall morality
of the economy.

I wish to emphasize the dierence between magnanimous and market moralities, showing that each supplements the other in contributing to a moral social
orderbut only if they are conned to their proper spheres of human action.

The Magnanimous Morality of Caring and Sharing
We instinctively think of morality as personally caring for and sharing with
others. It can be dened briey as satisfying three conditions: 1) helping others intentionally; 2) doing so at a personal sacrice; and 3) providing the help
to identiable individuals or groups. Behavior of this sort is clearly benecial
to the well-being of small groups in which the members are in close personal
contact and knowledgeable of the circumstances and concerns of one another.
We spent most of our evolutionary history in small hunter/gatherer tribes tting this description, so a strong anity for magnanimous morality has been
hardwired into our emotional makeup. Its presence or absence has predictable
eects on how we view behavior and social arrangements.
The enduring popularity of Charles Dickens's A Christmas Carol, published
in 1843, illustrates the emotional appeal of intentionally caring for and sharing
with identiable people at personal sacrice. Ebenezer Scrooge is introduced
as a squeezing, wrenching, grasping, scraping, clutching, covetous, old sinner
with no regard for the welfare of this employee, Bob Cratchit, his own family,
or anyone else. But after Scrooge's encounter with the ghost of his former partner and the three ghosts of Christmas he experiences a moral transformation.
He nds true happiness in paying for the medical care needed by Tiny Tim,
the Cratchits' crippled son, raising Bob's salary, and more generally using his
wealth for the benet of others.
The appeal of magnanimous morality is fully warranted and understandable.
The relationships we have with family and friends are rooted in it, providing
us with our greatest happiness and most satisfying and meaningful moments.
It should be emphasized that magnanimous morality is not inconsistent with
the proper functioning of a market economy. Success in market transactions
depends on being sensitive to the concerns of others.

And this sensitivity

seems to extend beyond strictly market transactions. Based on experimental
evidence from a number of countries with wide dierences in the degree of
integration into global markets, Herb Gintis concludes, [S]ocieties that use
markets extensively develop a culture of cooperation, fairness and respect for
the individual (quoted in Matt Ridley's The Rational Optimist).
It should also be admitted, however, that the proper functioning of a market economy does not depend primarily on magnanimous morality. Indeed, the
morality on which markets primarily depend is easily seen as rejecting magnanimous morality, and the way most economists make the case for markets
encourages this view and the instinctive hostility that so many have for markets.
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The Morality of the Market
Market morality is rather modest, with little if any emotional appeal; in fact,
it scarcely seems to deserve the name morality, instead being commonly seen
as a justication for behavior widely held to be immoral. This morality can
be dened as following the general rules and norms of market exchanges, such
as respecting property rights, honoring contractual obligations, and not harming others by violating their legitimate rights and expectations through force
or fraud. Market morality can be achieved, according to Adam Smith in The
Theory of Moral Sentiments, by sitting still and doing nothing. And while
markets reward kindness and caring for those with whom we have personal exchanges, the vast majority of the exchanges we benet from are impersonal; we
neither know nor meaningfully care for those on the other side of the exchange.
Since these impersonal exchanges create enormous benets from outcomes
that emerge without conscious direction, people seldom give much thought to
those benets or the market morality on which they depend. Of course people do think about markets occasionally, but when they do it is seldom with
appreciation for the benets they are receiving.

More often than not peo-

ple think about markets when they are being inconvenienced by the market
disciplinethe requirements imposed on us, for example, in return for incomethat makes their benets possible. Few of us connect such discipline to
the far greater benets we receive as a consequence, particularly when we see
others who appear to be reaping great rewards from the very discipline that is
apparently making us so much worse o. Under these circumstances it is easy
to conclude that we are imposed on unnecessarily by the greed of others. How
easy it is to also believe there is something immoral with an economic system
that not only tolerates greed but also rewards it.
When economists make the case for what they see as the most impressive
feature of markets, they typically do so with the aid of Adam Smith in a way
that reinforces the view that markets at best lack morality. Smith understood
and appreciated magnanimous morality, as any reader of The Theory of Moral
Sentiments, his rst book, knows. But this would not be known to someone
who knew only Smith's invisible hand argument for markets in The Wealth
of Nations. The advantage of markets, according to Smith, is that by pursuing their own interests in the marketplace, people unintentionally do more to
promote the public interest (the interest of no one in particular) than if it had
been their intention to do so.

This argument ignores every requirement for

magnanimous morality, and the way economists phrase the argument makes it
easy for people to conclude erroneously that the argument for the market rules
out the more personal caring and sharing in which our personal relationships
are rooted.
I am not proposing that economists discard the invisible-hand explanation
of the market. But to make the case for the morality of markets, economists
should recognize the tendency for people to dismiss the benets of the market
for its apparent moral failing and counter that tendency by pointing out the
inability of magnanimous morality to achieve the desirable economic outcomes
expected of it.
72

Demanding More Than Magnanimous Morality Can Deliver
The belief that markets are immoral causes many either to fail to notice or
to dismiss the benets they realize from them. For example, while most people claim to value conservation and clearly benet from the conservation that
smooths the availability of goods and resources over time, the nearly unanimous
criticism of speculators, whose prot-seeking behavior makes this conservation
possible, suggests that most people are unaware that this is a benet of markets.
Even those aware that they are receiving a benet from market activity
commonly feel it is contaminated by the process providing it. This was illustrated after Hurricane Fran knocked out power in Raleigh, North Carolina,
in September 1996. According to Michael Munger, four men from Goldsboro,
North Carolina (an hour from Raleigh), rented two freezer trucks and drove to
Raleigh with a thousand bags of ice, which they bought for $1.70 each. Customers quickly queued up to pay $8 a bag, with each limited to ve bags. Some
complained about the price, but no one refused to pay. With the line still long,
the local police arrived in force, arrested the four men for price gouging, and
conscated their trucks and all the remaining icewhich was not distributed
to those in line. Surprisingly, at least to economists, the frustrated shoppers
applauded the police for arresting those whose activities would have made them
better o; would the customers have been happier had the sellers not bothered
at all? The applause strongly suggests that those in the line felt that the benet
for which they had lined up was contaminated by the prot motive.
Or consider the idea of getting consumers in developed countries to pay
extra for fair trade coee, bananas, tea, and chocolate to reduce the poverty
of poor farmers in developing countries.

Assuming the premiums paid for

fair trade products go to the intended recipients and forgetting Gene Callahan's economic analysis suggesting these recipients may be harmed even if
they do (Is Fair Trade a Fair Deal?, Freeman, March 2008), it is clear that
fair trade advocates are sincere in their belief that this approach will reduce
poverty and hope that it will catch on with consumers.

Yet many are con-

icted by what has been described as a paradox in the fair trade movement
resulting from the widespread hostility toward markets that pervades it.

As

described by Sarah Lyon and Mark Moberg in Fair Trade and Social Justice,
In seeking social justice...fair trade...pursues a market-based solution to the
very problems developing from free markets. When large corporations such
as Starbucks, Nestlé, Walmart, and McDonald's signed on to sell Fair Trade
products, which would clearly increase sales and supposedly the incomes of poor
farmers, many in the movement objected. Representative of these objections
are those voiced by Pedro Haslam and Nicholas Hoskyns (in their contribution
to The Fair Trade Revolution), who see these corporations motivated by marketing success rather than ideology. [F]air trade certied farmers who sell to
them [big corporations]..., they continue, are still locked into the traditional
supply chain dominated by the largest companies.

This is not the vision of

sustainability and community many of us started out with, where local familyowned businesses sell the products of small farmers and personal relations are
maintained throughout the supply chain.
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These statements reect hostility for economies based on marketing success and impersonal exchanges between large companies and the suppliers
they depend on. The statements, and numerous others from fair trade enthusiasts, express a yearning for economies based on personal dealings between
consumers in developed countries and those in poor countries who supply them
with products anonymously. In this they are like many others who are emotionally attracted to the idea of economies based more on the magnanimous
morality of caring and sharing and less on the market morality of pursuing
self-interest through impersonal market exchange.
While it is hard to imagine a life of meaning and joy without mutual caring
and sharing, we shouldn't demand more of magnanimous morality than it can
deliver. Calls for a more moral marketplacesometimes referred to as capitalism with a human faceare invariably motivated by the hope of substituting
the instinctive morality of the small group for the morality of impersonal markets. When such a substitution goes beyond feel-good rhetoric and is actually
attempted, the result is less morality and prosperity as political power replaces
voluntary exchange.
Good economists see nothing wrong with caring and sharing. But they also
see the opportunity to supplement that morality by extending our ability to
help far more people than we can personally care about. The primary advantage
of markets is that they provide each of us with the information and motivation
to share with literally millions of people, without caring for them.
Of course some will say, Yes, people are helping each other, but they are
doing so for the wrong reason by considering only what's in it for them. Such
people may never be convinced that self-interest is a legitimate motivation.
But one would like to ask them if, when enjoying a good cup of coee, reading
a thrilling mystery on their e-reader, or boarding an airplane to visit a sick
friend, they are troubled by the thought that all the many people who made
those things possible were motivated primarily by a desire to improve their own
conditions and the conditions of the families they love. I doubt they are, and
for their sake I hope they aren't.
The healthiest and certainly the most compassionate way to think about
markets is by recognizing that they allow us to provide better for the few we
genuinely do care about by doing more to serve and share with the multitude
of those we don't. This suggests that a strong moral case can be made for the
market by explaining why the noble desires inspired by magnanimous morality
are more fully realized when the urge to substitute that morality for market
morality is resisted.
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Comparing the Morality of Government and Markets

March 28, 2012

Beyond a very limited role in our economy and our lives, further expansions
of government retard economic eciency and reduce human liberty. The most
important contribution of the Public Choice school of political economy has
been to use economic analysis to realistically compare the eciency of government and markets and to explain the tendency to substitute government
activity for market activity far beyond the point where economic eciency is
reduced. Yet this substitution continues.
I shall argue that by limiting its concern almost entirely to eciency comparisons, Public Choice has limited its inuence over the prevailing political
ideology, which has made the continued growth of government possible. Economic eciency is important, but eciency arguments are less convincing than
moral arguments. As Joseph Schumpeter observed, The stock exchange is a
poor substitute for the Holy Grail. So even if people are convinced that markets generate more ecient outcomes than government, it will still be favored
over markets as long as most people believe it is more moral than markets.
Unfortunately, convincing them otherwise is dicult.
Economists have argued that markets are moral, but they almost always
do so by pointing to the desirable, but unintended, outcomes that result from
people pursuing their private interests. Economists are rightly impressed with
the ability of markets to motivate self-interested individuals to unintentionally serve the interests of a multitude of others they don't know, much less
care about. The result is a truly impressive pattern of individual freedom, social cooperation, and prosperity. But people are emotionally programmed to
judge morality on the motivations that produce outcomes rather than on the
outcomes themselves. If people make personal sacrices with the intention of
beneting others, their actions are seen as moral. When the eort is directed
toward identiable people, this sense of morality is intensied. The outcome
of the eort carries less moral signicance than the intention motivating it and
the personal sacrice involved.

For example, if a man risks his life by jumping into a rapidly owing river
to save a child from drowning, his action would be credited as moral whether
he is able to save the child or not. On the other hand, he would receive little if
any moral credit if he saves the life of the child by accidentally providing him
something to hold on to as he steers his boat to shore.
Not only are the benets of markets the unintended byproducts of people
motivated primarily by self-interest, but they are widely dispersed over the
public (or no one in particular) and generated by an indirect process of market
coordination that obscures the connection between the benets created and the
actions that make them possible. Such a process is unlikely to be seen as moral;
many see it as immoral and are unaware of the benets it provides. Even those
who recognize the benecial outcomes of markets commonly consider them
contaminated by a morally tainted process. In other words, they don't believe
the desirable ends justify the market means.
In contrast to the market process it is easy for people to see morality as
an inherent feature of the political process. Political rhetoric emphasizes the
intention of doing good, not for personal advantage but because it is the right
thing to do. The good is directed toward deserving groups whom we should
care for, such as the poor, the elderly, the sick, and operators of family farms.
And the political process allows us to care for these groups in direct and easily
understood ways, such as mandating a minimum wage, providing a pension
program, subsidizing medical care, and creating price supports for agricultural
products. Also, the means by which most people make political decisions, voting, encourages them to be responsive to moral claims for government programs
and to reject evidence that those programs often do more harm than good.
It is useful to consider an important dierence between voting in the
market with dollars and voting at the polls with ballots.

When you vote

for something in the market you get what you vote for, and you get it and
pay for it only because you vote for it. This is very unlikely when you vote
at the polls. At the ballot box you often get, and have to pay for, what you
vote against. And except in elections with only a few voters, you almost never
get what you vote for because you vote for it. This feature of voting is often
interpreted to mean that your vote doesn't count.
be counted.

Wrong.

Your vote will

If you vote in Chicago it might be counted several times.

The

important characteristic of an individual's vote, as just described, is that it is
almost never decisive.
The probability that any one vote will decide the outcome in a state or
national election is far too small to take seriously. Indeed, it is much smaller
than the probability of winning millions of dollars in a state lottery or being
killed by a shark. A few people win millions in lotteries every year, and in an
average year there are 16 people attacked by sharks in the United States, with
one fatality every two years. But I am not aware of any state or national election
that was decided by one vote, with one exceptionbut it is the exception that
proves the rule. I'm referring to the 2000 presidential election between George
W. Bush and Al Gore. That election came down to a 54 U.S. Supreme Court
decision to end the vote recounting in Florida, with Bush 327 votes ahead. So
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in that instance one vote did decide the election, but it was a vote with only
nine voters.
The minuscule probability that an election will be decided by one vote
explains why people are more inuenced by moral considerations when voting
in an election than when making purchases in markets. Consider a voter who is
convinced that an increase in government transfers would help the poor escape
poverty, but because she is in a high tax bracket, she knows that if the transfer
policy is enacted it will increase her lifetime tax burden by $10,000 in present
value. Furthermore, the only benet she will receive from voting for the transfer
is the moral satisfaction from intentionally making a sacrice to provide what
she believes will be direct government help to an identiable and deserving
group. Will she vote for the transfer?
The answer obviously depends on a comparison of the perceived cost and
benet of voting yes. The common response is that she has to receive at least
$10,000 worth of moral satisfaction to vote in favor of the transfer. But this
response is incorrect because even though it will cost our voter $10,000 if the
transfer policy passes, it will cost her almost nothing to vote yes.

The cost

of voting yes is an expected cost and it equals $10,000 times the probability
that her vote will decide whether or not the policy passes. Even if we assume
a one-in-a-million probability her vote will be decisive (which is very much on
the high side for most state and federal elections), the expected cost of voting
yes is one penny. If the moral satisfaction she receives from voting yes is worth
only the price of a designer cupcake, her yes vote is a bargain. Voting provides
her with the opportunity to enjoy a sense of moral virtue at virtually no cost.
Beneting from cheap virtue in the polling booth depends on more than the
low cost of voting for expensive government policies that are claimed to achieve
noble objectives. First, the voter has to believe that her vote contributes to
passing the policy she favors, and that it represents her willingness to make a
personal sacrice. It is dicult to feel particularly virtuous for doing something
that costs and accomplishes almost nothing. The voter also has to believe the
policy she votes for really will do all the wonderful things claimed. It is dicult
to feel virtuous supporting a policy if you believe it will harm those you want to
help. Therefore, it is not surprising that so many people are aggravated when
economists point out that their vote has a meaningless eect on the outcome
of most elections, and therefore casting their vote for an expensive government
program represents a trivial sacrice.
Also, expect those who get a sense of moral superiority by voting for a
policy to be hostile to evidence casting doubt on the policy's ability to achieve
the noble objectives claimed for it. Even when it is irrefutable that a policy
causes great harm, many who voted for it will defend their vote by arguing that
the policy is motivated by good intentions. The ends may be unfortunate, but
because the political means are seen to be motivated by moral intentions, those
ends should be overlooked, or euphemistically dismissed. For example, those
who defended what they believed were the noble goals of Soviet communism
initially rejected the evidence that millions of people were being killed in the
name of achieving those goals.

When the evidence was overwhelming, the
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euphemism for killing millions of people was that you've got to crack a few
eggs to make an omelet. Those who nd it morally comforting to trust in
the good intentions of government have been willing to condone outrageous
immorality to maintain that comfort.
If those who vote to give government more power to do good things were
as virtuous as they fancy themselves, they would do more than cast a vote
and proudly walk out of the ballot booth wearing an I Voted sticker. They
would realize that even if a policy is potentially desirable, voting for it (or for a
politician who claims to favor it) is but the rst step in realizing its potential.
Good political outcomes depend on more eort and virtue than voting requires.
To make sensible decisions at the polls, voters would need to become well
informed on a wide range of issues and consider alternatives to government for
addressing particular problems. They would need to follow up their votes by
paying attention to the type of legislation that the two branches of Congress
passed and nd out what came out of the reconciliation process. This followup would need to continue when legislation goes to government agencies to
be supplemented with thousands of pages of detail and then enforced with
bureaucratic discretion. Finally, voters would also write letters, make calls, and
work with genuinely public-spirited groups to pressure politicians and agencies
to keep the legislation consistent with the lofty goals they voted for. Obviously,
few voters can be expected to incur the cost of doing much if any of these tasks.
And we would not want them to, given the productive opportunities they would
have to sacrice in their occupational specialties. It can be hoped, however,
that more voters would recognize that there are some who are making the
political eort just described but with less elevated objectives than voters want
to believe they are achieving with their votes.
Members of groups organized around particular interests and their hired
lobbyists will work to inuence legislation that directly aects those interests.
In many cases they are actively involved in writing the legislation for congressional committees.

They will follow the legislation as it goes through both

the House and Senate and is turned over to the bureaucracy for ne-tuning,
interpretation, and enforcement.

It should surprise no one that the political

eorts of special interests are invariably directed at serving their narrow objectives at the expense of the noble objectives voters had in mind when casting
their ballots. Of course special interest groups and their lobbyists will use the
rhetoric of moral concerns and the public interest in support of the legislation
they favor.

Their primary interest in high-minded objectives, however, is in

determining which arguments for the legislation they favor are most likely to
convince voters that supporting it at the ballot box is the moral thing to do.
Teachers' unions calculate that expressing concern for our children is the
most eective way to motivate public opposition to policies that would improve education by subjecting government schools to competition. Similarly,
corn farmers and agricultural rms calculate that expressing concern for the
environment is the most eective ploy for securing government tax advantages
for ethanol.

And industries facing competition from imports calculate that

expressing their desire to save American jobs is the best way to get public sup78

port for import restrictions that will increase consumer prices and reduce job
creation in other industries. Most of the benets from farm subsidies and agricultural price supports go to wealthy owners of large farms rather than small
family farmers, while (in the case of price supports) increasing the prices the
poor pay for food. Numerous interest groups seize the widespread public concern for the poor to create support for government transfers that are designed
and implemented to benet those very interest groups more than the poor who
were supposedly the primary beneciaries.
Voters are being enticed by the pretense of morality to vote to give government more money and power that will be captured largely by the politically
inuential for their personal gain, with government doing little to achieve the
noble goals voters expected, and commonly undermining the achievements being made without government. Government is a poor agent for those who hope
to do good through the morality of good intentions and personal sacrice.
The reality is that political behavior is no less motivated by self-interest
than is market behavior.

Voters are motivated by the desire for a low-cost

sense of moral virtue to vote for noble-sounding policies while remaining oblivious to the morally appalling outcomes those policies often generate. Organized
interest groups use the rhetoric of morality, supplemented by backroom deals,
to manipulate the political process and capture privileges and protections at
public expense.

And incumbent politicians secure the support of naive vot-

ers and campaign contributions from self-serving voting blocs.

Where is the

morality here?
Any realistic moral comparison of markets and government obliterates the
ction that political behavior is more moral than market behavior and compares
politics and markets in terms of the desirability of their outcomes.

Political

self-interest is not nearly as productive as the self-interest pursued in markets.
People serve the interests of others more eectively when they are spending
their own money, subject to the information provided and the discipline imposed by markets, than they do when casting votes to spend other peoples'
money and lobbying for political favors paid for by others. Markets encourage
a fundamental morality in terms of taking responsibility for the consequences
of one's actions, being responsive to the concerns of others, and reciprocating
value in return for value. This market morality is nowhere to be found in the
political process when one looks behind the smokescreen that characterizes so
much current political rhetoric.
Truly moral political behavior is voting against most proposals put forth by
politicians. The most noble of all political objectives is limiting government's
ability to erode our freedoms and reduce our prosperity under the pretense of
noble-sounding objectives.
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The Market as a Process

Freedom and Failure
October 1, 1986

During good times and bad, the economic landscape seems always littered
with rms that have failed, workers who have become unemployed, farmers
who have lost their land, and the residue of entire industries in the process of
withering away. The natural tendency is to see these failures, and the genuine
human hardships that result, as a aw of the economic system that produces
them.

Even those who consider themselves supporters of the market econ-

omy call for government action to buer society against the harsh failures of
unfettered capitalism.
It is certainly the case that when viewed in isolation the consequences of
economic failure appear creel, harsh, and unfair. Because of events over which
they have little or no control, many hard-working, law-abiding citizens experience serious economic hardships in a system of free market capitalism. No
one can argue with credibility that all, or even a signicant minority, of these
victims of economic failure are getting what they deserve in any particular instance of adversity. But economic outcomes that in isolation seem unjustied
may be the necessary consequence of a system that is generating an overall,
long-ran pattern of outcomes that is entirely justied. As Henry Hazlitt has
warned repeatedly, the major source of error in economic understanding comes
from the tendency to concentrate on...short-ran eects on special groups and
to ignore...the long-run eects on the community as a whole.

1

Hazlitt's warning cannot be overemphasized when considering economic failure and the fairness of free market capitalism. Each market failure is an inseparable part of a wider web of interactions and outcomes that provides everyone
the maximum opportunity for success in the world of scarcity. Scarcity is an
unfortunate fact of life, and it is easy to see scarcity itself as unfair. But unless
one is prepared to argue that making the best of an unfortunate situation is
also unfair, there can be nothing unfair about free market capitalism.

1 Henry
17.

Hazlitt, Economics in One Lesson.

And

New York, Arlington House Publishers, 1979; p.

because instances of failure are necessary companions to the general success of
the free market process, it would require a sharp twist of logic to characterize
as unfair the failures that arise from free market activity.
Economic failure is inevitable if we are to have economic
progress. One explanation for this link between failure and progress was provided by Joseph Schumpeter when he described capitalism as a process of creative destruction.

1

The discovery of improved products, and better ways of

producing existing products, necessarily means that many established products
and technologies are valued less. Those who have committed their resources
to these now obsolete products and technologies will suer a decline in wealth
as their investments turn sour and their skills become less employable. They
will experience economic failure. But this destruction of wealth, or economic
failure, is only part of a larger picture of wealth creation and economic success. The loss of wealth experienced by some is (1) a transfer of resources to
those who will put them to more valuable use, and (2) a compelling incentive
to redirect eorts into more productive employment. The process of creative
destruction is our best hope for economic success.

Entrepreneurial Freedom and Failure
There is another vital link between economic failure and progress. Economic
progress that expands opportunities for all is clearly a force for fairness. Such
broad-based economic progress depends on what is best described as the entrepreneurial spirit.

Without those with visions of what might be, and the

dedication and courage to pursue those visions, few of the technologies and
products that provide the foundation for our current wealth would be available.
It is only because individual entrepreneurs have had the freedom to attempt
what the more sensible among us would never have attempted that economic
development has been possible.

2

This does not mean that most entrepreneurial ventures contribute to our
economic well-being. Quite the opposite is true. A relatively small percentage
of the projects promoted by entrepreneurs add more to our wealth than they
consume in time, talent, and resources. Most entrepreneurial ventures turn out
to be exactly what most of us would have predicted in advance,
impractical fantasies.

But, it is impossible to know in advance which en-

trepreneurial gambles will be an economic step forward.

There is only one

way to discover these economic successes, and that is by giving entrepreneurs
the freedom to snub their noses at the conventional wisdom and venture forth
in pursuit of their impossible dreams.
This freedom to attempt success in the face of daunting odds requires an
accompanying freedom to fail. And the freedom to fail has to be suciently
painful that it cannot be ignored. The entrepreneur whose project is rejected
by the consumer will remain convinced that it is the consumer who is mistaken. Unless such entrepreneurial condence is sternly subordinated to con-

1 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York, Harper Torch Books,
1962; pp. 81-86.

2 F.

A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty. The University of Chicago Press. 1960; p. 32.
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sumer preferences, the losses from the many entrepreneurial mistakes would
persist and overwhelm the gains from the relatively few entrepreneurial successes.

Without the discipline of failure forcing accountability to consumer

preferences, entrepreneurial ventures would be economically destructive and
entrepreneurial freedom could not be tolerated.

The economic system that

cannot condone failure cannot risk freedom.

Communication, Honesty, and Concern
There is only one economic system that turns failure into a force for the type
of accountability that makes freedom possible.
capitalism.

That system is free market

It is a system that allows freedom because it is a system that

motivates people, both when they succeed and when they fail, to deal with
each other with honesty and fairness.
Consider the characteristics of a system of human interaction that would be
ideal from the perspective of economic accountability and fairness. First, this
system would have each of us in constant communication with everyone else.
If there is to be any hope of being accountable to the preferences of others in
our use of resources, each of us will need to receive information from others on
their preferences. Second, the communication that took place would be honest.
Transmitting inaccurate information on the value derived from resources would
make it impossible to direct resources into their highest valued uses.

Third,

each individual would give the preferences of others the same weight he gives
his own. No matter how much an individual may desire one economic outcome,
if others communicate to him that they value another outcome even more he
would accommodate their preferences.
It is possible to achieve a real world approximation to this ideal systemfree
market capitalism. The key to understanding this approximation is in recognizing the incentives established by the private property system which forms
the foundation of the market.
In the private property system, resources are transferred from one individual to another through voluntary exchanges. The market prices that arise from
these exchanges are the means by which all market participants communicate
their preferences to each other.

There exist strong incentives for people to

communicate honestly through prices. It is in the interest of all market participants to assess carefully the value realized from dierent resources, and to
communicate their desire for more of a particular resource only if it is honestly
worth more to them than the prevailing market price. The temptation sellers
would otherwise have to overstate the values of their products with excessive
prices is controlled by market competition.
Finally, each market participant is motivated to act as if he has the same
concern for the preferences of others as he has for his own. When an individual
reduces his use of a product in response to a higher price, he is in eect saying,
Others are telling me that this product is worth more to them than it is to
me, so I will consume less so that they can consume more. Similarly, economic
failures such as bankruptcies and unemployment can be thought of as people
saying, Others are telling me that my resources would be more valuable in
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other activities, so I will respond to their preferences. These failures reect
the success of free market capitalism in getting people to cooperate with each
other freely, fairly, and honestly.

Focusing on Failure
Unfortunately, few people heed Henry Hazlitt's warning and look beyond the
isolated trees of economic failure to see the overall forest of economic success.
This oversight is explained in part by the fact that it is easier to concentrate
on particular outcomes than to comprehend the larger pattern of which these
outcomes are only a part. But this is far from a complete explanation. The
fact is that there is more for people to gain as members of organized interest
groups by concentrating on the isolated failures than by considering the overall
success of free market capitalism.
When individuals suer losses from the operation of free market capitalism,
they are in fact making a necessary contribution to the working of an economic
system that serves the long-run interest of all. From the perspective of each
individual, however, the best possible situation would be to receive protection
against personal economic failure while beneting from the contributions the
failures of others make to economic progress. The fundamental fairness of the
free market is that it does not provide anyone a free ride on the contributions of
others. In the free market everyone has to contribute to the general economic
prosperity by accepting the failures as well as the successes that come his way.
It is the legitimate function of government to enforce the private property
rights upon which the fair and honest cooperation of the free market depends.
When property rights are enforced no one can avoid making the cooperative
adjustments required by economic failure while beneting from the cooperative
adjustments economic failures force on others.
Unfortunately, government power, though justied as a means of protecting
property rights, can be destructive of these rights. This abuse of government
power is sure to occur when, as has been the case in recent decades, government
ceases to be viewed as a necessary evil and instead is seen as the primary source
of social progress. Once it becomes widely believed that the discretionary use
of government power is an acceptable means of solving particular economic
problems, economic failure will become a useful justication for the politically
organized to receive unfair advantages at the expense of the politically unorganized.
The negative consequences of economic failure are highly visible because at
any one time they tend to be concentrated on a relatively few. The positive
consequences of economic failure are largely invisible because they are indirect
and spread over the entire population. When the few who experience economic
failure are organized they will see it to their advantage to lobby government for
relief. By granting this relief, politicians receive the gratitude of the beneting
few by imposing a diused cost on the entire population. This imparts a clear
political bias in favor of substituting unfair government force for the fairness
of market cooperation. This bias, however, although generated by the political
muscle of organized special interests, ultimately rests on perceptions of fairness.
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If protecting a particular group against the consequences of economic failure
is widely considered to be an unjust use of government power, then politicians
will be very reluctant to provide such protection. Special interest groups lobbying government for relief from an economic failure cannot rely solely on the
organizational advantage they have over the general public. Success depends
crucially on the perception that justice is served by indemnifying particular
groups against failure. There is much to be gained by those that are, or would
be, politically inuential from portraying their economic failures as unfair. No
one should be surprised that as government has grown, the focus on economic
failures has increased, as has the perception that these failures are unfair. With
government standing ready to transfer wealth to those whom the economy has
treated unfairly, the private payo is increasingly in lamenting the unfairness of failure rather than celebrating the fairness of the cooperation, wealth,
and freedom that this failure makes possible.

Conclusion
The fact is that government cannot reduce economic failure. It can only protect
some against failure by increasing the overall level of failure and imposing it
on others. As Hayek warned over 40 years ago: The more we try to provide
full security by interfering with the market system, the greater the insecurity
becomes; and, what is worse, the greater becomes the contrast between the
security of those to whom it is granted as a privilege and the ever increasing
insecurity of the underprivileged.

1

The special favors granted by government are not only unfair, they become
the justication for yet more futile government attempts to provide security
against economic failure.
Once government starts down the road of buering people against the failures of market activity it becomes dicult to turn back.

And the ultimate

destination if we remain on this road is a politicized economy lacking both fairness and prosperity because it cannot provide the accountability nor tolerate
the freedom which are essential for economic success and honest cooperation.
The best hope for preserving the market process is by advancing public understanding of how this process works to promote a broad-based prosperity. Only
through economic understanding can we pierce the rhetorical facade of fairness used by organized special interests to acquire political favors. Once this
facade has been stripped away, it Will be dicult for political opportunists to
undermine the freedom and prosperity of all under the pretense of concern and
justice.

1 F.

A. Hayek. The Road to Serfdom, The University of Chicago Press. 1944: p. 130.
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The Entrepreneur on the Heroic Journey

April 1, 1997
Dwight R. Lee and Candace Allen

What do you want to be when you grow up? was a question that adults
regularly posed to all of us when we were young. Generally, even as children, we
imagined ourselves becoming like those whose accomplishments we respected
or whose qualities we admired.

At a time when sports gures, Hollywood

personalities, musicians, and even politicians vie for the hearts of the young,
why not honor those among us who provide the energy and strength behind
the invisible hand of economic progress?
Entrepreneurs are, in fact, heroic gures, and their accomplishments are
worth celebrating.

All of us are better o because entrepreneurs have been

willing to attempt what others knew couldn't be done, and then persist in the
face of adversity. Their visions extend beyond existing horizons, and eventually
expand the realm of the realistic, transforming one generation's dreams into
the next generation's necessities.

Who Are Heroes?
Who is a hero? For some, a hero represents a person who embodies such ageold values as honesty, integrity, courage, and bravery.

For others, a hero is

someone who is steadfast or who sets a good example. To many, being a hero
means sacrice, even of life itself, for the sake of others.

Increasingly, many

people nd heroic those who simply gain notoriety or attention.
However, Joseph Campbell, an expert on world mythology, would probably nd all of these denitions to be incomplete.

Campbell contends that

every society celebrates heroes, and in doing so, honors the past, energizes the
present, and shapes the future.

In studying most known cultures, Campbell

has discovered that though details of the heroic path change with time, the
typical journey of the hero can be traced through three stages. In our view,
the entrepreneur travels through all three.

The rst stage involves departure from the familiar and comfortable into the
unknown, risking failure and loss for some greater purpose or idea. The second
stage is encountering hardship and challenge, and mustering the courage and
strength necessary to overcome them. The third is the return to the community
with something new or better than what was there before. Ultimately, the hero
is the representative of the newthe founder of a new age, a new religion, a
new city, or a new way of life that makes people and the world better o.

The Modern Entrepreneurial Hero
In our modern world, the wealth creators, the entrepreneurs,
actually travel the heroic path and are every bit as bold and daring as the
mythical heroes who fought dragons and overcame evil.

With conventional

virtues, the entrepreneur travels through the three stages of the classic journey
of the hero to achieve unconventional outcomes and should serve as a model of
inspiration and guidance for others who follow.
In the rst stage of the heroic journey, the entrepreneur ventures forth from
the world of accepted ways and norms. He asserts, There is a better way, and
I will nd it!

Unlike those who are overwhelmed by the challenges of their

immediate world, the entrepreneur is an optimist, able to see what might be
by rearranging the world in creative and useful ways. The entrepreneur refuses
to accept the conclusions of others about what is or is not possible.
In this rst stage, risk-taking entrepreneurs are motivated by many factors.
Some want to become rich or famous. Others desire to better themselves, their
families, or their communities. Some seek adventure and challenge. Regardless,
they are characterized by energy, vision, and bold determination to push into
the unknown.
In the second stage the entrepreneur nds himself in uncharted territory.
Everything is at stake. The entrepreneur sacrices for an idea, purpose, vision,
or dream that he sees as greater than himself. Comfort and security become
secondary.
Entrepreneurial action is often controversial. An
entrepreneurial educator, for example, might leave the state school system to
nd a better way to provide education to youngsters as an alternative to government schooling. Yet, former colleagues might see him or her as a traitor.
Regardless of what the entrepreneur sacrices during this stage of the heroic
quest, he is impelled into risky, unfamiliar territory.

He must be resilient in

the face of mistakes or failure.
In this discovery stage, the entrepreneur often encounters those who have
a stake in maintaining the status quo. Business opponents may even turn to
the state, as Netscape has pushed the Justice Department to hound Microsoft
for alleged predatory behavior. Professor Don Boudreaux, writing in the Wall
Street Journal, sees this anticompetitive tactic as a serious abuse of the legal
and judicial system in an attempt to prevent entrepreneurs from bringing new
products and services to consumers.
The third stage of the classic heroic journey begins when the entrepreneur
returns to the community with his product, service, or new process. By buying
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the new oerings, the customer acknowledges the entrepreneur's success. The
more prot that is generated, the greater the value of wealth produced. Thus,
prots are the entrepreneur's reward for increasing benets to individuals in
society. Serving in the capacity as wealth creator, the entrepreneur becomes a
social benefactor.
The true heroic entrepreneur will continue to anticipate future challenges.
He is no ordinary business person whose main priority is keeping one step ahead
of his competitors and maintaining market share. Nor does he seek government
subsidy or protection. For him, the quest is to venture forth again and again
into the unknown to create and bring back that which other individuals value.

The Bold Quests of Individuals
Not all people who venture forth on such heroic quests succeed. Approximately
80 percent of new businesses quickly fail. But over three-quarters of all new
jobs each year come from rms no more than four years old. Though large, wellestablished corporations are more visible, one nds the most entrepreneurial
action and risk-taking activity in small business ventures.

Hermann Simon,

author of Hidden Champions: Lessons from 500 of the World's Best Unknown
Companies, argues that many little-known, super-performer companies made
up of two, three, or more highly entrepreneurial folks have control over 50, 70,
and even 90 percent of the world-wide market for their products. For example,
St. Jude Medical has 60 percent of the world's market for articial heart valves.
Today, those individuals (or small groups of them) who are embarked on the
bold quests are the ones who are changing the face of society so rapidly. And
we can look to the future with optimism, since opportunities abound for further
entrepreneurial adventure.
In fact, the changes we have witnessed in our lives since we were children are
likely to pale in comparison to the changes we will see in coming decades. Yet,
while entrepreneurs are essential for this progress, seldom are entrepreneurs
hailed as heroes. To the contrary, typically they are ignored in textbooks, or
castigated as robber barons.

It's no surprise, then, that most adults know

far more about successful politicians than about successful entrepreneurs, and
most admire the former more than the latter. How can a society continue to
prosper when it views those who transfer wealth as more heroic than those who
create it?
Why are entrepreneurs seen as looters and exploiters rather than as heroes?
One reason is the political bias against them. As government control over the
economy has grown, so has the incentive for politically inuential interests to
disparage entrepreneurs. Few, if any, economic forces are more disruptive than
entrepreneurship. But while this creative destruction, in Joseph Schumpeter's
words, is essential to general progress, it harms some individuals and groups
whose wealth is tied to the status quo. Each group wants to gain protection
against progress that imposes costs on itself. The larger government becomes,
the more it acts as a force against progress.

While the entrepreneur with a

superior idea can draw large numbers of customers from existing corporate giants in market competition, he can't mobilize large numbers of citizens against
88

government obstacles to that competition.
Of course, entrepreneurs can often overcome political obstacles, but such
eort diverts attention and energy from the creative activities that propel economic progress. Moreover, political opponents of economic change frequently
vilify individual entrepreneurs. Thus, instead of celebrating entrepreneurs who
do the most to push back the frontiers of the possible, the public often seems
to single them out for condemnation.
Another reason entrepreneurs are criticized is that the connection between
their innovations and economic progress is often indirect and dicult for most
to recognize. For example, few people understand the great contributions made
by Michael Milken and Bill Gates. Special-interest groups with a stake in the
status quo can exploit this lack of understanding to depict entrepreneurs as
rapacious scoundrels.
Indeed, few people understand how capitalism works. Most tend to focus on
the concentrated costs inicted by market competition, while taking for granted
the diused benets made possible by that competition. Trying to explain the
workings of the invisible hand is not an easy task. Educating the public is made
more dicult by intellectuals who use their positions in academia to criticize
capitalism and the entrepreneurial energy that propels it.

Why Individual Entrepreneurs Matter
Even many staunch supporters of the free-market system diminish the importance of entrepreneurs. The economists who have developed the subdiscipline
referred to as the new economic history have been among the most eective
at explaining the causal links between the market and economic progress. Yet
many of these new economic historians dismiss the role of entrepreneurs. For
example, Robert Thomas of the University of Washington argues that individual entrepreneurs, whether alone or as archetypes, just don't matter. According
to Thomas, a successful entrepreneur is no more important to the economy than
the winning runner in a 100-yard dash is to the race. The winner gets all the
glory, but if he had not been in the race, the next runner would have won by
crossing the nish line a fraction of a second later, and the spectators would
have enjoyed the race just as much. Thus, if Henry Ford, Ted Turner, or any
other successful entrepreneur had not made his pioneering contribution, someone else would have quickly done so. So, as Thomas tells the story, it is hard
to justify special celebration of their accomplishments.
Thomas's view is incomplete. Go back to his race analogy. The argument
that a given entrepreneur's accomplishments would, in his absence, quickly be
achieved by others assumes an environment that encourages entrepreneurship.
If the runners themselves, their training, and their eorts during the race are
simply taken as givens, it is no doubt true that removing the winner of the
race would do little to reduce the benets of winning. But the identity of the
runners and their preparation and eorts can't be taken for granted. Competitors are inuenced by treatment aorded the winner. When champion runners
receive public esteem, those with the greatest talent are more likely to become runners, train hard, and run faster. Similarly, public attitudes aect the
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entrepreneurship process.
Of course, the entrepreneur prots nancially if he is successful, which is
one reason critics discount the role of public acclaim. Money is obviously important in directing his eorts into those ventures in which his talents have
the greatest social value. But this actually strengthens the case for celebrating
entrepreneurs. Failing to do so emboldens politicians, and their special-interest
clients, who are constantly looking for justications to tax away the nancial
gains of successful entrepreneurs. It is no coincidence that, over the past century, as public respect for entrepreneurs has eroded, so have the constitutional
barriers against what is best described as the punitive taxation of economic
success.
Thus, just as the society that doesn't venerate winners of races will produce
fewer champion runners than the society that does, the society that does not
honor entrepreneurial accomplishment will nd fewer able people engaged in
wealth-creating activities. And that society will be less well o than the one
which perceives the wealth creator to be a hero.
One last factor helps explain why entrepreneurs are seldom viewed as heroes.
When dening a hero, people often focus on self-sacrice, rather than benets received by other individuals and society.

Yet the vast majority of en-

trepreneurial eorts do fail, often with signicant loss to the entrepreneur.
And when the entrepreneur succeeds, he receives his reward only after having
enriched everyone else even more.

Conclusion
Economists tend to focus on what can be seenthe measurable aspects of the
economy and mechanical understanding of the marketplace as an ecient resource allocator. But abstract economic models seldom inspire. To paraphrase
Schumpeter, economic eciency is a poor substitute for the Holy Grail.

In

human entrepreneurs, in contrast, people, particularly the young, can see and
appreciate those heroic qualities that continuously create a better world.
Some may criticize romanticizing the entrepreneur. But societies are shaped
by the ideals they embrace. If one of our children or grandchildren wanted to
emulate an entrepreneur who heroically struggled in uncharted territory and
ultimately changed the world for the better, we would be proud.
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Constitutional Economics

The Political Economy of the U.S. Constitution

February 1, 1987

During the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution it is appropriate to reect
on the political wisdom of our Founding Fathers.

No written constitution

in history has established a more durable or successful democracy than has
the U.S. Constitution. A full appreciation of the Founding Fathers, however,
requires an understanding of the economic as well as the political consequences
of our Constitution. Every economy is a political economy and the enormous
success of the U.S. economy has been as dependent on our political system as
on our economic system.
Indeed, many of the problems that currently plague the U.S. economy are
the result of our failure to hold on to the political wisdom that guided our
Founding Fathers.

Economic knowledge is obviously important in the eort

to promote economic growth and development. But no matter how sound our
economic understanding, economic performance will continue to suer until
we once again recognize that political power is a force for progress only when
tightly constrained and directed toward limited objectives.
The genesis of the political and economic wisdom of our Founding Fathers
is found in the fact that they distrusted government while fully recognizing the
necessity of government for a benecent social order. The cautious embrace the
Founders gave government is reected in their view of democracy as necessary
but not sucient for the proper control of government.
The concerns that led to the colonists' break with Great Britain were very
much in the public mind when the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787. The well known prerevolution rallying cry,
No taxation without representation, reected a clear understanding of the
dangers that accompanied any exercise of government power not answerable to
those who are governed. That the government established by the Constitution
would be democratic in form was not in doubt.

Unchecked democratic rule,

however, was anathema to the most thoughtful of the Founding Fathers.

A

grievance against English rule rivaling that of taxation without representation concerned the sovereign authority assumed by the English Parliament in

1767. In that year Parliament decreed that, through its democratically elected
members, it had the power to pass or strike down any law it desired.

The

colonists had brought with them the English political tradition, which dated
back at least to the Magna Carta of 1215: the people have certain rights that
should be immune to political trespass regardless of momentary desires of a
democratic majority.

The concern was not only that the colonists were un-

represented in Parliament but, more fundamentally, that Parliament assumed
unlimited power to meddle in the private lives of individuals whether represented or not:
Although the Founding Fathers were determined to establish a government
that was democratic in the limited sense that political decisions could not ignore
citizen input, they had no intention of creating a government that was fully
responsive to majority interests.

In many ways the Constitution is designed

to frustrate the desire of political majorities to work their will through the
exercise of government power. The most obvious example of this is the rst
ten amendments to the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights. These amendments
guarantee certain individual freedoms against political infringement regardless
of majority will. If, for example, freedom of speech and the press was dependent
on majority vote many unpopular but potentially important ideas would never
be disseminated. How eectively would a university education expose students
to new and controversial ideas if professors had to submit their lectures for
majority approval?
Other examples exist of the undemocratic nature of the government set
up by the Constitution.

There is very little that can be considered demo-

cratic about the Supreme Court. Its nine members are appointed for life, and
their decision can nullify a law passed by the Congress and supported by the
overwhelming majority of the American public. In a ve to four decision one
member of the court, insulated from the democratic process, can frustrate the
political will of a nearly unanimous public. The arrangement whereby the President can reverse the will of the Congress through his veto power is certainly
not a very democratic one.

Neither is the Senate where the vote cast by a

senator from Wyoming carries weight equal to the vote by the senator from
California, even though the California senator represents a population fty
times larger than does the Wyoming senator. The senators from the twenty-six
least populated states can prevent a bill from clearing Congress, even though it
has incontestable popular support in the country at large. Congress is actually
less democratic than just indicated once it is recognized that popular bills can
be prevented from ever being considered in the full House of Representatives
or Senate by a few representatives who serve on key congressional committees.
It is safe to say that the chief concern of the framers of the Constitution
was not that of in suring a fully democratic political structure. Instead they
were concerned with limiting government power in order to minimize the abuse
of majority rule. In the words of R. A. Humphreys, they [the Founding Fathers] were concerned not to make America safe for democracy, but to make
democracy safe for America.

1 R.

A. Humphreys.

1

The Rule of Law and the American Revolution, Law Quarterly
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Prelude to the Constitutional Convention
Fear of the arbitrary power that could be exercised by a strong central government, democratically controlled or otherwise, was evident from the Articles
of Confederation. The Articles of Confederation established the national government of the thirteen colonies after they declared their independence from
England. There is some exaggeration in this use of the term national government, since the Articles did little more than formalize an association (or confederation) of thirteen independent and sovereign states. While the congress
created by the Articles of Confederation was free to deliberate on important
issues and pass laws, it had no means of enforcing them. The Articles did not
even establish an executive branch of government, and congressional resolutions
were nothing more than recommendations that the states could honor if they
saw t. The taxes that states were assessed to support the Revolutionary War
eort were often ignored, and raising money to outt and pay the American
army was a frustrating business.
Because of the weakness of the national government, the state governments
under the Article of Confederation were strong and often misused their power.
Majority coalitions motivated by special interests found it relatively easy to
control state legislatures and tramp on the interests of minorities. Questionable
banking schemes were promoted by debtors, with legislative assistance, in order
to reduce the real value of their debt obligations. States often resorted to the
simple expedient of printing money to satisfy their debts. Trade restrictions
between the states were commonplace as legislators responded to the interests
of organized producers while ignoring the concerns of the general consumers.
There was a 1786 meeting in Annapolis, Maryland of the ve middle states
to discuss ways to reduce trade barriers between the states. At this meeting
the call was made for a larger meeting in Philadelphia in the following year to
discuss more general problems with the Articles of Confederation. This meeting
became the Constitutional Convention.

Achieving Weakness Through Strength
It was the desire of Madison, Hamilton, and other leaders at the Constitutional
Convention to replace the government established by the Articles of Confederation with a central government that was more than an association of sovereign
states. The new government would have to be strong enough to impose some
uniformity to nancial, commercial, and foreign policy and to establish some
general protections for citizens against the power of state governments if the
new nation was to be viable and prosperous. In the words of James Madison,
we needed a general government suciently strong to protect the rights of
the minority, which are in jeopardy in all cases where a majority are united
by a common interest or passion.

1

But this position was not an easy one to

Review 11937). Also quoted in F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1960). p. 474.
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Many opponents to a genuine national government saw little merit

in the desire to strengthen government power at one level in order to prevent
the abuse of government power at another level. Was there any genuine way
around this apparent conict? Many thought not, short of giving up on the
hope of a union of all the states. There were those who argued that the expanse
and diversity of the thirteen states, much less that of the larger continent, were
simply too great to be united under one government without sacricing the
liberty that they had just fought to achieve.

1

Madison, however, saw no conict in strengthening the national government in order to control the abuses of government in general. In his view the
best protection against arbitrary government authority was through centers of
government power that were in eective com petition with one another. The
control that one interest group, or faction, could realize through a state government would be largely nullied when political decisions resulted from the
interaction of opposing factions within many states. Again quoting Madison,
The inuence of factious leaders may kindle a ame within their particular
States but will be unable to spread a general conagration through the other
States...A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division
of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to
pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it...

2

A central government strong enough to unite a large and diverse set of states
would weaken, rather than strengthen, the control that government in general
could exercise.
To the framers of the Constitution weakening government in the sense just
discussed meant making sure that government was unable to extend itself beyond a relatively limited role in the aairs of individuals. This does not imply,
however, impotent government. The referees in a football game, for example,
certainly are not the strongest participants on the eld and have limited control over specic outcomes in the game. Yet in enforcing the general rules of
the game the decisions of the referees are potent indeed. Government, in its
role as referee, obviously cannot lack the authority to back up its decisions. In
addition to performing its refer-eeing function, it is also desirable for government to provide certain public goods; goods such as national defense that will
not be adequately provided by the private market. Again this is a duty which
requires a measure of authority; in this case the authority to impose taxes up
to the limit required to provide those public goods which are worth more than
they cost.

How to Impose Control?
In granting government the power to do those things government should do,
the Founding Fathers knew they were creating a power that had to be carefully
controlled. But how could this control be imposed? It could not be imposed by

1 See

Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were for: The Political Thought of

the Opponents of the Constitution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1987).

2 Madison

in Federalist 10. The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library.

Edition. 1961).
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specifying a particular list of government do's and don't's. Such a list would be
impossibly detailed and even if it could be drafted it would need to be revised
constantly in response to changes in such considerations as population size, age
distribution, wealth, and the state of technology. Instead, government has to be
controlled by a general set of constitutional rules within which governmental
decisions are made, with specic government outcomes determined through
the resulting political process. It was the hope of those at the Constitutional
Convention to establish a political process, through constitutional reform, that
brought government power into action only when needed to serve the broad
interests of the public.
This hope was not based on the naive, though tempting, notion that somehow individuals would ignore their personal advantages and concentrate on the
general advantage when making political decisions.

While noble motives are

seldom completely absent in guiding individual behavior, whether private or
public, the Founding Fathers took as a given that most people, most of the
time, maintain a healthy regard for their private concerns. The only way to
prevent self- seeking people from abusing government power was to structure
the rules of the political game in such a way that it would be costly for them
to do so. The objective of the framers was to create a government that was
powerful enough to do those things that received political approval, but to establish a political process that made it exceedingly dicult to obtain political
approval for any action that lacked broad public support.
There were, of course, some powers that the national government was not
constitutionally permitted to exercise. The national government was created
by the states, and until the Constitution all governmental power resided in
the states.

Through the Constitution the states re linquished some of their

powers to the national government, e.g., the power to impose taxes on the
citizens, establish uniform rules of naturalization, raise an army and navy, and
declare war.

In addition the states agreed to refrain from exercising certain

powers; e.g., the power to coin money, pass laws impairing the obligation of
contracts, and pass retroactive laws. Important government powers remained in
the states, however, with some of them located in the local governments. Thus
the powers that could be exercised by government were limited, and the powers
that did exist were diused over three levels of government. The Constitution
further diused power at the national level by spreading it horizontally over
three branches of government, the power of each acting as a check and balance
on the power of the others.
The intent of the Founding Fathers was to so fragment government power
that it would be extremely dicult for any narrowly motivated faction to gain
sucient control to work its political will. Only those objectives widely shared
and consistent with Constitutional limits would be realized through the use
of government power. The beauty of the political process established by the
Constitution is that it is cumbersome and inecient. According to Forrest McDonald the process is So cumbersome and inecient...that the people, however
virtuous or wicked, could not activate it. It could be activated through deals
and deceit, through bargains and bribery, through logrolling and lobbying and
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trickery and trading, the tactics that go with man's baser attributes, most
notably his greed and his love of power.

And yet, in the broad range and

on the average, these private tactics and motivations could operate eectively
only when they were compatible with the public good, for they were braked by
the massive inertia of society as a whole.

1

Or, as Clinton Rossiter has said of

the Founding Fathers' motives in creating the system of checks and balances,
Liberty rather than authority, protection rather than power, delay rather than
eciency were the concern of these constitution-makers.

2

The Economic Success of the Constitution
It is hard to argue with the success of the U.S. Constitution. The history of
the United States in the decades after the ratication of the Constitution was
one of limited government and individual liberty, major increases in the size of
the U.S. in terms of population and geography, and unprecedented growth in
economic well-being. With the major exception of (and to a large extent, in
spite of ) the unfortunate legacy of slavery and the Civil War, millions of diverse
people were able to pursue their individual objectives through harmonious and
productive interaction with one another.

The opportunities created by the

process of specialization and exchange made possible by limited and responsible
government motivated an outpouring of productive eort that soon transformed
a wilderness into one of the most prosperous nations in the world. The role the
U.S. Constitution played in this transformation was an important one and can
be explained in terms of both negative and positive incentives.
Broadly speaking there are two ways an individual can acquire Wealth: 1)
capture existing wealth through nonproductive transfer activities, or 2) create
new wealth through productive activities. A major strength of the Constitution
is that it established positive incentives for the latter activities and negative
incentives for the former.
The most obvious form of nonproductive transfer activity is private theft.
The thief simply takes through force or stealth something that belongs to someone else. A primary purpose for establishing government is to outlaw private
theft. But the power that government necessarily possesses if it is to enforce
laws against private theft is a power that aords individuals or groups the opportunity to benet through public theft (legal transfer activity to phrase it
more gently). The more vague and ineective the limits on government authority, the less dicult it is to acquire legal transfers through political activity,
and the larger the number of people who will nd this activity oering them
the greatest prot opportunity.
While those who are successful at the transfer game can increase their personal wealth, in some cases signicantly, it is obvious that the country at large
cannot increase its wealth through transfer activity. What one person receives
is what another person, or group, loses. No net wealth is created, and for this

1 Forrest
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reason transfer activity is often referred to as a zero-sum game. In fact, it is
more accurately described as a negative-sum game. The attempts of some to
acquire transfers, and the predictable eorts of others to protect their ` wealth
against transfers, require the use of real resources. These resources could be
productively employed creating new wealth rather than wasted in activities
that do nothing more than redistribute existing wealth. For every dollar that
one person receives from a transfer activity the rest of the community sacrices
more than a dollar.

Incentives to Produce
A major virtue of the U.S. Constitution was that it discouraged people from
playing the transfer game. By establishing a governmental apparatus that was
very dicult to put in motion for narrowly motivated purposes, the Constitution dampened the incentive to use government as a means of acquiring the
wealth of others.

This is not to say that the government was not used as a

vehicle for transfer in the early days of our Constitutional government. Every
political decision results in some redistribution of wealth, and no governmental
structure will ever completely insulate the political process against the trans1

fer activities of some.

But the opportunity for personal enrichment through

political activity was limited. Most people found that the best way to increase
their wealth was through wealth producing activities.
It was here that the political structure established by the Constitution created positive incentives. Not only did the Constitution establish a climate in
which it was dicult to prot from transfer activities, it also created a setting
in which productive eort was rewarded. By providing protection against the
arbitrary taking of private property (the Fifth Article of the Bill of Rights) people were given assurance that they would not be denied the value generated by
their eorts. This provided people with strong incentives to apply themselves
and their property diligently. In the words of M. Bruce Johnson, America was
a place where if you were ready to sow, then by God you could reap.

2

But the motivation to work hard is not enough for a productive economy.
Also needed is information on the objectives toward which eort and resources
are best directed, as well as incentives to act on this information.

It is the

protection of private property that provides the foundation for a system of
price communication and market interaction which serves to guide eort and
resources into their most valuable employments. To complete this system the
concept of private property rights has to be expanded to include the right to
transfer one's property to others at terms regulated only by the mutual consent
of those who are party to the exchange.

The lower the cost of entering into

transactions of this type, the more eectively the resulting market prices will allow people to communicate and coordinate with each other to the advantage of

1 For

a discussion of the use of government to transfer wealth throughout American his-
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all. The U.S. Constitution lowered these transaction costs by reducing government's ability to interfere with mutually acceptable exchanges and by putting
the weight of the national government behind the sanctity of the contracts that
resulted from these exchanges.
In what has become known as the contract clause of the Constitution,
the states are for bidden from passing any law impairing the obligation of
contracts... In the same clause the states are also forbidden from imposing
tari duties on imports or exports (unless absolutely necessary for enforcing
inspection laws). In the commerce clause the national government was given
the power to regulate commerce among the several states. Though the commerce clause can be interpreted (and indeed has been in recent decades) as
providing the central government the authority to substitute political decisions
for market decisions over interstate commerce, the U.S. Congress ignored this
possibility until it passed the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887. Prior to the
Civil War the commerce clause was used instead by the U.S. Supreme Court to
rule unconstitutional state laws that attempted to regulate commerce. After
1868 the Supreme Court made use of the doctrine of due process as expressed
in the fourteenth amendment to strike down many government attempts to violate the sanctity of contracts through their regulation of such things as prices,
working hours, working conditions, and pay.
In summary, the Constitution created an environment in which private advantage was best Served by engaging in productive positive-sum activities. The
specialization and exchange facilitated by the Constitutional rules of the game
is a system in which individuals can improve their own position only by serving
the interests of others. When private property is protected against conscation,
an individual becomes wealthy only by developing skills, creating new products,
or innovating better technologies and thereby providing .consumers with more
attractive options than they would otherwise have. In a truly free enterprise
economy, with the minimum government role envisioned by the framers of the
Constitution, the rich are the benefactors of the masses, not the exploiters as
commonly depicted. Wealth through exploitation becomes possible only when
unrestricted government allows negative-sum transfer activity to become more
protable than positive-sum market activity.

Constitutional Erosion and the Rise of Political Piracy
The early success of the Constitution, and the economic system that developed
under it, is reected in the fact that relatively few people felt any urgency to
worry about politics. Political activity oered little return as there was little
chance to exploit others, and little need to prevent from being exploited by others, through political involvement. People could safely get on with their private
aairs without having to worry about the machinations and intrigues of politicians and bureaucrats in faraway places. But this very success can, over time,
undermine itself as a politically complacent public increases the opportunities
for those who are politically involved to engage in political chicanery.
Motivating people to maintain the political vigilance necessary to protect
themselves against government is always a dicult task. The individual who
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becomes involved in political activity incurs a direct cost. By devoting time and
resources in attempting to realize political objectives he is sacricing alternative
objectives.

The motivation to become politically active will be a compelling

one only if the expected political outcome is worth more to the individual
than the necessary personal sacrices. This will typically not be the case when
the objective is to prevent government from undermining the market process
that it is government's proper role to protect. The benets that are realized
from limited government are general benets.

These benets accrue to each

individual in the community whether or not he personally works to constrain
government.
Over the broad range of political issues, then, people quite rationally do
not want to get involved.

This is not to say, however, that everyone will

be apathetic about all political issues.

This clearly is not the case, and it

is possible to predict the circumstances that will motivate political activism.
Often a relatively small number of individuals will receive most of the benet
from a particular political decision, while the community at large bears the
cost.

Members of such a special interest group will nd it relatively easy to

organize for the purpose of exerting political inuence. The number of people
to organize is comparatively small; the group is probably already somewhat
organized around a common interest, and the political issues that aect this
common interest will be of signicant importance to each member of the group.
Of course, the free rider problem exists in all organizational eorts, but
the smaller the group and the narrower the objective the easier it is to get
everyone to contribute his share. Also, the benets of eective eort can be so
great to particular individuals in the group that they will be motivated to work
for the common objective even if some members of the group do free-ride. Not
surprisingly then, narrowly focused groups commonly will have the motivation
and ability to organize for the purpose of pursuing political objectives.

1

The

result is political piracy in which the politically organized are able to capture
ill-gotten gains from the politically unorganized.
The Constitutional limits on government imposed eective restraints on
political piracy for many years after the Constitution was ratied. There are
undoubtedly many explanations for this.

The vast frontier rich in natural

resources oered opportunities for wealth creation that, for most people, overwhelmed the opportunities for personal gain through government transfer activity. Also, it can take time for politically eective coalitions to form after the
slate has been wiped clean, so to speak, by a social upheaval of the magnitude
of rst the Revolutionary War and then the Civil War.

2

Public attitudes were

also an important consideration in the control of government.
Much has been written about how the pervasive distrust of government

1 According
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power among the American people shaped the framing of a Constitution that
1

worked to limit government.

What might be more important is that the

Constitution worked to limit government because the public had a healthy
distrust of government power.

For example, in the 1860s the Baltimore and

Ohio railroad had its Harpers Ferry bridge blown up many times by both the
Confederate and Union armies, and each time the railroad rebuilt the bridge
with its own funds without any attempt to get the government to pick up part
of the tab. Or consider the fact that in 1887 President Grover Cleveland vetoed
an appropriation of $25,000 for seed corn to assist drought-stricken farmers with
the statement, It is not the duty of government to support the people.

2

There

is little doubt that Cleveland's view on this matter was in keeping with broad
public opinion.
The Constitutional safeguards against government transfer activity unfortunately have lost much of their eectiveness over the years.

The western

frontier disappeared, and a long period of relative stability in the political order provided time for factions to become entrenched in the political process.
Of more direct and crucial importance, however, in the move from productive
activity to transfer activity has been the weakening judicial barrier to the use
of government to advance special interests. The 1877 Supreme Court decision
in Munn v. Illinois is often considered to be a watershed case. This decision
upheld a lower court ruling that the Illinois state legislature had the authority
to determine the rates that could be charged for storing grain. This decision,
by sanctioning an expanded role for government in the determination of prices,
increased the payo to political activity relative to market activity and established an important precedent for future increases in that payo.
In Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Minnesota, decided
in 1890, the Supreme Court imposed what appeared to be limits on state regulation of economic activity by ruling that such regulation must be reasonable.
Unfortunately, this reasonableness doctrine put the eectiveness of judicial restraint on government at the mercy of current fashion in social thought. What
is considered unreasonable at one time may be considered quite reasonable at
3

another.

It was unreasonable for the Baltimore and Ohio railroad to consider

requesting government funds to repair its Harpers Ferry bridge, destroyed by
government forces, during the Civil War. In the 1980s it was considered reasonable for Chrysler Corporation to request and receive a federal government
bailout because Chrysler was not competing successfully for the consumer's
dollar.

1 Gordon
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this pattern of judicial decisions was not solid enough to prevent these decisions from being
ignored or overruled when the political climate and prevailing notions of reasonableness
changed.
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Undermining Constitutional Law
The idea of reasonable regulation signicantly undermined the concept of a
higher Constitutional law that established protections needed for the long-run
viability of a free and productive social order. Once the notion of reasonable
regulation stuck its nose into the judicial tent it was just a matter of time
before the courts began seeing their task as that of judging particular outcomes rather than overseeing the general rules of the game. Illustrative of this
changing emphasis was the legal brief submitted by Louis Brandeis, then an
attorney for the state of Oregon, in the 1908 case Muller v. Oregon. At issue
was the constitutionality of an Oregon law which regulated the working hours
of women. The Brandeis brief contained only a few pages addressing constitutional considerations and well over one hundred pages of social economic
data and argumentation attempting to establish the unfortunate consequences
of women working long hours.

It was a judgment on the reasonableness of

a particular outcome, women working long hours, rather than constitutional
considerations, which were considered of paramount importance and led to a
Supreme Court ruling in favor of Oregon.

1

When the constitutionality of legis-

lation stands or falls on the reasonableness of the particular outcomes it hopes
to achieve, opportunities increase for people to increase their wealth through
nonproductive political activity.
In the 1911 case United States v.

Grimand, the Supreme Court handed

down a decision that signicantly increased the private return to obtaining
transfers through political inuence. Prior to this decision, the U.S. Congress
had increasingly moved toward granting administrative agencies the authority
to promulgate specic rules in order to implement the general policy objectives
outlined by Congress.

In United States v.

Grimand the high court empow-

ered these administrative rulings with the full force of law. After this decision,
the cost of successfully using government authority to transfer wealth decreased
signicantly as special interest groups seeking preferential treatment could concentrate their inuence on a few key members of a particular administrative
board or agency. The typical result of this has been the development of symbiotic relationships between bureaucratic agencies and their special interest
clients.

A special interest group can thrive on the benets transferred to it

by the ruling of a bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy's budget and prestige will
2

depend on a thriving special interest group demanding its services.

1 For

a brief but useful discussion of this case see Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of

Regulation (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge. 19841.
pp. 87-88.
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relationship between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the farm bloc is but

one of many illustrative examples that could be cited here. It is clear that those employed by
the Department of Agriculture strongly support the agricultural price support and subsidy
programs that transfer literally billions of dollars from the American consumer and taxpayer
to the nation's farmers most of this transfer goes to the largest and wealthiest farmers;
see Bruce L. Gardner. The Governing of Agriculture [Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas.
1981]). It is by expanding these programs that the Department of Agriculture can justify
bigger budgets and more employees, something it has been quite successful at doing. In 1920
when the farm population was approximately 31 million, the Department of Agriculture
employed 19,500 people. By 1975 the farm population had declined to less than 9 million,
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What we have observed over the years is a slow, somewhat erratic, but
unmistakable breakdown in the protection the Constitution provides the public
against arbitrary government power. Those who want to get on with the task of
creating new wealth have much less assurance today then they did in the past
that signicant portions of the wealth they create will not be conscated by
government and transferred to those who have specialized in political inuence.
Maintaining constitutional constraints on government transfer activity is
a task requiting constant vigilance.

Once a breakdown in these constraints

begins, it can initiate a destructive dynamic of increasing government transfers
that is dicult to control. Any change that makes it easier to obtain transfers
through government will motivate some people to redirect their eorts away
from productive enterprises and into transfer enterprises. As this is done, those
who continue to create new wealth nd the payo from doing so is somewhat
diminished as more of this wealth is being taken from them.

This further

reduction in the relative return to productive activity motivates yet more people
to use government power to benet at the expense of others. Furthermore, the
burdens and ineciencies created by one government program will be used
as justication for yet additional government programs which will create new
burdens and ineciencies.
as a transfer society.

1

This dynamic can lead to what is best characterized

2

Political Piracy and the Transfer Society
Once we start down the road to the transfer society we can easily nd ourselves
trapped in a situation almost everyone will disapprove of, but which no one
will be willing to change. The analogy of piracy is appropriate here. When all
ships are productively employed shipping the goods, a large amount of wealth
can be generated.

But if sanctions against piracy are eased a few shippers

may nd it to their personal advantage to stop shipping and start pirating the
merchandise being shipped by others, even though this reduces the total wealth
available. This piracy by the few will reduce the return the others receive from
shipping, and there will be an increase in the number nding the advantage
in piracy. Eventually the point may be reached where everyone is sailing the
seas looking for the booty that used to be shipped but is no longer. No one
is doing well under these circumstances, and indeed, all would be much better
o if everyone would return to shipping the goods. Yet who will be willing to
return to productive shipping when everyone else is a pirate?
but the Department of Agriculture had increased its employment to 121.000 people. This
trend toward fewer agricultural workers relative to agricultural bureaucrats has continued
into the 1980s.

1 Our

Federal farm programs are a perfect example of this process. See Gardner, ibid,

Early on, James Madison recognized the possibility of this type of legislative chain reaction.
In Federalist 44 Madison states. that legislative interference, is but the rst link of a long
chain of repetitions; every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the eects of
the preceding.

2 For a detailed and compelling analysis of how the breakdown in constitutional limitations

on government activity has moved the U.S. away from positive-sum economic activity and
toward nega-tive-sum activity, see Terry L, Anderson and Peter J, Hill, The Birth of a
Transfer Society (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press. 1980).
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Obviously, we have not yet arrived at the point of being a full-blown transfer
society; not everyone has become a political pirate. There are plenty of people
who remain productive, and they still receive a measure of protection against
the conscation of the returns to their eorts by the constitutional limitations
that remain on government power.

But there can be no doubt that these

limitations are less eective today than they were in the past. This erosion is
in large measure due to a change in the prevailing attitude toward government.
The fear of unrestrained government power that guided the Founding Fathers
has been largely replaced with the view that discretionary government power
is a force for social good.

If there is a problem, government supposedly has

the obligation and ability to solve it.

Such public attitudes have a decisive

inuence on the eectiveness of constitutional limitations.
Simply writing something down on a document called the Constitution does
not by itself make it so.

And, because of this fact, Alexis de Tocqueville,

writing in the 1830s, predicted that the U.S. Constitution would eventually
cease to exercise eective restraint on government. According to Tocqueville,
The government of the Union depends almost entirely upon legal ctions. He
continued that it would be dicult to imagine that it is possible by the aid of
legal ctions to prevent men from nding out and employing those means of
gratifying their passions which have been left open to them.

1

But controlling our passions is what constitutional government is all about.
In the absence of government we have the anarchy of the Hobbesian jungle in
which those who control their passion for immediate gratication-and apply
their eorts toward long-run objectives only increase their vulnerability to the
predation of those who exercise no control or foresight. Granting government
the power to enforce general rules of social interaction is surely a necessary
condition if a productive social order is to emerge from a state of anarchy. But
without strict constitutional limits on the scope of government activity, the existence of government power will only increase the scope of eective predation.
The notion that government can solve all problems becomes a convenient pretense for those who would solve their problems, not in cooperation with others,
but at the expense of others. Unlimited government reduces the personal advantage to the productive pursuit of long-run objectives just as surely as does
anarchy. In such a case, government is little more than the means of moving
from the anarchy of the Hobbesian jungle to the anarchy of the political jungle.
The American experience, however, demonstrates convincingly that with
a healthy fear of government power and a realistic understanding of human
nature, a constitution can be designed that, over a long period of time, will
eectively constrain government to operate within the limits dened by the
delicate balance between proper power and prudent restraint. All that is needed
to restore the U.S. Constitution to its full eectiveness is a return to the political
wisdom that guided our Founding Fathers 200 years ago.

1 Quoted

in Felix Morley, Freedom and Federalism, (Chicago: Regnery, 1959): pp. 138-

139.
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Conclusion
The U.S. is a wealthy country today in large part because our Founding Fathers had what can be quite accurately described as a negative attitude toward
government.

They had little condence in the ability of government to pro-

mote social well-being through the application of government power to achieve
particular ends. In their view, the best that government can realistically hope
to achieve is the establishment of a social setting in which individuals are free,
within the limits of general laws, to productively pursue their own objectives.
This negative view of government contrasts sharply with the dominant view
today; the view that government is the problem solver of last resort and has
an obligation to provide a solution to any problem not resolved immediately
in the private sector. Unfortunately, this positive view of government is less
conducive to positive consequences than the negative view of the Founders.
According to F. A. Hayek:

The rst [positive view] gives us a sense of unlimited power to realize our
wishes, while the second [negative view] leads to the insight that there are limitations to what we can deliberately bring about, and to the recognition that
some of our present hopes are delu sions. Yet the eect of allowing ourselves
to be deluded by the rst view has always been that man has actually limited
the scope of what he can achieve. For it has always been the recognition of the
limits of the possible which has enabled man to make full use of his powers.1
The exercise of government can, without doubt, be used to accomplish
particular ends. Neither can it be denied that many of the specic outcomes
realized through government programs provide important benets and advance
worthy objectives. But, as is always the case, those accomplishments are only
realized at a cost, and the pervasive truth about government accomplishments
is that those who benet from them are seldom those who pay the cost. Indeed, much of the motivation for engaging in political actions is to escape the
discipline imposed by the market where individuals are accountable for the cost
of their choices.
The escape from market discipline is the inevitable consequence of reducing
the constitutional limits on the use of government power. The immediate and
visible benets that are generated by wide-ranging government discretion are
paid for by a shift in the incentive structure that, over the long run, will reduce
the amount of good that can be accomplished.

More, much more, has been

accomplished by the American people because our Founding Fathers had a
strong sense of the limits on what can be accomplished by government.

1 Friedrich

A. Hayek, Law. Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 1 Rules and Order (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press. 1973). p. 8.
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Liberty and Individual Responsibility

April 1, 1987

Liberty is both a highly valued outcome of a benecent political economy,
and an essential ingredient into it. In some respects a consideration of the role
of liberty as both output and input is straightforward. Limited government,
serving to maintain the legal environment necessary for an economic order
based on private property and voluntary exchange, provides fertile ground for
individual liberty. And the lifeblood of a political economy characterized by
limited government, private property, and voluntary exchange, is the ow of
information that can be provided only when individuals possess a full measure
of political and economic liberty.
However, a careful examination of how a political economy based on classical liberal principles both nourishes, and is nourished by, individual liberty
reveals a complicated interaction between the social institutions necessary for
liberty and the exercise of liberty. The exercise of liberty, unless tempered by
a responsibility that can never be imposed entirely by a force external to the
ethical convictions of the individual, will with time undermine the social institutions upon which liberty depends. A careful study of the political economy of
liberty contains within it a warning of just how fragile is the foundation upon
which liberty stands.

Scarcity, Rules, and Liberty
In order to examine the connections between economics, politics, and liberty,
it is useful to consider rst the most fundamental of economic problems. That
problem is scarcity. In a world without scarcity each of us could be entirely
independent of others. Each individual could exercise complete freedom in a
broad range of activities and have no impact whatsoever on anyone else. Because we live in a world of scarcity, individuals must interact with one another
and this interaction is shaped by rules of social conduct. Such rules impose restrictions on the activities of individuals and establish the important distinction

between liberty and license. Without the restrictions imposed by such rules,
scarcity itself would impose on us an even more conning set of restrictions.
Consider the fact that although scarcity makes cooperation desirable, it
makes competition inevitable.

Each of us wants more than he has and the

only way to get more is by competing against others for control over limited
resources. Competition is commonly seen as the source of a host of social ills,
with the replacement of competition by cooperation suggested as necessary for
social improvement. What this view fails to recognize is that competition is not
the cause, but rather the consequence, of the ultimate social ill, namely scarcity.
With no way to eliminate scarcity, the important question is not how to prevent
competition, but how to provide rules for social conduct that motivate the type
of competitive behavior which leads to productive and cooperative outcomes.
Competition can be either productive or destructive depending on the rules
that dene permissible limits in our dealings with one another.
Consider the possibility of no rules, or more accurately the rule of force.
Everyone would be free to do whatever he wanted as long as he possessed the
power to force his will on others.

In this setting, people would be forced to

compete through the exercise of unrestrained brute strength and there would
be no freedom in the meaningful sense of independence of the arbitrary will of
another.

1

If one person had enough physical power he could force others to work
for him without compensation, to be his slave. But the master today has no
assurance that he will not be someone else's slave tomorrow.
Neither is the rule of force likely to motivate productive and cooperative
outcomes. There would be little motivation to devote one's eort to the production of wealth since there would exist no protections against its forcible
expropriation by others. Competing successfully would depend more on developing the skills needed for plundering and defending against plunder than on
developing the skills needed to produce wealth. Even if one were able to survive in such a social environment, one's standard of living would be low. With
resources being devoted overwhelmingly to predation and protection from the
predatory activity of others, little would be produced and poverty would be the
norm. Life in such a Hobbesian jungle would indeed be solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short.
Freedom from rules is simply not a viable social possibility.

In a society

without rules there would be little prosperity and no genuine freedom.

Social Order at the Sacrice of Liberty
Emergence from the Hobbesian jungle, which nds a war of each against all, is
necessary if we are to realize the benets of a civil social order. Underlying any
benecent social order are rules that will impose limits on individual behavior.
All rules serve to limit freedom of action.

1 The

However, when rules are applied

usefulness of this denition of freedom is explained by F. A. Hayek in his The

Constitution of Liberty (The University of Chicago Press. 19603. See especially chapters I
and 2.
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generally they can, by limiting the actions of each in predictable ways, expand
the liberty of all.

2

On the other hand, when they become too numerous and detailed, rules can
destroy liberty just as surely and eectively as no rules. And the tendency is in
the direction of too many rules. Traditionally the obsession within societies has
been the horrors of disorder. With plunder, riot, rape, mayhem, and murder
the common experience, the loss of liberty has been seen as the unavoidable
cost of escaping disorder. The prevalent human condition throughout history
has been subjugation to rigid and brutally enforced rules that specify the type
and location of one's work, travel, religious practices, and even social status.
The overriding problem of society has been that of maintaining order, and only
the most limited amount of liberty has been considered compatible with this
objective.
While a rigid social order based on detailed rules concerning every aspect of
behavior may be preferred to the chaos that would prevail in the absence of all
rules, the shortcomings of such a social order are apparent. The rst problem
is to nd leaders who can be trusted with the power that has to be exercised in
a totally controlled society. Such power is subject to enormous abuse. Those
who have such power are in a position to advance their interests at the expense
of their subjects, and will seldom be able to resist the temptation to do so. The
only possible advantage an all powerful government has over anarchy is that
the exercise of government power is visible.

Moving from the anarchy of no

rules to the detailed control of leviathan government is to substitute one thief
in the light for many thieves in the night.
The cost in terms of sacriced liberty is much the same regardless of whether
it is sacriced to anarchy or to unlimited government. One who nds himself
forced to toil for the benet of others is not likely to care who his masters
arethe physically dominant brutes in the jungle or the politically dominant
brutes in the government.
So, traditionally, the social choice appeared to have been between some
combination of two undesirable states: the regimentation of detailed rules or
the lack of social order. Society could have less of one only at the cost of having
more of the other. There appeared to be no realistic hope that individuals living
together in a world of scarcity could simultaneously have both more liberty and
more social order. It was in the 17th and 18th centuries that philosophers began
to give serious consideration to a structure of rules that oered the possibility
of overcoming this social dilemma.

2 In

3

the words of John Locke, The end of law is not to abolish or restrain but to preserve

and enlarge freedom; for in all the stales of created beings capable of laws, where there is no
law. there is no freedom. For liberty is to be free from the restraint and violence of others,
which cannot be when there is no law; but freedom is not, as we are told. a liberty for every
man to do what he lists. For who can be free, when every other man's humor might domineer
over him? See John Locke. The Second Treatise of Government. ed. by Thomas P. Perdon
(New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 19543, pp. 32-33.

3 The

rst recorded awareness that individual liberty could be expanded under a set

of universally applied rules (the rule of law) comes from the ancient Greeks.

particularly

the Athenians during the fth and fourth centuries B.C. The Greek ideals of liberty were
kept alive by Roman writers, such as Cicero, whose work was important to the modern
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The Rule of Private Property
It was the writings of John Locke, Adam Smith, Bernard Mandeville, and
other 17th-and 18th- century philosophers that gave modern birth to the ideal
of compatibility between individual liberty and social order.

Crucial to this

ideal was a fundamental conceptual shift regarding the role of rules.

Social

rules were traditionally seen as necessary to force particular outcomes which
were required if a productive social order was to be maintained. Fields had to
he tilled, cloth had to be woven, cattle had to be tended, and particular services
had to be rendered. Concentrating authority in the hands of a ruler who could
require these things to be done was seen as the only guarantee that they would
he done. The fundamental insight of the aforementioned philosophers was that
establishing general rules of social conduct, which ignored particular outcomes,
could create an environment in which desirable outcomes emerged from the
exercise of individual liberty.
Crucial to this liberating view of social order are rules which clearly dene
individual rights by providing assurances that individuals can plan and carry
out their activities without the return to their activities being arbitrarily conscated by others. Lacking such assurances, little motivation exists for people
to be productive and no basis exists for them to interact with each other in a
civil manner.
The rule of private property can now be seen as crucial to the goal of
a productive social order that is compatible with, indeed dependent upon,
individual liberty. The rule of private property requires that individual rights
to property be well dened and subject to transfer from one individual to
another by mutual consent of both parties.

When liberties are constrained

only by the broad limits imposed by the role of private property, then a system
of social communication and cooperation is established within which the liberty
of each individual is compatible with the liberty of all. Indeed, under the rule
of private property the liberty exercised by one expands the options over which
liberty can be exercised by all.

4

The social cooperation facilitated by the rule of private property, though
well known to all serious students of economics, is suciently relevant to a consideration of liberty to deserve discussion. When property is privately owned
and voluntarily exchanged, market prices emerge. These prices are the means
by which each market participant communicates to all other market participants the value he places on the marginal units of goods.

Property Encourages Honesty
In addition to creating a truly impressive network of communication, private
property moti vates an equally impressive degree of honesty. Honesty can be
expected to prevail since it is in no one's interest to be dishonest about the price
development of classical liberal principles.

4 As

Hayek points out, The benets I derive from freedom are thus largely the result of

the uses of freedom by others, and mostly of those uses of freedom that I could never avail
myself of. F, A. Hayek, op. cit.: p. 32.

109

he is willing to pay. The self-interest of market participants insures that they
will assess carefully the value they expect to realize from an incremental unit of
each good, and then communicate their desire for more only if the incre mental
unit is worth more to them than the prevailing market price.

5

Furthermore,

each participant in this communication process is motivated to act as if he
gives the concerns of others the same consideration he gives his own. When an
individual reduces his consumption of a product in response to an increase in
its price, he is in eect saying, Others are saying to me that this product is
worth more to them at the margin than it is to me, so I will consume less so
they can consume more.
This system of communication and cooperation obviously does not work
with perfection.

However, even when full recognition is given to what has

become known as market failure, any impartial evaluation must acknowledge
that the benets derived from the rule of private property and the derivative
market process, cannot even remotely be duplicated by any known alternative
social role, or set of rules. Because the information and incentives generated
by market competition allow each of us to interact cooperatively and honestly
with literally millions of people around the globe, we are able to specialize
our eorts, direct resources into their most productive uses, and thus generate
enormous wealth.
Surely more important than the wealth generated under a system of private
property and market exchange is the individual liberty that this system permits,
The rule of private property makes it possible to allow people a large measure
of liberty because this rule makes people accountable for the consequences of
their decisions.

Every time an individual puts a resource to use, a cost is

imposed; that cost being measured in terms of the value of the resource in the
highest valued alternative use. When an individual owns a resource he is fully
accountable for this cost, since his use of the resource requires the sacrice of the
highest amount someone else is willing to pay for it. Given this accountability
there is no harm, and indeed much benet, in giving individuals wide latitude
to use resources as they choose.
In the absence of private property rights there is a constant clamoring, often
with justication, for detailed restrictions on individual behavior. Consider, for
example, the fact that it is dicult in the extreme to divide up and parcel out
the atmosphere as private property.

As a consequence, the atmosphere is a

common property resource and individuals are not held accountable for the
costs being generated when they use the atmosphere as a receptacle for their
auto exhaust, or industrial smoke.

The result is broad public acceptance of

huge Federal and state bureaucracies imposing a host of detailed restrictions
on our behavior in the name of forcing us to act in environmentally responsible

5 Under

certain conditions it is obviously possible for sellers to benet by misrepresenting

their products.

But just as obvious is the fact that this problem is mitigated by market

forces. Also, specic market arrangements tend to develop that reduce the seller's potential
to gain from fraud, because both buyer and seller can benet from such arrangements. For a
useful discussion of such arrangements, and the theory behind them, see Benjamin Klein and
Keith Leer. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, Journal of
Political Economy (August 1981), pp. 615-41.
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ways.
Eliminate the accountability provided by the rule of private property and
you eliminate the very basis upon which people can be tolerant of the freedom
of others. A reduction in the scope of individual liberty, with detailed directives
and regulations replacing general rules of social conduct, is the certain consequence of either the inability or the unwillingness to rely on private property
and voluntary exchange to order economic activity.

The Need for Government
The advantages we realize from observing the rule of private property are general advantages. The rule of private property is not designed to generate particular outcomes or to allow particular individuals to benet at the expense of
others. Rather it allows the liberty necessary to accomplish objectives that on
balance benet us all, but which no one could have predicted or programmed
ahead of time.

However, unless each of us refrains from attempting to in-

fringe upon the property rights of others, the general advantages realized from
an economic process which fosters both the production of wealth and a social
tolerance for liberty will be diminished for everyone.
Unfortunately, even though we become collectively worse o when property
ghts are violated, it is possible for each individual to improve his situation by
infringing on the property of others. The only parasite on a healthy organism
is in an enviable position. It is true that if there is a multitude of parasites
attempting to free ride on the same organism no one benets; the organism perishes, as do the parasites. But this elementary fact provides little motivation
for any one individual to cease being a parasite and turn to productive activity. Each individual recognizes that denying himself the immediate gains from
plunder will do nothing to preserve the benets derived from private property
and voluntary exchange if there is a general failure to respect property ghts.
Indeed, in a world where everyone is engaged in plunder it would be the height
of folly for an individual to conne his eorts to productive activity.
In other words, the free and productive social order based on private property and voluntary exchange is a public good; a good which when available to
one is available to all. As with any public good it has to be paid for by the
contributions of individuals, contributions which in this case take the form of
sacricing opportunities to infringe on the property ghts of others. As is the
case with all public goods, each individual faces the tempting possibility of free
riding on the contributions of others.

Since individuals know that they can

benet from the free and productive social order that is being paid for by the
restraint of others, whether they restrain themselves or not, when left entirely
to individual choice we can expect too little respect for private property rights.
Faced with the problem of maintaining social order, each individual is generally willing to exercise restraint if, by agreeing to do so, everyone else is made
to do the same.

Such collective respect for private property rights has the

potential for making everyone better o and, with good prospects for enforcement, will be agreed to almost universally. Enforcement of the social rules of
the game is essential here, and it is the need for such enforcement that provides
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the rationale for the monopoly in coercion which is granted to government.
It is the legitimate role of government to exercise its power in order to serve
as an impartial referee who knows the rules of the game, observes the play of
the participants, and imposes penalties on those who violate the rules. Good
government, as a good referee, does not strive for particular results, but is
concerned solely with facilitating the interaction of individuals each of whom
is free to pursue his own purposes as long as he operates within the limits
established by the agreed upon set of rules.
By enforcing the rule of private property, government is both performing as
a referee and requiring that those who benet from a free and productive social
order contribute their part in maintaining it. Those who persist in violating
the property rights of others will, if government is doing its job, be denied their
liberty through imprisonment, This has the eect of converting the public good
provided by respect for private property into a price-excludable public good.
That is, those who do not pay the price are excluded from the benets.
Up to this point the discussion has been concerned primarily with the protective or rule enforcement role of government. The government has to enforce
general rules if liberty and social order are to be maintained. In this capacity
the government makes no choices in the sense of weighing the benets and
costs of alternatives. It has only to determine if the rules are being obeyed and
to take predetermined measures if they are not. The discussion has, however,
touched on a further function of government. Public goods other than social
order exist, and the government is also the institution through which members of the community decide which of these goods to nance publicly, and
how extensively they should be funded, in this capacity, government is called
upon to make genuine economic choices, and to engage in directly productive
6

activities.

The Need to Control Government
The government is then more than the referee in the game; it is a participating
player as well. In its capacity as a player government is also subject to rules.
This situation presents some rather dicult problems. The fact is that the government is necessarily exempt from certain rules that apply to all other players
in the game. The government, in one sense, has the authority to violate property rights by forcing citizens to pay for certain public goods. One can argue
that this is not really a violation of property rights since everyone is part of the
collective process in which the decision to provide public goods is made and
goods are provided in return for payments rendered. This argument notwithstanding, it remains true that government's legal power to compel people to
make payments places it outside the rules that apply to private individuals and
organizations.

6 Buchanan

makes a clear distinction between the rule enforcement role of government

and the role of government as economic decision maker in his discussion of the protective
state and  the productive state. See James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between
Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 19753, Chapter 4.
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Not only does government enter into the game under less restrictive rules
than are imposed on nongovernment players, but since it is government that enforces the rules on all, it is government that enforces the rules on itself. Letting
a player in any game be the judge of his own infractions creates an opportunity
for abuse that few can be expected to resist. Of course, the government is not
a single player but rather a collection of the members of the community. Even
so, in their roles as political decision makers individuals will coalesce around
certain objectives and will be tempted to take whatever action is necessary to
realize their objectives. Whether acting individually or in groups, people nd
fewer things easier to do than justify in their minds those actions that advance
their interests. As a player in the game the government has to be called to task
for violations of the rules just as other players; but how can we be sure that
the government will be suciently diligent in calling infractions and imposing
penalties against itself ?.
The problem here was clearly seen by James Madison when, in arguing for
ratication of the United States Constitution, he wrote:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary.

If angels

were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to
be administered by men over men, the great diculty lies in this:
You must rst enable the government to control the governed; and
7

in the next place, oblige it to control itself.

Obliging government to control itself is no easy task. Government power, unless
tightly circumscribed, creates opportunities for some to benet at the expense
of others through in voluntary transfers. This abuse of government power tends
to feed upon itself. First, government transfers reduce the private return from
producing new wealth and increase the private return from acquiring or protecting existing wealth through political inuence. This shift in relative returns
draws more people out of productive activity and into political activity, which
shifts relative returns yet further in favor of the latter.

Second, government

transfer activity is destructive of the accountability that characterizes an economic order operating in accordance with the rule of private property. As this
accountability is reduced the very basis for individual liberty is also reduced
and there will be increased pressure for yet broader government control on individual behavior. The power needed by government to maintain a free social
order can easily become the force that undermines that order.
Our liberty and prosperity depend on general rules of social conduct. It is
government's legitimate function to enforce those rules, as well as to provide
a limited number of public goods.

In order for government to perform its

role properly, the conduct of government also has to be disciplined by general
rules. It is important that these rules on government are obeyed. No society
will long remain free unless they are. But how do we impose the discipline on
government to get it to enforce these rules on itself and ensure that government
power is not used to destroy the very liberty it is supposed to protect?

7 Federalist

51, The Federalist Papers.
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Constitutional Limits and the Limits of Constitutions
The only genuine hope for controlling government is through constitutional
limits on government activity and constitutionally grounded procedures for
operating within those limits. It is only by elevating these limits and procedures
to the constitutional level that there can be any real prospect of immunizing
them against the special interest pressures of ordinary politics.
But while the constitutional approach is the only one that holds promise for
limiting government power and for making this power a positive rather than
a negative force for freedom, constitutions by no means provide an easy or
assured route to responsible government. An eective constitution cannot be
created simply by writing words on parchment. The U.S. Constitution, surely
the most eective and durable written constitution in history, has served as
the model constitution (sometimes being copied nearly verbatim) for numerous political regimes around the world. Few of these cloned constitutions have
been particularly durable or eective. A successful constitution has to be derived from customs, beliefs, and ethical understandings that are rooted in a
pre-existing social order. A constitution can serve eectively to guard against
only those abuses of government power that are widely recognized as abuses. If
battered by the force of public approval of particular government practices, constitutional barriers against those practices will soon be breached. As observed
by Henry Simons: Constitutional provisions are no stronger than the moral
consensus that they articulate. At best, they can only check abuses of power
until moral pressure is mobilized; and their check must become ineective if
often overtly used.

8

There can be no doubt, for example, that the success of the U.S. Constitution derived from the fact that it was the product of intense and widespread
public concern for individual liberty.

The 55 delegates to the constitutional

convention who met in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787 were not operating from a clean slate. For at least two decades interest in securing liberty
had been elevated to an obsession among the American people. According to a
colonist writing in 1768, Never was there a People whom it more immediately
concerned to search into the Nature and Extent of their Rights and Privileges
than it does the People of America at this Day.

9

Edmund Burke noted before the House of Commons in 1775 that the colonists'
intensive study of law and politics had made them acutely inquisitive and sensitive about their liberties.

10

An outpouring of writing, taking the form of

everything from political tracts by the unlettered to celebrated contributions
to political philosophy by the intellectual luminaries of the day, were manifestations of the public concerns that found expression in the U.S. Constitution.
The protection of liberty was the pre-eminent concern, a concern that saw gov-

8 Henry

C. Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 19513, p. 20.

9 Quoted

in Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic:

The Origin of the American

Tradition of Political Liberty (New York: Harcourt. Brace, and World, Inc., 19533, p. 362.

10 See

Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic. 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill:

The University of North Carolina Press. 19693. pp. 4-5.
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ernment power as a necessary evil and discretionary government power as an
unmitigated evil.
There is no way of shifting to a constitution the responsibility for protecting
individual liberty against the abuse of government power.

Liberty will not

long survive the absence of eective constitutional limits on government, but
constitutional limits on government will not long remain eective in the absence
of public approval of those limits.

Individual Responsibility and Political Restraint
Public approval of constitutional limits that make liberty possible depends
ultimately on individuals accepting responsibility for the consequences of exercising that liberty. Responsibility has no meaning in the absence of individual
liberty, but liberty has no future in the absence of individual responsibility. In
the words of Hayek, A free society will not function or maintain itself unless
its members regard it as right that each individual occupy the position that
results from his action and accept it as due to his own action.

11

This sense of individual responsibility is not easily maintained. As Hayek
also points out, liberty can oer to the individual only chances and...the outcome of his eorts will depend on innumerable accidents...

12

When an indi-

vidual suers a setback it is always possible for him to nd plausible reasons
for absolving himself of responsibility.

The temptation is strong to petition

government for relief through exemptions from the rules of the game that apply to everyone else.

The individual may recognize that if such exemptions

were generalized everyone would be worse o, but still feel sincerely that in his
particular case special treatment is fully justied.
When politicians begin exceeding their constitutional authority in order to
provide special assistance to the few, they soon nd it impossible to avoid
providing special assistance to the many. The sense of individual responsibility
that is the only eective bulwark against the abuse of government power will
quickly break down in the face of that abuse. Few people retain a strong sense of
responsibility for their actions when those around them are seeking to avoid this
responsibility through political inuence. The destructive dynamic here is clear.
An expanding government weakens the sense of individual responsibility, and
results in more demands on government and yet further government expansion.
And, by increasing the opportunities for people to benet at the expense of
others, an expanding government weakens the rule of private property and
thus undermines the accountability upon which individual liberty depends.
There is every reason for concern that the size of government in the western
democracies has reached the point of posing a threat to the long tradition of
liberty that has made these democracies beacons of hope throughout the world.

11 Hayek,
12 Hayek,

op. cit., p. 71.
op, cit., p. 71. While acknowledging here the obvious fact that no one can be

in complete control of the outcomes that aect him. Hayek continues with the observation
that when an individual has to accept responsibility for those outcomes. it forcefully directs
his attention to those circumstances that he can control as if they were the only ones that
mattered".
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Underlying this development is a fundamental shift in the way the public views
government. Rather than seeing government power as a threat that is socially
benecent only when tightly circumscribed, discretionary government power in
pursuit of particular ends is now widely seen as the primary force for social
progress.
The surface consequences of this shift in responsibility from the individual to
the state are clear enough. Expanding budgets and chronic decits have become
ubiquitous features of the modern welfare state, and have raised concern that
this scal irresponsibility creates the potential for economic adversity.

The

most troubling thing about chronic budget decits, however, is not their adverse
economic consequences, but the fact that they reect our inability to exercise
political restraint. There is much discussion of the nancial burdens our lack
of scal responsibility is imposing on future generations. But our lack of scal
responsibility derives from a general lack of political restraint that portends a
far greater burden on the yet unborn than the obligation to pay our debts. That
burden is the loss of the liberty that we enjoy today because of the political
restraint exercised by our ancestors, but which cannot long survive our political
intemperance.

Conclusion
Liberty is possible only when adherence to general rules of conduct makes the
regimentation of detailed directives and restrictions unnecessary for the maintenance of social order.

Liberty can never be license since the unrestrained

use of liberty quickly and surely renders inoperative the general rules upon
which it is based. The ideal setting for liberty is one in which individuals have
internalized an ethic of responsibility and restraint that motivates voluntary
compliance with society's general rules. It is because this ideal can never be
fully realized, however, that government is granted the power to force compliance on those who would, in the absence of external restraint, threaten the
general liberty by abusing their own liberty. Government power is necessary if
liberty is to be prevented from cannibalizing itself.
Government power may be necessary to maintain liberty, but it is not sufcient. The ability of government to enforce impartially general rules can be
sabotaged by the same lack of individual responsibility and restraint that makes
government necessary in the rst place. The ability of government to enforce
impartially general rules will be sabotaged if the lack of responsibility and restraint reaches the point where government becomes the dominant source of
discipline in society. The more necessary government is to the maintenance of
the general rules upon which liberty depends, the more insucient to this task
it is sure to be.
There is no avoiding the fact that liberty will perish if the exercise of liberty
is not tempered by an ethic of individual responsibility.

The armation of

this fact is the ethical responsibility of those of us who cherish liberty and
understand the fragile foundation upon which it stands.
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Governments and Markets

The Problems of Halting Economic Growth

April 1, 1976
Dwight R. Lee and Robert F. McNown

Economic growth is no longer a universally accepted goal of economic policy. To be sure there are still plenty of defenders of economic growth, but it
has become increasingly fashionable to criticize continued growth as undesirable and unsustainable. The debate surrounding this issue has centered almost
entirely on the question of whether our resource base is adequate to support the
demands of a growing economy. Without going into detail here, it is our judgment that historical evidence and economic analysis require that this question
be answered with a resounding armative.
The purpose of this paper, however, is to address an important aspect of
the growth versus no-growth debate that has been largely neglected. There has
been little discussion of the problems that would be encountered in actually
formulating and implementing a policy of zero economic growth. Despite the
importance of these problems in assessing the desirability of the no-growth
position, they have been brushed aside by those pushing for a halt to economic
growth.

According to E. J. Mishan, one of the most articulate advocates of

zero economic growth (in his words, a steady-state economy):
The actual means whereby a steady-state economy is to be brought into
being  the rationing of raw materials, the controls on technology, etc.  and
the level of auence to be sought are important subjects of discussion. But in
the existing state of social awareness, they are perhaps premature. . . . The aim
of the ecologist and environmentalist is not a no-growth economy per se. It is
to win acceptance by the public at large of a no-growth society.

Why Does Growth Occur?
One may also say it is premature to feel an urgency to convince the public of the
desirability of a proposal until it has been fully thought through. Certainly a
consideration of the implementation and functioning of a zero-growth economy
is crucial in assessing the overall desirability of such an economy.

In considering the question of how growth in the economy is to be halted,
it is wise to ask why economic growth occurs in the rst place. The motivating
force behind our economic growth has always been the desire of individuals to
improve the economic well-being of themselves and their ospring. Government
policy can help by creating a stable political environment, protecting property
rights, and not destabilizing the economy with inappropriate monetary and
scal policy. But without individuals seeking to improve their lot by working,
innovating, saving, and investing, economic growth would not take place. This
means that achieving a no-growth society would require denying people many
of the opportunities and freedoms they now have to improve their situation.
The question of how this is to be accomplished poses problems that are crucial
in assessing the merits and liabilities of a no-growth economy.
Certain attributes are desirable in any economy, whether growing or not.
One of the most important of these is that our resources be used as eciently
as possible to produce those goods and services most valued by consumers.
Certainly this has to be considered an important attribute to those who feel
that a dwindling resource base makes halting economic growth an imperative. Stopping economic growth clearly shouldn't mean halting technological
improvements that allow a given set of consumer desires to be satised with
reduced demands on our resources. If a no-growth policy restricted this technological growth, it would frustrate the mechanism that has provided us with
a growing usable resource base in the past and can continue to do so in the
future. And as we are about to see, the implementation of a no-growth policy is
very likely to hamper technological advances. In so doing, such a policy would
probably hasten the very problems its advocates claim it will postpone.

Market Allocation
In a market economy the ecient use of resources is accomplished primarily by
private producers responding to prices of productive inputs and outputs. Output prices provide information on consumer preferences, with the relative price
of a good increasing in response to an increase in consumer demand, which in
turn motivates producers to increase their production of the good. Prices of
productive inputs reect their value in their most productive employments in
the economy.

Therefore, with producers responding to these input prices in

their attempt to produce as cheaply as possible, the cost of producing commodities is kept to a minimum, with substantial rewards going to those who
can innovate more ecient ways of producing. While the market mechanism
doesn't always work perfectly, it works better than any other mechanism yet
conceived.
But without a large amount of freedom aorded to the individual to spend
his money as he desires, and to allocate his productive resources and talents as
he sees t, much of the advantage of the market mechanism is negated. This
brings us face to face with the problem of how zero economic growth can be
achieved without obstructing the desirable allocation of our resources among
competing uses.

119

How Assure Constant Output?
It may seem quite simple to design an eective policy imposing zero economic
growth. The government could pass and enforce a law requiring the value of
production to remain constant from year to year.

However, some problems

come immediately to mind. First of all, what mechanism can the government
use to insure that output doesn't increase? One possibility would be to place
quotas on the quantity of each good to be produced. If this is done a major
problem is that of determining which goods should be produced and in what
combination.
As previously discussed, a crucial goal of any economy is that these decisions be made to conform to consumer preferences. These preferences vary
widely from individual to individual and change unpredictably through time.
It takes an extraordinary amount of information to keep the productive process responsive to these consumer preferences. It is optimistic indeed to hope
that any government agency would be able to keep abreast of this information
and maintain the desirable production quota system. Optimism would require
not only tremendous condence in the government's ability to keep current
on changing preferences, but also great faith in its ability to make decisions
independent of political pressures.
Assume, for example, that consumers began to sour on the automobile
as the almost exclusive form of personal transportation and that millions of
individuals decided that bicycles oered a more desirable alternative.

With

production decisions being made in response to market forces, we would nd a
reduction in auto production as auto manufacturers found fewer people willing
to buy their product at prices that covered their cost. On the other hand, with
increasing numbers of people willing to spend money on bicycles, producers of
bicycles would expand output in response to higher prots.

Problems of Control
It's hard to imagine this adjustment occurring so smoothly if the decision of
auto versus bicycle production was under the control of a government agency.
Under these circumstances automobile manufacturers would nd it to their advantage to invest heavily in lobbying against any reduction in their production
quotas. They could come up with any number of justications for maintaining high production levels for autos. Of course, bicycle manufacturers could,
and probably would, lobby for an increase in their production quotas; but being much smaller and less inuential politically, they would have an uphill task
getting their quota enlarged at the expense of the automobile quota. The bicycle manufacturers certainly wouldn't get any help from the oil industry or
the highway lobby, both of which would take an active interest in the issue.
Meanwhile, the consumer, who should be the important decision-maker, will
hardly be heard from in the decision-making process.
Extend our example of autos and bicycles to include razor blades, running shorts, motor boats, tennis balls, insect repellent, shoe repair services,
dental repair, textbooks, soy beans, and the like, and it is clear that vesting
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government with the authority to determine the allowable production of each
conceivable good and service would be a frightfully clumsy and wasteful way
to halt economic growth.
But there are further diculties involved in direct government control. Once
the quota for a good has been established, decisions as to which producing units
are to ll that quota would have to be made. Suppose, for example, that an
individual developed a new technique for making sleeping bags, and as a result
thought he could give consumers a better bag than was currently available
and at a lower price. Operating under the market mechanism, this individual
could invest his money in manufacturing and promoting his sleeping bag. If his
assessment of his bag wasn't consistent with that of the consumer, he would
soon nd it advantageous to direct his talents and money elsewhere. On the
other hand, if consumers did nd his sleeping bag preferable to existing bags,
his production and revenue would expand while the production and revenue
of his competitors would fall. Eventually our innovator's techniques would be
imitated and all producers would be producing better bags for less, much to
the consumer's benet.

The Consumer's Interest
If a government agency rather than the market was responsible for deciding
for each product which rms could expand output and correspondingly which
rms had to reduce output, it's doubtful if the interests of the consumer would
be promoted. For practical purposes it would be impossible for a government
agency to have the information on changing productive techniques necessary
to know, for each product, which rms should be expanding and which should
be contracting. Not having this information, the agency would soon nd itself
relying on the expertise of the existing rms in each industry in order to make
its decision. Each rm in an industry would soon learn that in order to protect
or enlarge its market share, it has to appeal to the judgment of the regulatory
agency rather than that of the consumer.

Technological improvements and

product innovations would be found less useful to the aggressive rm than its
lobbying activities and inuence with the right regulators. Unfortunately, this
wouldn't create the type of environment that a new rm with an improved
product or lower price will nd very hospitable. Well-established rms in the
industry could be expected to use their inuence to prevent such intruders from
ever getting their product to market.
This is more than idle conjecture.

We unfortunately have had plenty of

experience with government agencies regulating such things as market share
and entry in many of our industries. For example, since the Civil Aeronautics
Board was established in 1938 to regulate our airline industry, not one new
airline has been permitted to enter into long haul competition with the existing
airlines.
Another example comes from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),
an agency of the federal government charged with regulating interstate ground
transportation. In 1961, Southern Railroad had developed a grain-carrying car
that allowed them to cut their freight rates on grain by 60 percent and requested
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the ICC to permit this reduction. It was estimated that this innovation would
save consumers millions of dollars annually.

Yet the ICC, in sympathy with

barge lines, trucking rms, and other railroads, all of which competed with
Southern Railroad, refused to allow the rate reduction Southern requested. It
wasn't until 1965, after the case was nine times before lower federal courts
and twice before the U.S. Supreme Court, that the ICC quit ghting the rate
reduction and allowed it to go into eect.

Many other examples could be

given indicating the tendency of agencies charged with regulating industries to
completely lose sight of the consumer interest. But by now our point should
be clear.

Attempting to halt economic growth by controlling the permitted

output for each good and service would be inconsistent with the goal of using
our resources as eciently as possible to produce a combination of goods and
services compatible with the preferences of consumers.

The cost of halting

economic growth in this way would be so high that only the most enthusiastic
no-growth advocate would nd it acceptable.

Let Consumers Choose, But Limit Total Income
Having a government agency decide on the combination of goods and services
to be produced, isn't the only way zero economic growth could be imposed.
Another possibility is to let consumers spend their incomes as they see t,
but limit the total income that can be earned in the economy.

This would

seem to have the advantage of allowing consumers to decide what should be
produced and encouraging producers to be innovative and ecient with their
use of resources. But, of course, we now have the problem of controlling incomes.

And, unfortunately, for this approach, there is a strong relationship

between how consumers exercise their preferences for goods and services and
how individuals earn their incomes.
People earn their incomes by responding to the desires of consumers, producing and perfecting those things on which consumers are most anxious to
spend their money. As we have already pointed out, this provides the incentive for producers to use resources eciently and creatively in order to provide
consumers with better products at lower prices.

But people get rich doing

this, and in so doing they invariably enrich countless others by creating highly
productive jobs and permitting consumers to obtain more with less eort.
So any attempt at controlling the incomes consumers have to spend will
require strict controls or strong disincentives against creative responses to the
wishes of consumers. This doesn't necessarily mean that the government would
have to apply direct restrictions on innovative behavior. A high enough tax on
prots or investment returns could suciently discourage investment in capital
and technological improvements to be consistent with a no-growth economy.
But whatever the means, only by discouraging producers from responding to
the consumers' desire for better products at less cost will it be possible to
prevent incomes from increasing.
It's hard to see, therefore, where this approach to controlling economic
growth has eliminated the disadvantage of direct controls on output.

Both

approaches will have the eect of insulating the actions of producers from the
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desires of consumers.

Reducing Income Mobility
Attempting to control incomes and dampen investment presents another, but
related, problem. The necessity of controlling innovative responses to consumer
preferences means controlling one of the most important sources of income mobility in the economy. Despite much ridicule of the Horatio Alger myth the
evidence indicates a substantial amount of income mobility in the U.S. from one
generation to the next. There are plenty of opportunities for the ambitious and
capable individual to become wealthy even though born into poverty. Likewise,
being born into wealth is no guarantee that an individual can remain both indolent and auent for long. The primary source of this mobility is that those
who are productive are rewarded while those who are unproductive aren't. Attempts to control income would surely reduce income mobility in our society
by hampering the mechanism that produces it. Restricting people's ability to
develop more productive techniques or train for more productive employment
would restrict the means by which individuals have been able to improve their
economic situation. It also restricts the competition that forces those who have
achieved economic success to either remain responsive to consumer desires or
move down the economic ladder. With perhaps a little cynicism, we note that
no-growth advocates are seldom positioned in the bottom half of the income
distribution. Designing and enforcing a policy to halt economic growth would
be a dicult task. If such a policy were actually imposed, many of the consequences would be unfortunate. It would reduce the inuence that consumers
have on the choice of what is to be produced. Coupled with that is the stiing
inuence the implementation of such a policy would have on motivations to
produce eciently and creatively. We would also nd a more regimented society, with far less chance for the relatively disadvantaged in society to improve
their situation through ingenuity and hard work.

The likely consequence of

this calcication of society would be disruptive social unrest or the emergence
of a caste system in which people knew their place and accepted it.
If the advocates of eliminating economic growth feel we are faced with an
imperative, they had better come to grips with the serious problem of implementing their proposals. It is our judgment, however, that they have rst
failed to establish the imperative for a no-growth policy, and secondly, have
no positive proposals on how such an economy could be implemented without
unfortunate consequences.
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Labor Unions Aggravate Ination by Lowering Wages

April 1, 1981

It is commonly believed that labor unions generate ination by increasing
the wages of workers. This is not the case. Labor union activities do aggravate
ination, but they do it by reducing the real wages received by workers, not by
increasing them. An understanding of why this is true requires, rst of all, a
brief explanation of the cause of ination.
We are currently experiencing ination for the same reason that any economy, at any time, has ever experienced ination: the money supply has been
growing more rapidly than the growth in production.

Assume, for example,

that the production of goods remained the same but the number of dollars
we have to spend on these goods doubled. We would all be willing to spend
approximately twice as much on each good as before. But this means that the
price of goods would also double, as would the general price level.

Increase

the growth in the money supply and reduce the growth in productivity and
ination will result.
Since monetary growth is subject to much larger changes than productivity
growth, it is a rapidly growing money supply that explains most of our ination.
It is the federal government that controls the money supply, so the major blame
for ination can be placed on government activity.

Labor unions aggravate

ination however, by engaging in practices which impair economic productivity.
It is only by imposing restrictions on the economy which reduce productivity
that a union can provide an economic benet to its members. In a free and
open labor market a worker will be able to receive a wage that reects his
productivity and which is no higher than what comparably skilled workers are
receiving elsewhere in the economy.

A higher wage would attract additional

workers thus driving the wage back down to the competitive level. Of course,
this competitive process increases the productivity of the economy by directing
workers into those employments where their contribution is greatest. And it
is productivity that has increased over time in response to the incentives and
direction provided by competitive markets that, at least until recently, made
U. S. workers the best paid in the world.

But union leaders cannot attract dues-paying members by getting them a
wage rate that they could earn without a union. And the only way unions can
provide their members with higher than competitive wages in some occupations
is to restrict the competition from nonunion workers. While this may increase
union wages in the short run, it does so at the expense of lower wages for
other workers. Higher union wages and prices in one sector of the economy are
eectively oset by lower wages and prices elsewhere in the economy.
In order to realize this relative wage advantage for its members, organized
labor has consistently fought for legislation which reduces, if not eliminates,
the opportunity for nonunion workers to secure jobs that would otherwise be
available to them. Organized labor's struggle for the closed shop (only union
members can be employed) and their bitter opposition to state right- to-work
laws (which eliminate union membership as a requirement for employment) are
clear examples of union attempts to protect their workers against competition.
Other examples are union eorts to restrict imports and obtain legislation
restricting the movement of large employers from the unionized NorthEast to
the less unionized Sun Belt states.

Competition Reduced
To the extent that organized labor has been successful in these restrictive activities, the economic competition and mobility that is a major source of increased
productivity has been reduced. And strong evidence of the success of unions in
protecting their members against productive competition is seen in the featherbedding practices they are able to impose, practices which could never survive
open competition. Unions have long inicted costly featherbedding practices
on the railroads, with the requirement that remen remain on diesel locomotives being a well-known example. The building, theatrical and oceanshipping
industries, as well as many others, also suer from union featherbedding requirements.
A typical example is that of a construction job which required the use of
several very small gas-powered generators. Because of union requirements, each
generator had to be attended by an operating engineer, an electrician, and a
pipetter.

The engineer had to start the engine a few times each day, the

electrician pushed wire plugs in the generator's sockets if they were moved,
and the pipetter was there, just in case. Obviously, such practices further
the negative eect organized labor has on our economy's productivity.
It is this impact on productivity that explains why the overall eect of
organized labor is to reduce real wages. Productivity is the source of all income,
including wages. Real wages depend on the wage earner's ability to buy goods
and services. It cannot be purchased unless it is rst produced. Furthermore,
for a given rate of monetary growth, the lower our productivity the higher the
ination rate. So unions have an inationary impact by reducing productivity
and thus lowering, not raising, the general level of real wages.
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Market Eciency Hampered
The best way to increase productivity, improve the living standard of all workers, and help retard ination is to allow competition in free and open markets.
Unfortunately we can expect little support in this direction from organized
labor. Union leaders cannot tolerate the eciency of competitive markets because what they have to oer their members comes from their ability to reduce
the free market opportunities of others.
The very existence of organized labor depends on its ability to use its political inuence to sabotage the eciency of the free enterprise system. If allowed
to operate freely, the market process would simply circumvent union eorts
to impose ineciencies on the economy. This would leave union leaders with
little to justify their healthy incomes, but also with little ability to undermine
productivity, aggravate ination and thereby reduce, in the long run, the real
incomes of us all, union and nonunion workers alike.
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Controlling Ination by Controlling Government

June 1, 1981

Ination has become such a chronic problem that many people now believe
no one knows what causes it or how to eliminate it. In fact, the cause of ination
has been known for centuries, and it is very simple to eliminate. Ination is
a persistent increase in the prices of the products we buy and is always the
result of the money supply increasing more rapidly than the output of these
products. With a rapid increase in the money supply, ination is inevitable.
Without a rapid increase in the money supply, ination is impossible.

The

federal government can eliminate ination simply by bringing monetary growth
under control.
But if this is true, why has not the government eliminated ination long
ago? Politicians have consistently told us that ination is our major economic
problem and have unveiled a series of plans for solving this problem.
plans all have one thing in common.

They have not worked.

These

Ination has

gotten worse, not better. We are left with the suspicion that the government
has not been serious in its ght against ination.
Additional support for this suspicion comes from the fact that creating more
money, and therefore causing ination, is a convenient way for the government
to obtain more of the wealth that you and I produce.

The way this wealth

transfer occurs is in all important respects identical to the way an individual
in a position to personally increase the money supply could increase his wealth
at the expense of others.

An Easy Way to Make Money
Consider the situation in which you have the legal right to print money and
put it into circulation by spending it.

Every evening you can start up your

printing press and run o stacks of 20s, 50s, 100s, and 1,000s for the next
day's purchases. The desire to maintain productive employment will vanish as
your job provides only a pittance of what you can, in a few moments, make at
home. Also, you will nd that the demanding task of spending your money is a

full-time job. Overnight you will have become enormously wealthy. But notice
that the total wealth produced in the economy is not any larger than it was
before. In fact it is slightly less since, having quit your job, you are producing
less than before. So your increased wealth means a reduction in the wealth of
others. The additional goods and services you are buying are not available for
others to buy.
But even though you are making others worse o by creating money and
spending it, you need not worry about being blamed for this. To the contrary,
you will surely be sought after and held in high esteem as one, who is contributing to the wealth of the community. Your large expen ditures will be a very
visible source of income for those selling you yachts, resort homes, jet planes,
and lavish vacations.

Those who are on the receiving end of your purchases

will be encouraging you to increase, not reduce, the amount of money you print
and spend. And with these people now having additional money, they will be
able to spend more, thus providing more income for others. Because of you,
everyone will have more money.
But it is because of this additional money that others are being made worse
o.

With the additional money being spent, but with no more products to

spend it on, prices will increase.

Even with more money the ination will

reduce the amount others can buy.

Since you are buying more, others have

to be buying less. But even though you are causing the ination you can be
condent that your victims will place the blame elsewhere. People will blame
higher prices on those who are selling the higher priced products. It is ironic
that it is those who are helping to hold down increasing prices by continuing
to make products available who are most likely to be blamed for ination.
Adding to the irony is that many of those you are impoverishing with ination will urge you to increase your purchases; particularly your purchases from
them. Your ability to increase the money in circulation will be seen as the way
to compensate for higher prices. And you will probably be sympathetic with
this solution, having noticed how much less a couple of billion dollars buys
now in comparison with how much it would buy when you rst started printing
money. What could be more appropriate than increasing the amount of money
you print each evening?

Can the Temptation Be Resisted?
How many of us, nding ourself with the ability to legally increase the money
supply, would be able to restrain our desire for more? The opportunity to make
ourself and our family wealthy, while being honored as a great benefactor of
the community, would be a dicult one for most of us to resist. And if you or
I could not resist such a temptation, can we expect more restraint from those
in government?

The answer is surely no.

The only dierence between you

and me as individuals, and government, is that the federal government really
is in a position to acquire wealth by expanding the money supply. It is clear
that this is an opportunity the government has not been able to resist. Those
who benet from a growing government sector have pushed consistently and
eectively for public policies that generate ination and reduce our wealth. The
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problem is not that the government does not know how to eliminate ination.
The problem is that the government has not wanted to eliminate ination.
We are currently witnessing an attempt to control the inationary policies
that have become the hallmark of Washington over the last several decades.
This heroic eort deserves and needs our unagging support.

It is an eort

which will be stoutly resisted by one politically inuential interest group after
another, each hoping to benet from more inationary government spending.
They will argue that ination requires that the federal government increase
their price support program, increase their agency's budget, increase aid to their
city, increase welfare payments, etc. Each group will argue that the government
spending they favor will provide benets for all.

In fact each expansion in

government spending will add to inationary pressure, transfer wealth to a
few, and reduce the economy's capacity to generate more wealth for us all.
But the natural tendency of government is to give in to the special interest
groups. In fact the special interests are hard to distinguish from government
interest. Those in government have found that the safest way to expand and
perpetuate their power, control, and wealth is to provide concentrated benets
to politically organized groups while spreading most of the cost over us all
with ination.

The only way to stop this destructive process is to restrain

government.
The hope has been to vote for politicians who are sympathetic to the need
for controlling government. In other words, vote for a government that will restrain itself. But as important as it is to elect responsible representatives at all
levels of government, we cannot depend on this alone to do the job. Our elected
representatives answer to the voters only periodically, but they are under constant pressure from entrenched special interests pushing for more government
spending.

When appealing for votes almost all politicians argue for limited

government, but how many remain true to their campaign promises once the
election is over? And we have almost no control over those in the bureaucracy,
and the special interest groups with which the bureaucrats identify.

Restraining Government
The time has long since arrived for us to re-establish eective constitutional
limits on the scope of government activity.

Our founding fathers knew that

government could not be trusted to limit itself, and our Constitution is testimony to their profound insight.

Unfortunately, the limits the Constitution

imposed on government for over 100 years have, in recent decades, been severely
eroded by judicial interpretations guided by the false notion that wide-ranging
governmental discretion is a force for social good.

Few are naive enough to

believe that an individual, given the ability to conscate the wealth of others,
would be blind to personal advantage and trustworthy to use this ability to
promote only the public interest. Yet the sophisticated view of many of our
intellectual elite is that the collection of individuals who comprise government
can be trusted with enormous, and unrestrained, power to promote the public
interest.
Despite the wishful thinking that often passes as scholarship, there is a
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desperate need for the enforcement of clear constitutional limits on the federal
government's ability to create and spend money. Without such limits we can
be sure that an undisciplined federal government will continue inating the
currency and expanding its wealth at the further expense of the productive
sector of the economy. We may want to debate the form the restraint should
take: a return to the gold standard, a balanced budget amendment, a limit on
government spending, or some combination of these and other restraints. But
only the most naive would argue that we can continue to trust the government
to restrain itself.
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Patience

and

Property:

Corporate

vs.

Union

Management

August 1, 1990
Dwight R. Lee and Robert L. Sexton

"Managers who anticipate a short tenure with their rm unsurprisingly have little interest in long-term solutions to its basic problems.
Their goal is to look as good as possible in the immediate future."

 Robert Reich, The Next American Frontier
It is a commonly held belief that corporations, in pursuit of short-term
prots, shortchange the future. This alleged emphasis on the short run is seen
to create a host of problems such as an eroding industrial and human capital
base, a productivity crisis, a lack of competitiveness in world markets, the
energy crisis in the 1970s, mounting levels of corporate debt, and environmental
pollution. The solution advocated by Robert Reich and others is to substitute
more control by representative government and labor. However, this would be
a terrible mistake.

Property Rights and Incentives
Individual decision makers, whether acting as managers, union leaders, politicians, or workers, will appropriately weight the future when it is in their interests to do so. This is the reason why private property ownership is critical to
ecient, future-oriented economic decisions. If property rights are well-dened
and enforced, then current owners will benet from any foreseeable increase in
the future value of resources they control. And, if private ownership rights are
transferable, this will provide the incentive for individuals to concern themselves with outcomes that extend far into the future.
With corporations, transferable property rights exist in the form of shares
of stocks. Since corporate stocks are easily transferable, any management decision that is considered to inhibit a corporations long-run wealth position will
be translated quickly into lower stock prices.

On the margin, it only takes

a few to recognize the short-sighted business policies of management.

Once

this mismanagement is translated into lower stock prices, even relatively uninformed shareholders will notice and understand that it may be time to call
their broker. Thus, transferable property rights in the form of stock reect the
future consequences of corporate decisions.
However, unions do not have the equivalent property rights, and that is
why the long-run wealth eects of present decisions are not clearly registered
in a way that feeds back into unions decisions.

This leads to several impor-

tant implications. One, without transferable property rights (which reect the
present value of employment opportunities in a rm or industry) the control of
union members over union management is restricted. To some extent, union
members have control over union management through their right to vote on
some issues and on their union leaders. Therefore, members can restrict union
management from deviating too far from the collective interests of the members. However, any union-member voter has little motivation to be informed
since a single vote will not likely have a decisive impact on any decision, and
each worker's time horizon extends only as long as his employment tenure.
This is not the case with corporate stockholders.

They have much more

control over their agents than union members have over theirs.

The stock-

holder has the ability to buy and sell stocks. In order for union members to
protect themselves in an equally eective way against poor union management
decisions, they would have to change jobs and move to an employment setting
with either a dierent union or no union at all. Hence, union leaders have a
greater ability to maximize their personal goals and advantages and promote
their own agenda than corporate managers, since union members have little or
no eective recourse. In other words, unlike the market for corporate control,
the market for union control is very ineective.
Consequently, union decisions on many issues do not correspond with the
interests of the members. The position unions take is often at odds with the
political preferences of their members. Professors Dan Heldman and Deborah
Knight found that in a majority of questions posed to union members in opinion
polls, their positions diered (sometime diametrically) from the positions which
their union leaders were lobbying in Congress.
But, even if unions were perfectly responsive to the concerns of union members, they would still tend to be insensitive to future wage and salary decisions.
Since workers don't own transferable "employment stock" that reects the longrun value of their jobs, they have little incentive to take the long view when
balancing current wage demands against the long-run gains from maintaining
and expanding a productive capital base. But owning employment stocks would
require that workers own their jobs with the right to sell them to whomever
they please. This would remove the control over employment decisions from
those who have supplied the capital and hence would greatly increase the costs
of raising large amounts of capital.
However, when workers are in charge of management decisions, this often
leads to myopic investment practices. For example, in worker-managed rms in
Yugoslavia, employees are entitled to residual prots, but claims are retained
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only if the worker remains with the rm. So, it is in the workers' best long-term
interests to take their higher wages out of the rm in order to invest in items
which have a permanent title (for example, furniture or jewelry) rather than
investing in the long-term capital needs of the rm. This is true even when the
returns on capital far exceed those of alternative investment opportunities.
Under reasonable property rights arrangements, workers will be less sensitive to the long-term employment eects of current salary, wage, and investment
decisions than will corporate managers whose current compensation and future
prospects are directly tied to the performance of the rms they manage, as
reected in stock prices.

It is current compensation that is often used as a

monitor of union eectiveness. And union leaders who cannot extract current
wages and benets from employers will fall under the wrath of their members.

Political Inuence of Organized Labor
Unions have been adept at inuencing the political process in support of legislation that increases their control over business decisions.
explanations for their political inuence.

There are two

One, members of labor unions are

intensely concerned about short-run wages and fringe benets. Such narrowly
focused groups are more easily organized and generally are more politically
eective than are groups with more diverse interests. Two, political action is
best when an organized self-interest is able to disguise itself with the rhetoric of
a noble cause. This is particularly evident in labor unions that work under the
guise of struggling for the well-being of workers. But higher wages in the union
sector tend to depress wages in the nonunion sector, so it is easy to see that
union workers' gains come at the expense of nonunion workers. Thus the real
battle that unions wage is not against business but rather against nonunion
workers, who often would be willing to work for less than the union scale.
Unions have eectively been able to project the image, however, that they
are dedicated to the protection of workers' rights against the arbitrary so-called
power of big business. Union-supported legislation that restricts the discretion
of capital owners or corporate management is often politically popular because
it is perceived as a justiable means of curtailing exploitative business practices.
This may explain the political appeal of minimum wage laws, ' hour restrictions,
and other legislation that limits the ability of employers to negotiate with
employees.
Unions also have been active in support of political measure to restrict corporate practices that serve to motivate corporate managers to concentrate on
the long run. For example, takeovers, mergers, stock options, and bonuses provide important incentives for management to consider the future consequences
of current decisions. Another example is a corporate arrangement call "golden
parachutes" where corporate executives are compensated if their jobs are terminated as a result of a takeover or merger.

It is argues that this type of

arrangement provides incentives for corporate executives to take risks in line
with what their diversied shareholders would consider appropriate and not to
ght takeovers that would be in the shareholders' interests.
Union myopia will aect future productivity in at least two ways. First, in
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anticipation of a union's negative impact on the return to capital, one would
predict that the projected equity value of a newly unionized rm, or one threatened with unionization, will fall.

Second, in those industries in which union

power is strongest, one would expect that wage demands eventually will reduce
the industry's competitiveness and, in the absence of government bailouts and
protections, push it into serious decline.
The ling of a union election petition and the results of that action can impose signicant costs on a rm. Based on data from 1962 to 1980, a successful
union drive against a rm lowered the rm's stock by 3.84 percent. According to Professors Richard Ruback and Martin Zimmerman, even the threat
of unionization in the form of an unsuccessful union eort resulted in a 1.32
percent decline in the rm's stock price.
The reduction in returns to current and potential investors reduces an industry's investment appeal. Hence, capital formation will be retarded by the
eects of unionization. Also, lower protability in union rms will hamper the
internal market for capital, a very important source of eciency within rms.
One way to reduce the burden of union wage demands is by substituting
capital for labor.

And, indeed, once can be sure that the ratio of capital

to labor will, over time, increase in response to excessive wage requirements.
Whether this substitution will motivate an absolute increase in the amount of
capital isn't clear a priori. But, even if the amount of capital in the industry
actually increases, it will be the result of a union-induced distortion in the
capital labor mix that will reduce both the eciency of the industry and its
ability to compete.
The union myopia that motivates excessive wage demand has been detrimental to the long-run well being of all interests in the economy  consumers,
providers of capital, and employees alike.

But this economically destructive

shortsightedness is the completely predictable consequence of political action
that increases the power of unions over business decisions and over the allocation of business prots. Political attempts to rescue unions from the plight in
which they nd themselves  attempts which ordinarily involve granting them
yet more power and imposing still more restrictions on business decisions 
will prove just as self-defeating in the long run as have previous attempts.
Labor unions already have given worker representatives more control over
business decisions than most people realize.

This control has hampered the

ability of business management to pursue long-run goals through far-sighted
and productive investment commitments. Private business concerns may not
give the future the weight that, in some ideal world, would be considered appropriate.

But a realistic assessment of the motivations driving labor union

activity leads to the unmistakable conclusion that giving more control over
business decisions to labor unions will shorten the planning horizon of business
rms.
As long as owners and managers of private businesses are free to allocate
revenues among shareholders, employees, and capital investment in response to
market forces, decisions will be made that promote capital formation and lead
to long-run economic growth. Unfortunately, government regulation of labor
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relations has increasingly diminished businesses' (and therefore consumers')
control over decisions relevant to capital investment, and passed that control
to union ocials. As a result, government has shortened the planning horizon
of business decisions, allowed excessive wages to be substituted for capital formation, and reduced the long-run competitive vitality of major sectors of the
U.S. economy.
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Politics, Economics, and the Destructiveness of Decits

January 1, 1991

Are chronic budget decits a threat to the economy? The general public
believes that budget decits are something to fear, but economists are not so
sure, and Congress doesn't seem to care.
It is dicult to argue that either Congress or economists are wrong, given
their respective concerns, even though the public is justied in its worry over
the economic consequences of persistent Federal decits. The public's concern
is real, but it's an unfocused background concern that fails to translate into
signicant political pressure. So why should the concern over decits by members of Congress go beyond rhetoric when they can spend the Federal budget
into one large decit after another and still look forward to re-election rates in
excess of 98 percent?
Economists don't have to worry about being reelected, but they are worried about making obviously foolish predictions, and they have noticed that the
huge budget decits of the 1980s have precipitated none of the adverse consequences predicted by decit doomsdayers.

Economists are concerned with

explaining the eect of budget decits on such economic variables as interest
rates, ination, and the savings rate. These variables have not responded to
large decits as predicted by standard macro-economic models, and economists
have been busy developing alternative models explaining why they haven't. A
major conclusion of these models is that budget decits are almost completely
neutral in their eect on the economy.

An increasing number of economists

have concluded that decits have little eect, either positive or negative, on
the economy, and see public concern over decit spending as unfounded.
While economic analysis can provide useful insights, it is always risky to
dismiss the concerns of the public. The public may not have a sophisticated
understanding of economic analysis, but this is not necessarily a liability. Sophistication in the analysis of narrow economic relationships can divert attention from broader features of the political economy that are more relevant to
our economic prospects. In particular, budget decits may reect aws in the

political decision-making process that are a threat to economic performance
quite apart from any direct economic impact of the decits themselves.
In this essay we discuss briey the argument that budget decits are unlikely
to have the adverse economic eects commonly attributed to them. It is pointed
out, however, that the theoretical basis for the view that decits are benign is
hard to reconcile with the undeniable scal impulses of politicians. And given
these impulses, the greater the political latitude to rely on decit nancing
the greater will be the level of government spending. Even if decits do not,
for example, noticeably crowd out investment directly through interest-rate
increases, the political opportunity aorded by decit spending can facilitate
the expansion of public sector activity, which necessarily crowds out private
sector activity.

The consequences of substituting the less productive public

sector for the more productive private sector may not register immediately
in statistical measures of key economic variables. But the long-run economic
consequences of such a substitution are no less destructive because they go
unnoticed by econometric studies and the myopic political process.

Do Decits Matter?
What is the eect on the economy of an increase in decit spending?

The

best known answer to this question is given by the standard Keynesian model
which predicts that increasing the decit will increase aggregate consumption
demand, thereby reducing the total savings in the economy and increasing the
real interest rate.

With a higher interest rate there will be a reduction in

investment, and the decit spending will have crowded out some productive
capital.
Harvard economist Robert Barro has attacked the standard Keynesian view
by arguing that, under what he believes are plausible conditions, it makes no
dierence whether government spending is nanced by taxing or by borrow1

ing.

The argument begins with a proposition that dates back to the early

19th century, when it was put forth by the English economist David Ricardo.
Ricardo argued that if government nanced, for example, an additional $100 of
spending by borrowing, then, instead of being responsible for $100 in tax payments immediately, taxpayers would be responsible for $100 plus accumulated
interest at a later date. But the present value of the $100 plus interest later is
equal to $100 now, so the taxpayer who expects to be paying taxes later will
nd decit nancing no less costly than tax nancing. The taxpayer will be
indierent as to whether bor rowing or taxing is used to nance government
spending.
If borrowing versus taxing is a matter of indierence to taxpayers, then it is
also a matter of indierence as far as important economic variables such as the
interest rate and investment are concerned. Assume that government increases
the budget decit by reducing taxes without reducing spending. Taxpayers will
recognize that even though they experienced an increase in current disposable

1 Robert

J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? Journal of Political Economy,

Vol. 81 (1974), pp. 1095-1117.
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income, they have also experienced an equivalent increase in the present value
of their future tax obligations. Because they are no better or worse o, there
is no reason for them to increase current consumption and so the entire tax
reduction will be saved. Consumption and saving therefore will not be aected
by the increased decit; both private and public consumption remain the same,
and the increased public debt will be exactly oset by increased private saving.
This being the case, increasing the decit, with government spending held
constant, will not reduce long-run economic productivity by exerting upward
pressure on the interest rate and crowding out private investment.
Of course, as recognized by both Ricardo and Barro, complete indierence
between taxation and government debt requires that everyone alive when government increases its debt be responsible for all of the future tax increases that
servicing the debt requires. But many people realize that they will no longer
be alive when the future taxes required by current decit spending come due.
Why won't these people treat the decit as a real reduction in their tax burden
(with a corresponding increase in the tax burden of future generations), and
respond by saving less and spending more?
Barro confronts this question by arguing that most people will be reluctant
to increase their consumption when debt is substituted for current taxation even
if they know that they will not be alive to pay the higher future taxes required
by the debt. According to Barro, this reluctance is based on the obvious fact
that people are concerned with the well-being of their children beyond their own
lifetimes. This concern is reected in the investment parents make during their
lifetimes in their children's human capital and the bequests they make to their
children. Given this bequest motive, Barro argues that parents will recognize
that substituting debt for taxes in the nancing of government expenditures
will reduce the well-being of their ospring by increasing their future taxes.
In other words, parents will realize that the value of the taxes they will avoid
because of increased reliance on decit nancing will represent a reduction in
the value of their bequest to their ospring. The natural response to this is for
parents to increase their bequests, and therefore their saving, by an amount
equal to the tax burden that is passed from them to their children because of
the increased decit. The substitution of debt for taxation therefore leaves total
saving in the economy unchanged with no crowding out of private investment
and no reduction in the long-run productivity of the economy.
Barro recognizes that bequest adjustments will not oset completely the
eects of decit spending, but he argues that these adjustments are more complete than most people would expect. But Barro ultimately rests his case on
what he sees as empirical support for the economic neutrality of decit spending, with this support consisting of sophisticated econometric studies that nd
little connection between budget decits and interest rates.
No amount of empirical testing will ever provide conclusive support either
for or against the Barro thesis. Aggregate economic data are always of questionable accuracy, and empirical techniques are always less powerful and robust
than would be desirable. Fortunately, additional evidence can be brought to
bear on the relevance of Barro's proposition to scal policy without having to
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rely on economic data and sophisticated econometric techniques. This evidence
comes from the dearly observed behavior of politicians and it suggests caution
in accepting the Barro position. Furthermore, this behavior suggests that we
be concerned about budget decits for reasons not addressed either by Barro
or by economists in general.

The Political Cost of Decits
If the cost to the taxpayer is the same whether government spending is nanced
through taxes or decits, then politicians should be indierent as to the mix of
these two means of nancing. The evidence is clear that they are not. Why,
for example, are politicians so reluctant to respond to the public's general
disapproval of large decits (a disapproval that is hard to square with the
idea that debt and taxation have equivalent eects on the well-being of both
current and future taxpayers) by simply nancing all government expenditures
with taxation? The proposition that decits are economically neutral is simply
inconsistent with the obvious reluctance of politicians to reduce decit spending
signicantly.
The attractiveness of persistent budget decits to politicians suggests strongly
that current taxpayers do not believe that the future taxes they will have to
pay because of additional government debt are as costly to them as the current
taxes that the debt replaced. If this is the case, then over some range politicians will nd it is less costly politically to nance spending through debt than
through taxation. This suggests that the existing combination of debt and taxation prevails because it is the combination that allows existing spending levels
to be nanced at the least political cost. This being the case, it is clear that
politicians will be reluctant to reduce decit spending unless the political cost
of decit nancing is increased. Also clear is that any increase in the public's
tolerance of decit spending will lower the political cost of government spending and, therefore, motivate both larger decits and greater spending.

Can

anyone doubt seriously that government spending would increase if increased
public tolerance of decits lowered the political cost of further expanding decit
spending?
There is no obvious direct measure of the marginal political cost of decits,
so it is dicult to imagine a direct test of the proposition that a decrease in that
cost will increase government spending. But a testable implication of such a
response to a reduction in the marginal political cost of decit spending is that
an increase in the ratio of decit nancing to tax nancing will be associated
with an increase in government spending as a percentage of the Gross National
Product (GNP). The budget experience of the federal government is consistent
with this implication. Yearly Federal budget data from 1960 to 1988 show that
when the ratio of decit to non-decit nancing (almost all of which is tax
revenue) increased by 1 percent, government spending as a percentage of GNP
increased by .087 percent.

There can be little doubt that the political cost

of decit nancing has been reduced by the political embrace of a simplistic
version of Keynesian policy prescriptions, an embrace which began with the
1960 election of John F. Kennedy and lasted, though with reduced enthusiasm,
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into the 1980s. There can be even less doubt that the decrease in the political
cost of decit nancing, whether caused by Keynesian economics or not, is
largely responsible for the increase in the relative size of the federal government
since 1960 (from 18.2 percent of GNP in 1960 to 22.3 percent of GNP in 1988).

The Economic Cost of Decits
The connection between decit spending and the relative size of government
suggests a cost associated with decits that is easily overlooked by standard
investigations of the economic eect of decits. The expansion in government
that is facilitated in a regime of chronic budget decits reduces economic productivity and growth. To argue that government expansion reduces economic
growth is not to deny that over some range government is a source of improved
economic performance. A few government activities are necessary to establish
an economic order that promotes productive specialization and exchange. But
it also has to be recognized that organized interests persistently exert pressure
in favor of expanding the scope of government activity beyond productive limits. These interests are often quite successful owing to the fact that the cost of
expanding government is typically diused over a dispersed and unorganized
public, which lowers the political cost of this expansion below the social cost.
The result is that governments at all levels have expanded well into the range
where, at the margin, they are reducing our economic wealth.
Recent cross-national studies of the relationship between the relative size of
government (as measured by government expenditures as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product) and economic growth provide a quantitative dimension to
the negative marginal impact of government. One such study of 115 countries
by economist Gerald Scully found that a 1 percent increase in government expenditures (as a percentage of GNP) reduced average annual economic growth
by one-tenth of a percent.

1

Using Scully's estimate of the connection between government size and economic growth and our earlier estimate of the connection between the ratio of
decit spending to taxation and government size, it is possible to make a ballpark estimate of the cost, in terms of forgone GNP, associated with increased
decit spending: If the ratio of decits to tax revenue doubled from 10 to 20
percent (at the Federal level this ratio averaged about 3 percent during the
1960s, while from 1980 through 1988 it averaged 22.5 percent) then ourearlier
estimate predicts that government spending as a percentage of GNP will grow
by 8.7 percent. This means that if government spending began at 20 percent
of GNP it would have increased to 21.74 percent of GNP, which according
to Scully's estimate would reduce economic growth by .174 percent.

With a

GNP in the U.S. of approximately $5 trillion, this reduction in growth is ap-

1 Gerald

W. Scully, The Size of the State, Economic Growth and the Ecient Utilization

of National Resources, Public Choice, 63, (1989), pp. 149-64. Scully's ndings are supported
by similar studies.

For example, see Daniel Landau, Government Expenditures and Eco-

nomic Growth: A Cross-Country Study, Southern Economic Journal (January 1983), pp.
782-92; and Michael L. Marlow, Private Sector Shrinkage and the Growth of Industrialized
Economies, Public Choice, 49 (1986), pp. 143-54.
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proximately $8.7 billion per year. This may appear to be a relatively modest
amount as government budget numbers go, but with the gure increasing each
year with economic growth, and accumulating over time, this decit-related
cost is of genuine signicance.
While reasonable people can disagree over the magnitudes involved, it is
hard to deny that the easier it is to engage in decit spending, the lower
the political cost of increasing government spending. Equally hard to deny is
that the increased spending that will result, other things being equal, transfers
resources out of the productive private sector and into the far less productive
public sector. The clear conclusion is that there is a cost associated with decit
spending that is not the direct economic result of decits themselves.
By attempting to determine the direct eects increased decits have on
such economic variables as interest rates and savings, economists have been
ignoring what may be far more important consequences of decit spending.
Even if decits have little direct economic eect, they can still be economically costly. It is not the decits per se that are the problem, but rather the
political environment that is created when politicians face little resistance to
relying on decit nancing.

The move to such an environment increases the

control politi cians have over productive resources, reduces the responsibility
imposed on them in exercising that control, and, as a consequence, diminishes
the productivity of our economy.
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Public Interest Is Usually Special Interest

August 1, 1991

Special interest groups have been quick to tap the public till. Of course,
they usually aren't so blunt as to demand tax money for their personal benet.
They have found a more eective strategy: obtain government subsidies for
their pet project by arguing that it will benet everyone in the community.
Their project, in fact, is something we all need. It's amazing what a person
will need when someone else is picking up the tab.
A natural response is: If your project is so desirable, why do you have to
come to the government to get it funded? If everyone needs a good or service so
much, why aren't they willing to pay for it? (In which case some enterprising
entrepreneur will gladly supply it.)
Most special-interest advocates have a couple of answers. They argue that
most people aren't aware of all the benets they will receive from the project,
or that the project is a public good and deserves support on that basis.
The rst answer should persuade very few.

If you don't benet from a

private good, it's because you don't care enough to purchase and consume it.
Of course, there are always people who feel that you aren't very bright if you
don't like the same things they do.

But how you spend your money is your

concern, not theirs.
If the lobbyist claims public-good status for his or her proposal, at least two
questions need to be asked. Does the project convey important benets to the
community at large? Is it impossible to deny these benets to anyone once the
project is completed? Few projects meet these standards. But you would be
amazed at the number of projects that are funded at public expense because
they are supposedly public goods.
For example, many big cities have built large sports arenas at taxpayer
expense. Supporters claim that a sports arena, with the major-league teams
that usually go with it, brings recognition and fame and revenue to the city.
Furthermore, supporters assert, this will benet everyone in the city, whether
they are sports fans or not, because they will be living in a more prestigious
community. And this justies coercing everyone to pay for it.

Clearly, this is a weak argument. The people who benet the most from a
sports arena are the fans who use it. But it's easy to prevent someone from
receiving this benet if he doesn't buy a ticket. And it isn't true that everyone
will benet.

For example, sports arenas create trac congestion that many

nd objectionable.
It's probably true that some people who never attend a sporting event
may feel a little better just knowing that they can, or knowing that their city
makes national news occasionally for something other than a rising crime rate.
But does this justify commandeering funds from everyone in the city to build a
sports arena? What about ne restaurants? Certainly ne restaurants enhance
the reputation of a city. Many people are happy to know that one is nearby,
waiting to serve them, whether they visit it or not. But most people would nd
a proposal to build publicly nanced restaurants a little farfetched. If desirable
side eects justied government subsidies, then well-kept yards, hair styling,
pretty dresses, face lifts, car washes, toothpaste, deodorants, smiles, ice cream
parlors, and athlete's-foot medication would all qualify for a handout.
We need to recognize that special interest groups expend a lot of eort to get
subsidies for things that they enjoy. The sports arena is only one example. The
more cultured, and usually wealthier, denizens of many cities have managed to
obtain government support for symphonies, operas, ballet, and the performing
arts in general.
The justication they give is similar to that for subsidizing sports arenas.
Supposedly, everyone in a community will benet, even those who prefer to sit
home with a can of beer and watch all-star wrestling on television.
There are many other examples of special interest groups seeking public
funds for goods and services that primarily benet them. Just follow the proposals and requests that come before meetings of locally elected ocials. You
probably will be surprised at the number of socially concerned people who
have identied some urgent public need.
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Greed and Gravity

October 1, 1995

People have a tough time discussing self-interest in a morally neutral way.
While morally charged arguments about self-interest can be philosophically
intriguing, they are usually beside the point. Self-interest, or greed as it is often
called, is like gravity: a pervasive force remarkably unaected by philosophical
discussions of right and wrong. When confronted with such a force one should
recall the Alcoholics Anonymous prayer, Lord, give me the courage to change
the things that can and ought to be changed, the serenity to accept the things
that cannot be changed, and the wisdom to know the dierence. Discussions
of self-interest typically reect little serenity and even less wisdom.
Although self-interest does have its defenders, its detractors are far more
numerous and inuential.

Self-interest is commonly seen as a negative char-

acteristic that people should try to overcome.

In this view, self-interest and

greed are synonymous, and the world would be a better place if people discarded them as they would bad habits. Some people distinguish between greed
(bad) and enlightened self-interest (good). But the person who applies the
adjective enlightened often does so to champion action that he approves and
which commonly does more to promote his well-being than that of those urged
to take the recommended action.
The defenders of self-interest base their arguments on deeper philosophical
insight into human nature, and have made a strong case for narrowly focused
self-interestwhat most people would refer to as greed.

Those who defend

narrow self-interest recognize that people are capable of malevolence as well as
benevolence when concerning themselves with the interests of others. And given
the history of man's inhumanity to man, malevolence is probably a stronger
impulse than benevolence.

In Defense of Commerce
Indeed, the major advantage some eighteenth-century writers saw in the emerging market-based economy was that it motivated people to substitute commer-

cial avarice (or greed) for more disruptive passions, such as the lust for power
and conquest. This view was succinctly captured by Samuel Johnson when he
observed, There are few ways in which a man can be more innocently employed than in getting money.

1

In his famous 1748 treatise, Spirit of the Laws,

the French political philosopher Montesquieu stated: It is almost a general
rule that wherever manners are gentle there is commerce; and wherever there
is commerce, manners are gentle.

2

The Scottish historian William Robertson

wrote in 1769, Commerce tends to wear o those prejudices which maintain
distinctions and animosity between nations. It softens and polishes the manners
of men.

3

More recently, even John Maynard Keynes saw virtue in narrowly

focused self-interest:
Dangerous human proclivities can be canalized into comparatively
harmless channels by the existence of opportunity for money-making
and private wealth, which if they cannot be satised in this way,
may nd their outlet in cruelty, the reckless pursuit of personal
power and authority, and other forms of self-aggrandizement. It is
better that a man should tyrannize over his bank balance than over
his fellow-citizens...

4

But the defenders of self-interest, and their arguments, are not widely
known. Most people see the defenders of self-interest as villainous characters.
Certainly popular entertainment promotes the view that self-interest, particularly commercial self-interest, is a corrupting inuence in society. According
to one study, during the 1980s almost 90 percent of all business characters on
5

television were portrayed as corrupted by greed.

Politicians do the most to foster and exploit the negative view of selfinterest. They constantly rant against the greed of those who put their private
interest above the public interest. Invariably when a politician engages in such
a diatribe, he is rationalizing the failure of some public policy that he favors.
Few things would do more to discredit silly political statements and derail pernicious public policies than to recognize that self-interest is not good or bad,
it just is.
Imagine an aeronautical engineer who kept designing airplanes that either
never got o the ground or crashed almost immediately if they did. Consider
our response to such an engineer if she claimed that there was nothing at all
wrong with her engineering, and that her planes would y just ne if it weren't
for gravity. She would immediately be dismissed as a raving lunatic. But is

1 James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson (Middlesex, England:

Penguin Books, 1979),

p. 177.

2 Quoted

on p. 1464 of Albert O. Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society:

Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble, Journal of Economic Literature, December 1982, pp. 14631484.

3 Quoted

in Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments

for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 61

4 The

General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Macmillan, 1936),

p. 374. Also quoted in Hirschman (1977), op. cit., p. 134.

5 See page 146 of Robert Lichter,

Linda Lichter, and Stanley Rothman, Watching America

(New York: Prentice Hall, 1990).
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her argument really any sillier than those we hear from politicians and statist
policy wonks every day?
Recall the recent health-care debate. Government policy has led to healthcare arrangements where most medical services are paid for by third parties,
with neither patients nor physicians having much motivation to take costs into
consideration. The predictable result has been escalating prices for health-care
services and, of necessity, increasing health-insurance premiums. But the constant refrain from the health-care engineers in Washington is that the problem
is greed, not the collectivization of healthcare decisions.

Indeed the recom-

mendation has been for more collectivization. The recommended health-care
system would work just ne, with the nest care at the lowest prices for all, if
only physicians, drug companies, and insurance companies weren't so greedy.
As government has grown larger, controlling an increasing share of the national income, organized interests have predictably devoted more eort to inuencing government policy. The noble objectives that it is easy to imagine being
achieved by an expansive government invariably fall victim to perversities of
interest-group politics. Yet good-government types are convinced that bigger
government could be the source of bigger benets if only the greedy special interests would quit putting their narrow concerns ahead of the general welfare.
Greed is the problem, not the design of government programs and policies. So
all that is needed is the right campaign reform and lobbying restrictions to
banish the corrupting inuence of greed from politics.
Other examples could be given of social engineers blaming greed and selfinterest when their policies fail to achieve lifto, but the point is clear. The
public would be well served if politicians and policy makers began recognizing
that self-interest is not good or bad, but an unalterable fact of life. Until they
do, they will continue to design cumbersome and costly public policies that do
far more harm than good, and then blame their failures on greed.
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Should Prots Be Shared with Workers?
June 1, 1997

When most people argue that rms should share prots with workers, they
are not interested in the general distribution of business receipts.

1

Rather,

they are pointing to rms experiencing exceptionally high prots and claiming
that fairness requires that most of those prots be passed on to workers. For
example, management consultant Ale Kohn states, If a company has had a
protable year, I see no reason those gains should not be distributed to the
employees; after all, their work is what produced the prots.

2

At a supercial level, it may seem only right that when a rm is doing
well, its good fortune should be shared with the workers who made it possible.
And, indeed, workers do benet when their rms are protable and expanding
because their jobs are more secure and opportunities for promotion are greater.
But shouldn't rms making high prots directly share some of those prots
with their workers by increasing their wages much more than in leaner times?
Workers and their union representatives are frequently quick to use high prots
as justication for demanding large wage increases, but is it wise to acquiesce?
It is generally true that those fortunate enough to work for highly protable
3

rms receive higher wages than those who work for barely protable rms.

But

1 At one level the answer to the question in the title of this paper is, of course prots should
be shared with workers. The only durable source of compensation for any worker (whether in
the private or public sector) is the revenue earned by protable businesses. Indeed, by a wide
margin, most of the national income goes to pay workers. In 1994, for example, employee
compensation made up 73.4 percent of the national income, with corporate prots coming to
9.9 percent and proprietors' and rental income (not all of which can be counted as business
prots) amounting to 9.2 percent. The rest of the national income in 1994, or 7.5 percent,
went to net interest. These gures are found on page 39 of Herbert Stein and Murray Foss,
The New Illustrated Guide to the American Economy (Washington, D.C.: The American
Enterprise Institute Press, 1995).

2 See

page 183 of Ale Kohn, Punished by Rewards (Boston: Houghton Miin Company,

1993).

3 This

does not necessarily mean, however, that highly protable rms are more generous

in sharing prots with their workers than are less protable rms. More likely, highly profitable rms are paying higher wages to attract workers more skilled than those working for

this is not the same as a rm giving its workers a large wage increase whenever
it experiences a large prot increase.

Firms seldom do this for reasons of

eciency, fairness, and the best interests of their workers.

Eciency
Consider rst the eciency of sharing prots with workers.

Although many

people see prots as nothing more than rich people accumulating more wealth,
prots serve a vital function in creating wealth by allowing consumers to communicate how they want scarce resources allocated among competing productive activities. A rm earning a large prot is using resources to create more
value (as measured by what it sells its output for) than those resources could
create elsewhere in the economy (as measured by what the rm has to pay
for its inputs). The total value of production can then be increased, with the
same use of resources, by reallocating resources to highly protable rms and
away from less protable rms elsewhere in the economy. And this is exactly
the reallocation of productive resources nanced and motivated by high prots.
Firms typically reinvest high prots right back into the productive activity that
generated them by bidding resources, both human and non-human, away from
less protable activities. Output expands in the high-prot rms (driving their
rate of return down) and contracts in the low-prot rms (driving their rate of
return up) until additional inputs are worth no more in the former than in the
latter.
This ecient reallocation would be impossible if a rm that began making
high prots, say because of an increase in the demand for its product, used those
prots to increase the wages of its workers. Firms are forced by competition to
pay their workers at least as much as they are worth in their best alternative
employments. If a rm devoted its high prots to paying its current workers
more than is justied by their productivity, it would be unable to attract the
additional resources it needs to expand.

The workers receiving the higher

wages would be obviously better o in the short run, but their gains would be
more than oset by the losses (forgone opportunities) suered by others in the
economy.

Fairness
Quite apart from the adverse eects on eciency, paying workers higher wages
when the prots of the rm they work for are high forces rms to behave in
ways that will be widely seen as unfair. If, because of high prots, a rm oers
wages well in excess of their opportunity cost (the amount needed to attract
workers with the appropriate skills from other employments), more people will
want to work for that rm than it can aord to hire. This creates a situation
where rms nd themselves having to choose workers on the basis of noneconomic considerations. Regardless of how rms make those choices, they will
be criticized for practicing favoritism and unfair discrimination by those who
are not chosen, and maybe with justication. Certainly the fairest approach,
less protable rms.
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and the one that penalizes discriminating on non-economic grounds, is to give
all workers the opportunity to compete for jobs on the basis of their productive
ability. This opportunity is denied to most workers when some are being paid
more than their productivity warrants.
But even those who would get large wage increases because they work for
rms creating high prots would probably not benet from a policy of sharing in
those prots, and certainly not if the policy were fairly implemented. If workers
receive large wage increases when their rm is making large prots, then fairness
would require that they also receive wage cuts when prots decline. Indeed, if
workers favored a consistent policy of sharing in the prots, then they should be
prepared to give money back (receive negative wages) when their rm (as rms
often do) loses money. But workers obviously would not be happy with such a
policy. It would expose them to all the risks that confront the owners of the
rm, risks that few workers are willing to bear. People willing to accept large
risks typically start their own businesses, or invest in businesses that others
start, in return for a higher average, but very uncertain, return. Workers are
typically more risk averse, as evidenced by the fact that they choose to work
for others for a lower average, but more certain, return in the form of a xed
salary or wage.
Of course, some rms have attempted to motivate workers to be more productive through arrangements that give them some ownership in the rm. But
these plans are not what those calling for sharing high prots with workers
have in mind, since they can impose losses on workers when prots decline.
For this reason, these prot-sharing plans are not widespread.

Furthermore,

when they do exist, prot-sharing plans are typically rather limited because
even under the best of circumstances they do little to motivate workers to be
more productive.

The Free-Rider Temptation
Prot-sharing arrangements are easily frustrated by the free-rider temptation.
Although it is collectively rational for all employees to work harder in response
to prot sharing, it is not individually rational to do so.

Each worker will

recognize that if others work harder, that he will reap the benets from higher
prots without extra eort. Each worker also recognizes that if others don't
work harder, then his share of the additional prot generated by extra eort is
too small to be worth the eort.
For example, assume that there are 1,000 workers in a rm, each earning $15.00 per hour.

Also assume a prot-sharing plan is established that

would increase total worker productivity, and therefore worker compensation,
by $40,000 per week if all workers reduce their shirking on the job by one hour
per week. This is clearly a good deal for the workers, since each one stands to
receive $40 for putting in just one more hour of genuine eort. But consider
the payo each individual would realize from his decision to shirk an hour less.
The individual who puts in one more hour of work would be responsible for
increasing total compensation by $40 (assuming that each individual's impact
on productivity is the same as everyone else's, and independent of what others
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do). But since the additional $40 is spread over all 1,000 workers, his share, in
the form of higher wages is only $.04. How many would be willing to give up
an hour of on-the-job leisure for $.04? At that hourly rate a person would have
to work an entire 40-hour week to make enough to buy a small box of popcorn
at the movies.
So having workers share consistently in the prots of their rm is not a
policy many workers would nd attractive. Such prot-sharing arrangements
do little to motivate more productive eort, while imposing risk on workers that
few are comfortable accepting. This explains why prot-sharing arrangements
are often short-lived.
Consider the experience of Du Pont's bers division.

In 1988, Du Pont

began an incentive pay plan for its bers division workers.

Workers were to

commit some of their annual pay increases to an at risk pot until it contained
6 percent of their annual compensation.

They were to share in the prots

through bonuses based on how well the division did compared to a target of a
4 percent real growth in prots. If, for example, prots increased by 5 percent,
then workers would be paid the 6 percent of the pay they contributed plus
another 6 percent.

If prots increased by 6 percent, workers would be paid

their 6 percent plus the maximum bonus of 12 percent. On the other hand,
if the division just made its prot target of 4 percent, the workers would get
just their 6 percent back, with no bonus. And if the division's prots fell to 80
percent or less of its prot target, then the workers lost the 6 percent of the
pay they put at risk.

1

Even though the risk the Du Pont plan imposed on its workers was less than
a complete prot-sharing plan would have imposed, some workers expressed
concern about gambling with a signicant amount of their annual pay before
the plan went into eect.

2

This concern was temporarily disregarded, however,

when in 1989 prots exceeded the target and workers received $19 million in
bonuses. Few people complain about the risk when they are holding a winning
hand. But in the 1990 recession, the bers division's prots were not meeting
the target and workers were going to lose some of their at-risk pay under the
incentive pay plan. The prospect of this loss did not sit well with the division's
20,000 workers, most of whom took something other than an entrepreneurial
attitude toward the downside of risk. Faced with complaints and problems with
worker morale, Du Pont canceled the incentive plan, letting the workers avoid
the type of loss that those who want to share in prots have to be willing to
3

accept.

More recently, Wal-Mart Stores has experienced some diculties with its
prot-sharing plan. Probably no other U.S. company has used stock incentives
more than Wal-Mart to motivate hard work and loyalty from its workers. And
for years it worked as Wal-Mart stock steadily increased in value (100 shares

1 For

more details on the plan, see Nancy L. Perry, Here Come Richer, Riskier Pay Plans,

Fortune, December 19, 1988, pp. 50-58.

2 See

All Eyes on Du Pont's Incentive Pay Plan, Wall Street Journal, December 5, 1988,

p. A-1.

3 Richard

Koenig, Du Pont Plan Linking Pay to Fibers Prot Unravels, Wall Street Jour-

nal, October 25, 1990, p. B-1.
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of Wal-Mart stock, which cost $1,650 in 1970 when it rst went public, were
worth $3.5 million in February 1993). But then the stock experienced a decline,
going from $34.125 a share in February 1993 to $20.875 on the rst trading day
in 1995. During this decline, the prot-sharing plan became a source of worker
complaints and demands for more pay and union representation. As reported
in the Wall Street Journal, The world's largest retailer is also discovering the
1

risks in a prot-sharing plan heavily invested in its own stocks.

Unless workers are willing to take the losses that are inevitable in business
activity, as well as the gains, the argument that fairness requires that workers
share in the prots of their rms is an empty one. Many workers, and their
representatives who call for sharing prots with workers, seem to believe that
fairness means heads I win, tails you lose. All workers are better o, and treated
more fairly, when most prots are retained by rms to expand the production
of goods and services that consumers are communicating with those prots
that they want more of.

1 See

Bob Ortega, What Does Wal-Mart Do If Stock Drops Cut Into Workers' Morale?

Wall Street Journal, January 4, 1995, p. A1.
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Markets and Freedom
September 1, 1998

The social cooperation that emerges in free markets permits the specialization on which prosperity depends. We would be much poorer without the
specialization that is possible only when large numbers of people can coordinate production and consumption through market exchange. But even more
important than the material wealth we realize from the marketplace is the benet of freedom. We would soon be deprived of most of our freedom without
the accountability and discipline possible only in market economies.
Freedom is easy to take for granted, especially in the United States where
we have enjoyed what people in many other countries can only dream about.
Freedom is a lot like good health: people tend not to appreciate it until they
lose it. Just as healthy people can destroy their health by yielding to shortrun temptations, free people can destroy their freedom by opting for short-run
political advantages that undermine the conditions on which freedom depends.
Also, as important as wealth is, it is secondary to both good health and
freedom. Wealth is of limited value to those without the health or the freedom
to enjoy it.

Furthermore, good health and freedom are important elements

in the production of wealth, with freedom being absolutely essential.

Sick

people can be productive, but without freedom the productive cooperation of
the marketplace is impossible.
So I shall discuss two separate but related points in this column. First, the
productive cooperation of the marketplace depends on freedom, and second,
freedom depends on the productive cooperation of the marketplace. Economists
typically have the unpleasant task of pointing to the tradeos that are the inevitable consequence of scarcity.

But with wealth and freedom, there is no

tradeo; they reinforce each other in market economies, with it generally im1

possible to have one without the other.

Attempts to increase wealth with

political policies that reduce freedom invariably end up reducing both.

1I

have qualied this statement to account for the situation where a country possesses

great wealth because of natural resource endowments and has an autocratic political regime,
suppressing the freedoms of its subjects. But even in this case, the lack of freedom prevents

Markets Require Freedom
Markets work their magic by allowing people to communicate the benets they
realize from the eorts of others and the costs of their eorts to benet others.

Ultimately, all benets and costs are subjective, depending on people's

preferences and circumstances, which only they can accurately evaluate. This
is obvious in the case of benets. Who but the person who consumes a good,
or avails himself of a service, is in a better position to judge the value of the
benets realized? But if benets are subjective, then so are costs, which are
nothing more than the value of forgone benets. And since they are subjective,
people can accurately communicate costs and benets to one another only by
having the freedom to enter into, or exit, dierent markets as they see t, and
to buy and sell at any mutually agreeable price. Government price controls restrict our freedoms as both buyers and sellers, and destroy wealth by censoring
our communication with one another.
Central planning fails because people don't have the freedom to act on the
local information that only they possess. When the central direction of political authorities is substituted for the market choices of individual producers and
consumers, economic decisions are necessarily made in an informational vacuum. A productive economy requires the use of information that is dispersed
throughout the population, and that information cannot be used without individual freedom. Destroy freedom and you destroy the information ows that
are the essence of market economies.

Freedom Requires Markets
The connection between freedom and markets also runs the other way. Just as
the market depends on freedom, so freedom depends on the market. Certainly
private property, which is fundamental to all market economies, protects individual freedom. If the state owns all of the auditoriums and printing presses,
how much freedom do you have to speak out against government policy?

If

the state owns all the means of production, how much freedom do you have to
launch your own business? Start eliminating private property, and undermining
the market that depends on it, and you start eliminating freedom.
But the market also protects freedom by establishing the only setting in
which it can be tolerated.

Freedom without responsibility is mere license,

indulgence, and privilege, and will not long be tolerated. Real freedom, and
the only freedom that can survive, is exercised in ways accountable to the
concerns of all. The only freedom that satises this requirement is that which
is subject to the discipline of the marketplace.

Eliminate markets, and you

eliminate the accountability necessary for freedom to survive.
For example, pollution problems result directly from not having markets
in the use of the environment as a dump.

If such markets existed, polluters

would have to pay prices that reected the cost their emissions imposed on
others.

Polluters would be accountable to others, and we could tolerate the

the country from realizing the full benet from its resources, and undermines the productivity
necessary to expand, or even maintain, its wealth.
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freedom to discharge waste products into the environment.

But because we

don't have pollution markets, we accept government restrictions on polluting
activities that would be unacceptable in most areas of our lives.

Our Freedoms Are Vulnerable
Freedoms are seldom taken away all at once. They are typically lost a little at
a time, with people seldom noticing the loss. Even when freedom is reduced
directly, as when government imposes occupational licensing in the name of
protecting consumers, few people notice, and even if they do, they don't see
the restrictions as aecting them. But as the great Austrian economist F. A.
Hayek pointed out, The benets I derive from freedom are...largely the result
of the uses of freedom by others.

1

For example, those who suer the most

when people lose their freedom to become barbers without having to pass state
exams on the chemical composition of hair are not aspiring barbers, but people
who need haircuts.
Also, there is an insidious dynamic to the loss of freedom. Direct restrictions always reduce freedom by more than is apparent because every restriction
imperceptibly undermines the accountability of the marketplace that makes
freedom possible.
Thomas Jeerson was correct when he said, Eternal vigilance is the price
of liberty. People are more likely to exercise vigilance in protection of their
freedom when they understand the inextricable connection between it and the
market.

1 See

F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1960), p. 32.
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Distrust and Verify

February 1, 1999
Dwight R. Lee and J.R. Clark

Perhaps the most positive legacy of the Clinton administration will be that it
further eroded the public's trust in the federal government. Trust has declined
signicantly since the Great Society programs of the Johnson administration.
According to University of Michigan surveys, the number of people who responded that the federal government does what is right always or most of
the time has dropped from 75 percent in 1964 to less than 30 percent in the
mid-1990s.
Our view is that this decline in trust is a good thing because it mirrors rather
accurately the performance of a government that has become less trustworthy.
However, before making our case for less trust in government, we acknowledge
that most people see the decline in this trust as a serious problem.

The Cart Before the Horse
People have worried about lack of public condence in government for a long
time. For example, Benjamin Franklin fretted that:
"Much of the Strength and Eciency of any Government, in procuring & securing Happiness to the People, depends on...the general
Opinion of the Goodness of that Government."
This was no doubt a legitimate concern in Franklin's day, when the federal
government was undergoing a controversial birth and controlled little of the
people's wealth. But today, with the federal government commanding over 20
percent of our income directly through spending, and signicantly more through
regulation, some are still concerned that condence in government might be too
low to allow it to seize more of our resources. For example, Joseph Nye, dean
of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, worries that if people believe
that government is incompetent and cannot be trusted, they are less likely
to provide [critical] resources.

Without [these] resources, government can't

perform well. Studies investigating the decline in trust, and fueling concern
about the consequences, have been published recently by the Kennedy School,
University of Virginia, and Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.
These studies sometimes admit that government's performance leaves something to be desired, but suggest that the best way to improve its performance
is by restoring trust in it. This puts the cart before the horse. Where is the
advantage in placing more trust in an organization whose performance does not
justify trust?

How many people needing heart bypass surgery would trust a

surgeon who kills most of his patients on grounds that he will become a better
surgeon only if more people trust him?
The only sensible way to restore trust in government is by making it more
trustworthy. And a trustworthy government is more likely to be undermined by
too much trust than by too little. Indeed, a major reason government performs
so poorly is that persistent political inuences encourage citizens to put far too
much trust in it.

The Arithmetic of Voting
Public trust is easily transformed into political power that will be used to
promote private advantage at public expense.
simple arithmetic of voting.

The reason is rooted in the

Voting is an important civic responsibility, and

nothing here is meant to suggest otherwise. But in state and national elections,
the probability of your vote deciding the outcome is far less than that of being
injured driving to the polls. This means that favoring one candidate or proposal
costs you almost nothing in terms of sacricing the alternative. Only in the rare
case of a tie is your vote decisive; only then does your vote for one alternative
cause you to sacrice the other.
This arithmetic is important because it explains why charisma and emotion
can trump substance in politics. Registering support at the polls for a supercially attractive candidate or a supercially compassionate proposal allows a
voter to identify with the glamorous or feel virtuous with little concern about
cost or eectiveness. For example, if voting for a proposal to combat global
warming (or for a candidate who supports the proposal) makes you feel good,
you might be tempted to shelve any doubts and vote regardless of the cost to
you if it passes, since your vote is not decisive. The more people trust government, the more virtuous they feel when voting for a wide range of government
initiatives that end up costing far more and delivering far less than promised.

Exploiting the Public's Trust in Government
The nature of government programs enables well-placed interest groups to capture private benets at public expense. The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has increased the size of its budget by championing command-andcontrol approaches to reducing pollution.

Market-based measures are more

eective and cheaper, but require fewer bureaucrats and have been resisted by
the EPA. Industry groups (such as the eastern coal industry) have also supported command-and-control approaches to protect themselves against com156

petition (from low-sulfur western coal), at the expense of consumers (higher
electricity prices) and environmental quality (more sulfuric oxides in the atmosphere). The list of government activities supported by well-intended citizens,
but perverted by organized interests, is painfully long.
Every interest group wants to convince the public that government can
be trusted to promote the general well-being by increasing some spending or
regulating. The result is a steady stream of rhetoric aimed at making people
feel good about trusting government to solve almost every imaginable problem.
Unfortunately, a widespread belief that discretionary government power
can and should solve every social problem is incompatible with government's
performing well. Such trust leads to politically compelling demands for government to do lots of things it has no business doing, with the result that it
does poorly the few things it should be doing.
The best way to make government more trustworthy is for voters to resist
the temptation to achieve a cheap sense of virtue by voting for every virtuous
proposal that comes along. The real virtue is in voting against most government
programs (and the politicians who support them), no matter how virtuous those
programs are supposed to be.
We need plenty of public skepticism toward government
to counter the voters' tendency to support government activities that purport
to do good with power that will invariably be captured and corrupted by
special interests.

A trustworthy government requires a healthy measure of

public distrust.
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Costs Should Be Revealed, Not Concealed

May 1, 1999

Making sound economic decisions is impossible without information about
opportunity costs.

Thinking about the cost of doing anything is crucial; it

amounts to considering the value of the alternatives.
A major advantage of the market process is that it gathers up information
on costs and transmits it to market decision-makers through prices that cannot be ignored. In contrast, the political process fails either to transmit cost
information to political decision-makers or to motivate the proper use of this
information. It fails partly because organized interest groups want to ignore the
costs of their pet projects, and partly because political institutions are unable
to acquire and communicate information on cost.

Markets promote wealth-

creating decisions by revealing costs, while politics promote wealth-destroying
decisions by concealing costs.

Revealing Lots of Little Costs
The costs of doing anythingfor example, buying a pencilresult from tiny
sacrices made all over the world. Leonard Read's primary point in his justly
famous 1958 article I, Pencil is that making something as simple as a pencil
requires the coordinated eorts of thousands (probably millions) of people with
a wide range of specialized knowledge that no one person could ever possess.
This coordinated eort is possible only because of the guidance provided by
market prices. Read's example also illustrates how the opportunity costs incurred by everyone involved in getting a pencil to the consumer (both in terms
of the value of their time and other resources) is incorporated into its price.
The consumer is thereby implicitly aware of the value of every tiny sacrice
made in producing it.
All prices reveal a similar collection of diused costs to consumers. Therefore, each product is consumed only to the point where consumers value another
unit by an amount equal to the value sacriced to make it available. As I've
emphasized before, the market generates a pattern of cooperative interaction

by people pursuing their own advantages in ways that take into account the
concerns of others. If only the diused costs of government action could be collected through the political process and revealed to decision-makers with the
same compelling clarity as in the marketplace! That the costs of government
decisions are commonly ignored goes a long way in explaining the perversities
of so many public policies.

Concealing Lots of Little Costs
When the costs of government action are spread wide, as they commonly are,
they are generally ignored.

For example, a tari that protects a domestic

industry against foreign competition will cost consumers far more in higher
prices than it benets the industry. But while the benets are easily attributed
to the tari and concentrated on a relatively small number of people, the costs
amount to only a few dollars a year for each of millions of consumers, few of
whom will notice the extra costs or the connection with the tari. And even if
a consumer does know of these costs, his share is so small that it doesn't pay
him to actively oppose the tari.
The benets of any special-interest proposal are communicated through the
political process loud and clear. The costs, however, are borne in silence and
therefore largely ignored by politicians. Organized interest groups are aware
that lots of small, widely diused costs are dicult to register through the
political process, and they aggressively exploit this fact to capture benets
at others' expense.

But the inability of the political process to collect and

concentrate diused cost would result in popular support for perverse public
policies even without interest-group lobbying.
For example, after an airplane crash in Sioux City, Iowa, in the late 1980s,
in which an infant was killed when torn from his mother's arms, pressure arose
for the federal government to require that all infants have their own airplane
seats.

The benet to children on planes was obvious; they would be safer.

But what was the cost?

The cost of an extra seat is obvious.

Other costs,

however, were less obvious because they were diused and remote. If families
with infants faced higher costs for airline travel, more infants would travel
in cars instead of airplanes. This would result in more infants being killed in
automobile accidents than would be saved in airline accidents, since car travel is
many times more dangerous per passenger mile than air travel. Several studies
suggested that the cost of saving one child with the seat requirement would
have been the lives of four to six children lost in car accidents. Fortunately, the
requirement never became law, but that it was seriously considered illustrates
the diculty the political process has perceiving widely dispersed costs and
concentrating them on the relevant decision-makers.

The Cost of the 55-MPH Speed Limit
Enactment of the 55 MPH speed limit on the grounds that it saves lives also
shows the tendency of the political process to conceal rather than reveal costs.
We have all heard that the speed limit reduced trac fatalities, which then
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increased when it was raised. But what were the costs of the 55 MPH limit?
One cost was the additional time people had to spend on the highway, a cost
that came to billions of hours per year (20 extra hours a year on the road for
200 million people is 4 billion hours). Evaluated at the minimum wage, this
amounts to $21 billion. Because this cost was spread over the entire population,
it was largely ignored.
Unfortunately, an even greater costalso politically ignoredwas the cost
in lives.

The claims that trac fatalities were reduced by the speed limit

are based on fatalities on the interstate highways, which, because they are
multilane divided highways, are the safest roads.

But when the limit was

imposed, trac was diverted to two-lane state roads that are far less safe. This
diversion occurred because the speed limit of these roads became relatively
higher than before, and they were not policed as eectively as the interstates.
The result was an overall increase in trac fatalities even though interstate
fatalities decreased.

It has been estimated that when states were allowed to

raise the speed limit on interstates outside the cities, fatalities on all roads
declined by 3.4 to 5.1 percent. (See Charles Lave and Patrick Elias, Resource
Allocation in Public Policy: The Eects of the 65-MPH Speed Limit, Economic
Inquiry, July 1997, pp. 61420.)
If the market did as poorly as government at collecting information about
dispersed and fragmented costs and imposing them on those responsible, we
would live in an impoverished economy. Governments are tempted to meddle
precisely because of their ability to conceal costs, and their inability to reveal
them. That's why the benets from government action are low and the costs
high.
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How Government Prevents Us from Buying Safety

December 1, 2000

There is a limit to how much people will voluntarily pay to reduce the risk
of accidental injury or death. In other words, the marginal value people place
on their lives is nite. We accept some risks to take advantage of opportunities
to do things that, at the margin, provide more value than the expected sacrice
in health and life expectancy. In eect, people routinely put a price on their
lives. They do it every time they go skiing, roller blade in the street, spend too
much time in the sun, drive to the store, walk across the street, overeat, stay
up late, go swimming, or do any of a thousand other things.
But saying that there is a limit to how much people will pay to reduce
risk implies they are willing to spend something. People value safety just as
they value other things, and they will purchase it up to the point where, in
their estimation, its marginal value equals its marginal cost (the value of what
has to be sacriced to get the additional safety). In fact, we are buying more
safety now than ever before because we are richer and can aord more of almost
everything.
For example, our jobs are far safer now than they were in the past.

In

part this reects the shift away from jobs demanding manual labor (like farming and mining) and into oce jobs where paper cuts are the biggest hazard.
But employers also spend more to provide safer conditions on all jobs because
workers would rather have the additional safety than the higher salary and
wages that otherwise could have been paid. We spend more on smoke alarms,
slip-resistant bathtub interiors, air ltration systems, and outside lighting to
make our homes safer. We demand levels of sanitation in the food we eat, the
water we drink, the air we breathe, and the clothes we wear that would have
been considered ridiculous a couple of generations ago, and unimaginable in
many poor countries today. Airline travel is far safer now, with the number of
miles traveled increasing as the number of airline fatalities is decreasing. And
the car you drive today is safer than the ones available a few years ago because
they are better designed, have better brakes, and contain more safety features.

Our increased demand for safety, and the response to that demand, is explained primarily by marketplace incentives.

Without the cooperation and

coordination created by market incentives, we would not have experienced the
growth in wealth that increased our demand for safety. And when our demand
for safety increases we can communicate that demand through prices and profits to those best able to respond. An automobile company that tried to sell cars
no more safe than those made in 1970 would quickly go bankrupt, as would
an airline with the same safety as 30 years ago. Some people will object that
government regulations have forced automobile manufacturers, food processors, the airlines, building contractors, and employers to provide the additional
safety. It cannot be denied that government regulations have had an impact,
but it has been a far less desirable impact than most people realize.
Governments often enact regulations requiring more safety only after the
private sector has started providing the desired amount. Indeed this is about
the best we can hope for, even though government regulations commonly
increase the cost of providing more safety by specifying one-size-ts-all approaches rather than allowing rms to use approaches best suited to their situations. But government regulators often require that we pay for far more safety
than we want because of the tendency toward bureaucratic expansion, the desire for greater power, and the demands of politically organized groups. For
example, some Environmental Protection Agency regulations are estimated to
cost over $4.5 billion per life saved, and some Occupational Safety and Health
Administration regulations that are estimated to cost over $72.7 billion per life
saved.

1

The CAFE that Kills
Unfortunately, while some government regulations are making us buy very little safety at exorbitant cost, others are discouraging us from buying a lot of
safety at low cost. Consider federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
regulations that require automobile manufacturers to produce vehicles that average no less than a specied number of miles per gallon. CAFE now requires
that new cars average 27.5 miles per gallon and that new light trucks (pickups, minivans, vans, and sport utility vehicles) average 20.5 miles per gallon.
These regulations were imposed in 1978 to force us to conserve gasolineafter
the federal government imposed gasoline price controls that denied people the
information and incentive to conserve more eciently on their own. More recently, environmentalists have lobbied for increasing the required mileage to
cut down on the emission of pollutants and alleged greenhouse gases.
It is not clear that CAFE standards do much, if anything, to reduce either
gas consumption or pollution. To the extent that the standards increase gas
mileage, the cost of driving will go down and people will drive more miles.
Also, because the standards increase the cost of new vehicles, particularly the
larger ones that are articially restricted in supply, people drive their old cars

1 I discussed these and other examples of extremely costly safety regulations in my October
column and explained why they result in less, rather than more, safety.
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longer than they otherwise would, and older cars commonly get poorer gas
mileage and almost always pollute far more than new cars. But it is clear that
CAFE standards do increase trac fatalities by preventing people from buying
additional safety at very little cost.
Because of CAFE standards, automobile manufacturers have had to produce cars that are smaller and lighter on average than consumers want to buy.
Straightforward physics insures that, everything else equal, smaller and lighter
vehicles are less safe than large heavy onesoccupants are closer to windshields
and dashboards and they are surrounded with less cushion. Not surprisingly,
a recent study using government and insurance data found that for every mile
per gallon added because of CAFE, 7,700 additional lives are lost in trac
accidents.

1

One has to conclude that there is a stronger bias in the political process to
expand regulations than to increase safety. What other explanation is there for
simultaneously imposing regulations that provide almost no safety at ridiculously high costs and preventing people from signicantly reducing their risks
at the cost of a few gallons of gas? Unfortunately, CAFE is not the only regulation that prevents people from buying more safety at low cost. For example,
thousands of people have died needlessly in the United States because of federal Food and Drug Administration restrictions on buying medicines that have
been widely and successfully used in other countries to reduce the risks of heart
attacks, strokes, and other diseases. Details on these restrictions will have to
wait until a future column.

1 This study was discussed by Murray Weidenbaum, Saving on Gas Costs Us Moneyand
Lives, Chicago Sun-Times, September 17, 1999, op-ed page.
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The Market Makes Diversity Worth Celebrating

January 1, 2002

The mantra on university campuses today is celebrating diversity. There
are good reasons to encourage a greater appreciation of the rich diversity in
the world. We are increasingly part of a global community; it's important that
we interact cooperatively with people of diverse backgrounds, understandings,
skills, and motivations.

But we should keep in mind that emphasizing our

dierences carries at least as much potential for conict as for cooperation.
Every day, in multicultural hot spots around the world, people celebrate their
dierences with bloody barrages of high-octane reworks.
Also, much of what is promoted under the banner of diversity on campuses
today ignores, and often disparages, the most eective force for fostering multicultural harmonythe market economy. Market economies, based on private
property and voluntary exchange, are now acknowledged to excel in the production of wealth. What people often fail to recognize is that market economies
are so productive because they allow us to make the best use of the dierences
between people and countries.

People are rewarded in market economies for

seeking out those who are dierent and taking advantage of those dierences
through specialization and exchange.
The best way to celebrate diversity on campuses is by promoting a better
understanding of the free-market economy that makes diversity worth celebrating. But you will look in vain for a multicultural course that emphasizes our
ability to cooperate across cultural divides through market activity. Instead,
the most vocal advocates of cultural diversity on campuses see the political
arena, not the marketplace, as the best setting for bringing people together.
Unfortunately, politicizing our dierences is far more likely to make diversity
a source of conict than a cause of celebration.
If people and countries were all the same, the world would be a very impoverished placeimpoverished and boring. If everyone had the same skills,
attitudes, cultural norms, interests, and backgrounds, and if all countries had
the same resource endowments, weather conditions, and cultural heritages, the

opportunities to gain from specialization and exchange would be far less than
they are. Individuals, and the countries they live in, would end up having to
produce more themselves of what they consumed, being jacks of all trades and
masters of none.

With less specialization, and less of the increased produc-

tivity that comes from it, we would all be poorer. And quite apart from the
reduction in wealth, the world would be a less interesting and exciting place.
People would have less to contribute to, and learn from, one another, and the
opportunity for personal growth from travel and social interaction would be
diminished. The world is a more wondrous place in every way because of its
diversity.
But to take advantage of the specialization that diversity makes possible we
must be able to share information with countless other people on what we can
best do for them and they can best do for us, and respond to this information
as if we were as concerned with the welfare of others as we are with our own.
This sharing of information and cooperative response is possible only through
market prices. The market is a multicultural collage of global cooperation that
not only allows people from all over the world to serve the interests of one
another, but also motivates them to do so. Free-market capitalism penalizes
parochialism and cultural isolation and rewards those who expand their markets
by accommodating a wide variety of culturally inuenced interests and tastes.

Scarcity and Conict
I don't want to leave the impression that markets completely eliminate conict
and replace it with the harmony of all joining hands and singing We are the
world. We live in a world of scarce resources, and the greater the diversity
the greater the variance in views on how those resources should be used. True,
in markets the best way for you to get more things you want is by helping
others get more things they want; conict is diminished by allowing everyone
to become better o. Thus market exchanges harmonize diverse preferences to
a degree rarely possible in the political arena.
When people pursue their objectives through the political process, they
usually achieve success by convincing authorities to take resources away from
others.

No more is producedwhat one person gains, others lose.

Worse,

people devote resources to lobbying politicians that could have been producing
more of what people want, so the winners gain less from political action than
the losers lose.
This explains why political decisions are often controversial, with opposing
sides pitted against each other. Each side nds it is more successful mobilizing public opinion and support for political action by presenting its case as a
crusade for virtue, which makes it is easy for members of opposing sides to see
each other as enemies. When one side loses, its tendency is to see the loss as a
personal rebuke and a triumph of evil by those on the other side.
In contrast, conicts over scarce resources in the marketplace are generally
impersonal.

The market is often criticized for being impersonal, but that is

actually one of its advantages. When you end up with less of something than
you had planned on because the price goes up, it is not the result of anyone's
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intentionally taking something from you.

The price increase is the eect of

countless people responding to a wide variety of considerations, with it doubtful
that any of them are giving you any thought at all. Because price changes are
impersonal, people are far less likely to respond with animosity when they end
up with less than if they knew that their loss was the intended result of political
action that permitted others to gain at their expense.
People in Texas use less gasoline than otherwise because the gasoline usage
of New Yorkers drives up the price they pay. But few Texans feel animosity
toward New Yorkers when lling up with gas. But imagine if gas were allocated
politically, and the Gas Allocation Commissar told Texans that they had to
reduce their gasoline use so New Yorkers could increase theirs.

This would

surely increase the sensitivity of Texans to the dierences between them and
New Yorkers, but it would be the sensitivity of a raw nerve.
In general, the more diversity in a community, the more socially divisive
political decisions will be. Fortunately, most decisions can be made individually
in the marketplace since they involve choices that people can make largely
independently of one another. The less we rely on government the more we can
tolerate diversity, indeed thrive from it. If only this were understood by those
who see more collectivism as the best way to promote (and celebrate) diversity.
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Public Interest or Private Interest?
May 1, 2002

That private interest dominates market decisions is widely accepted, if not
always applauded. Farmers don't get up early on cold mornings in Nebraska to
plant crops because of concern over world hunger, but because they want more
income for themselves and their families. People don't invest in pharmaceutical rms because they want to help the sick, but because they believe those
investments will increase their retirement incomes more than will alternative
investments.
Farmers and investors occasionally claim that feeding the hungry and curing the sick provide much of their motivation, and certainly people do feel
good about contributing to the well-being of others.

But who doubts that

if farm incomes and pharmaceutical prots dropped sharply, there would be
fewer farmers plowing the elds and fewer dollars invested in medical research,
regardless of the sickness and hunger in the world? The advantage of market
economies is not that they motivate people to sacrice their private interest
for the public interest, but that they motivate people to pursue their private
interest in ways that best promote the public interest.
On the other hand, government decisions are commonly
thought to be motivated by noble social concerns like helping the poor, protecting the environment, improving education, and promoting economic growth. Of
course, government decisions are made by people, just as market decisions are,
but supposedly when people move from market roles to political roles they
experience a moral metamorphosis, discarding their private interest to better
promote the public interest. Serious people would acknowledge, if confronted
with the issue, that no such metamorphosis occurs, yet the view that political
ocials care deeply about us and our problems is remarkably common.
A far more accurate, and useful, perspective on political decisions is that
they are motivated by private interest just as market decisions are. True, people
often vote for policies, or candidates who support those policies, on the basis
of public concern, but that can be explained by the minuscule probability that

any vote will aect the outcome of an election. So voting is a great way to feel
socially concerned at low cost. (I discussed this expressive voting last month.)
If voters were really willing to sacrice for public benet, they would make sure
the money spent by the programs they favor accomplished their stated goals.
But that would be costly.

Having voted to do good, few voters ever know

whether any good is actually done.
But because every government program aects politically organized groups,
these groups do follow up on how programs are designed and implemented. And
because the political inuence of these groups is signicant, their members
make sure that government programs serve their private interest, even when
this means doing less to accomplish noble public objectives.
The best evidence on who benets the most from government programs
supposedly dedicated to worthy public objectives is to consider the following
two questions. First, can government best accomplish desirable social goals by
downsizing bureaucracy and reducing transfers and privileges to an organized
interest group? Second, can you think of a government initiative to accomplish
a desirable social goal that downsized a bureaucracy or reduced transfers and
privileges to an organized interest group?
The answer to the rst question is clearly yes, as we are about to see. The
answer to the second question is, it's dicult. I can think of very few examples. The elimination of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and the military draft are possible examples, and I challenge
readers to come up with additional examples and e-mail them to me. With few
exceptions, when governments attempt to accomplish a public benet, they
undermine the attempt by making sure that the interests of politically inuential groups (including government bureaucracies) are well served. This means
that, if public authorities were seriously concerned with promoting the public
interest, there would be lots of ways they could do so much more eectively by
reducing spending and special-interest privileges. Don't hold your breath.

Doing Good by Doing Less
Politicians have so persistently expressed their deep desire to help the poor, and
their belief that only government can provide that help, that many Americans
now believe that without the federal government, masses of poor people would
be starving in the streets. But removing all import restrictions and eliminating
all agricultural price supports would do more to help poor Americans (by lowering prices) than all the social-welfare programs combined. Welfare programs
have done little, if anything, to alter the distribution of income; instead they
have reduced economic growth, thus probably leaving the poor worse o.
As I discussed at length in previous columns, we could do more to protect the environment, and do it more cheaply, by shifting from command-andcontrol to market-based policies to reduce pollution.

But doing this would

greatly reduce the budget and power of the Environmental Protection Agency
and remove protections against competition that current policies provide to
politically inuential businesses and labor unionssuch as those involved in
mining eastern coal.
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Politicians never tire of stressing the importance of improving the education
of our youth and promising meaningful education reform. Yet simply giving
students and their parents educational choice would do far more to improve
education in America (particularly for children in the poorest neighborhoods)
than all the money spent by the U.S. Department of Education and all the
methods courses taught in college education departments combined. But allowing parents to make schools compete for their dollars by providing better
education at lower cost would destroy the control of politically powerful teachers' unions and undermine the rationale for thousands of bureaucrats.
If the federal government really wanted to promote economic growth, it
would eliminate our impossibly complex tax code and replace it with a far
simpler tax with one low rate on income and few, if any, exemptions. The tax
system can never be quite as simple as some suggest, but it can be far less
complicated and do far less to distort economic decisions and reduce economic
growth than our current system.

But with a simple tax system, politicians

would lose their power to provide (read sell) special-interest tax breaks, and
hordes of lobbyists, tax accountants, lawyers, and employees of the Internal
Revenue Service would have to nd more productive work.
There are many more examples of how governments, if they really were
motivated to promote noble social goals rather than serve the private interest
of the politically inuential, could accomplish more by doing less. As my friend,
and well-known economist,
Murray Weidenbaum likes to tell government authorities, Don't just stand
there, undo something.
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The Bias Favoring Governments over Markets

June 1, 2002

The thrust of my columns could be summarized as follows: We would be
better o increasing our reliance on the voluntary cooperation of the marketplace and reducing our reliance on government commands. This is not an idle
assertion reecting blind ideology or religious zeal, as some would claim.
is based on an impressive foundation of theory and evidence.

It

For over 225

years, dating back at least to Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, economic
theory has explained how markets coordinate the actions of countless people,
even when each is motivated by narrowly dened self-interest, to serve the
public interest far more eectively than government action, no matter how well
intended.
And the evidence is clear that individual freedom disciplined by market
incentives is closely connected to widespread wealth. Markets and the freedom
they allow are far more important to the prosperity of nations than natural
resources.

Many countries rich in natural resources have been impoverished

by the substitution of government compulsion for market freedom (consider
Argentina, Russia, India, China, and any number of African countries). There
are also many countries poor in natural resources that have prospered by relying
primarily on market forces (Japan, Hong Kong, Switzerland, and Singapore).
But if the market is so superior to government, why do people respond to
almost every problem, real or imaginary, by demanding a government solution?
Why have governments relentlessly taken ever more responsibility for their
citizens' welfare, and ever more of their paychecks, in unsuccessful attempts to
make everyone better o at the expense of everyone else? No complete answer
to these questions can be given in a short column.

But at the heart of any

answer is an ironymarkets are criticized for the very reason that they create
wealth, and governments are applauded for the very reason that they destroy
wealth.
Markets work their wonders by creating in each of us an intense interest in
taking actions that increase the welfare of others. Few of us give much thought

to the well-being of more than a few of the hundreds of millions of people who
in various and indirect ways benet from our work and investments. But we are
vitally concerned with the salaries we are paid and the prots we receive, and in
markets our salaries and prots rise or fall with the value of our contributions to
others. So by adjusting our eorts and investments to improve our conditions,
we also improve the conditions of countless others.
The well-known implication of this is, as Adam Smith pointed out in 1776,
that though each person intends only his own gain, ...he is in this, as in many
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part
of his intention. But immediately before this famous statement, Smith made
another, less celebrated, observation that each individual neither intends to
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it (emphasis
added). Because the benets from our eorts are so dispersed over so many
people in so many ways, we can never know how much we benet others, even if
we cared. And because the benets we realize from others are similarly spread
over so many, none of us notice, or can identify, the particular contributions
others are making to our welfare. The benets generated through markets are
largely unappreciated because they are distributed so broadly and impersonally.
And even when these benets are appreciated, people seldom understand that
they are made possible only by the cooperation created by market incentives.

Little Credit Given
While the market receives little credit, or appreciation, for the benets it provides, it is constantly attacked for the very thing that makes those benets
possible. The inevitable consequence of the market's rewarding those who do
the most to benet others is that it imposes losses on those who don't. Firms
suer losses and bankruptcy when they fall behind the competition in catering
to consumers, releasing scarce resources to those making better use of them.
Similarly, those who invest in, and work for, rms that aren't continually giving consumers better products at lower costs nd their portfolios shrinking and
their jobs disappearing, again shifting resources (including labor) to more productive activities. Although everyone, including those who suer these costs,
is better o living in an economy that imposes them unrelentingly, the pain
that results is undeniable.

And because the pain is concentrated it is easily

seen, readily associated with the market forces that caused it, and invariably
criticized as a market failure that calls for corrective government action.
So the success of markets is easily overlooked, or taken for granted, while the
discipline that makes that success possible is easily depicted as an unnecessary
and unacceptable cost. We have all seen the nightly news lamenting the horrible
disruption people suer when the major employer in their communities goes
out of business. But how many have seen a follow-up on the millions who are
a few dollars a year better o because the bankruptcy freed up resources to
produce more valuable goods and services elsewhere in the economy? We have
become wealthy because these adjustments create more benets than costs.
But because the benets are dispersed and the costs are concentrated, the
market is seldom given credit for the former, but constantly blamed for the
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latter.
On the other hand, government programs destroy wealth because their benets are typically concentrated, and therefore easily noticed, while their costs
are widely dispersed and easily ignored.

The political benet-cost ratios of

these programs are greater than their social benet-cost ratios, so they are invariably expanded far beyond the point where their marginal value covers their
marginal cost. Obviously, the group receiving most of the benets from a program will appreciate it, know which politicians support it, and reward them for
expanding it. Even taxpayers who pick up the tab for wasteful special-interest
programs commonly favor them because the benets are so apparent and easily
connected to the particular program that provides them, and the cost of any
one program to any one taxpayer is typically too small to notice.
Finally, political authorities like providing government benets even when
doing so destroys far greater benets in the market. Politicians and bureaucrats
are in the business of taking credit for things, and they cannot take credit for
the benets generated through the market, and receive little if any blame when
programs reduce those benets.
We shouldn't laugh at the dog that bites the hand that feeds it.

When

expanding government programs that distort and discard market incentives,
we are not only biting the hand that feeds us, we are also feeding the hand
that bites us.
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The Disconnect Between Political Promises and Performance
April 1, 2006

What can politicians do to create more higher paying jobs? Politicians must
think that most of us believe the answer is: a lot. One of the most persistent
campaign promises is the creation of good jobs at good wages. I shall argue that
politicians can do quite a number of things to increase high-wage employment.
But this does not mean that I favor politicians trying to keep their high-wage
promises, because the things politicians can do to improve jobs are not the
things they will do.
Politicians can enact policies from two general categories to achieve desirable outcomes, including the creation of high-paid jobs: 1) policies that work,
but in ways that do not benet politicians, and 2) policies that don't work (and
typically make matters worse), but which create the mirage of working in ways
that do benet politicians.
Under prevailing democratic arrangements, electoral survival demands that
politicians appear to promote desirable social objectives with direct and decisive action that caters to organized interest groups. Even when such specialinterest policies are socially harmful, as they invariably are, they still do more
to promote the interests of politicians than policies that would promote broad
social benets indirectly by creating a setting in which people can pursue their
various interests through productive interaction.

The political problem with

the indirect approach is twofold: 1) the benets are created so gradually and
spread so widely that few will notice them, and 2) even if the benets are noticed, it will be dicult, if not impossible, for politicians to claim credit for
them.

As F. A. Hayek pointed out in volume three of Law, Legislation and

Liberty, politicians who hope to be reelected on the basis of what their party
during the preceding three or four years has conferred in conspicuous special
benets on their voters are not in the sort of position which will make them
pass the kind of general laws which would really be most in the public interest
(emphasis added).
When we look at policies aimed at creating high-paying jobs, we easily

nd examples where politicians preferred conspicuous benets that actually
harmed the public to inconspicuous benets that really were good for the public.
Many policies would increase the number of high-paying jobs indirectly,
and many would appear to increase the number directly but actually reduce
those jobs and lower wages. The former policies all do the one thing necessary
for higher wages and salariesincrease labor productivitywhile the latter
policies all reduce, or retard, labor productivity, and so reduce wages below
what they would be otherwise. The political bias against eective policies is
readily apparent from the following list and brief discussion.

Consider rst

some policies that would increase wages.
Eliminate restrictions on imports: One of the most eective things the federal government could do to increase labor productivity and wages is eliminate
taris and restrictions on imports. Reducing import restrictions increases real
wages in two ways. First, it reduces the price workers have to pay for those
goods and services that could be produced at less cost in other countries than
they can be domestically. Second, it increases the competition domestic producers face from foreign producers, which directs workers into those employments in which they are most productivein which they have a comparative
advantage.
Increased productivity is both necessary and sucient to increase wages, at
least in general. No serious person can deny that there are costs associated with
workers moving to more productive jobs, or that a few people will be unable
to nd new jobs that pay as much as the ones they lost. But no economy can
prosper without open competition, which keeps all resources, including labor,
moving from less-valued to more-valued employments (in the eyes of consumers)
in response to constantly changing conditions. And even those who end up with
lower wages because of the particular adjustments they are required to make
still earn far higher wages than they would in an economy where they, and
everyone else, are protected against having to make such adjustments.
End corporate welfare: Import restrictions are a form of corporate welfare,
but unfortunately not the only form. Eliminating all forms of corporate welfare
would increase high-wage jobs by reducing taxes and their distorting inuence
(see below), and allowing both domestic and foreign competition to direct labor
and capital into their most productive uses, as determined by consumers, not
by politicians catering to their special-interest clients.
Lower marginal tax rates: No matter how ecient a government is, it has
to raise revenue to nance its activities, and that means imposing taxes. Unfortunately, all other taxes reduce economic productivity by 1) putting a wedge
between the price suppliers receive and demanders pay, thus preventing mutually benecial exchanges from occurring, and 2) motivating people to make
decisions to avoid taxes rather than create wealth. These distortions are commonly called deadweight losses and are an inevitable cost of taxes over and
above the opportunity cost of the money raised. Reducing the deadweight loss
from taxation increases the eectiveness of exchanges between employers and
employees at directing workers to where consumers would value them most, and
increases the general level of productivity, both of which increase the real wages
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of workers. So an eective way of increasing the number of high-paying economy jobs is by lowering the marginal tax rate and expanding the tax base by
eliminating loopholes, reducing the deadweight loss of taxes for a given amount
of revenue raised.

The lower the marginal tax rate the smaller is the wedge

between what sellers receive and buyers pay, and the fewer the tax loopholes
(along with a low marginal tax rate), the less the tax benet from diverting
resources from high-valued production to low-valued tax avoidance.
Avoid ination: The federal government can do a lot to increase high-paying
jobs by avoiding ination. Ination erodes labor productivity and lowers real
wages, just as surely as it erodes the value of the dollar. The most destructive thing about ination is that it distorts the information communicated by
market prices, reducing the ability of market exchange to direct resources, including labor, into their most productive uses. Just as a yardstick ceases to be
useful for measuring and comparing distances if its length is subject to sporadic
change, so market prices are less useful for expressing and comparing values
when the value of money is subject to sporadic changes.

Also, inationary

distortions make it almost impossible to know what interest rate is appropriate
when people borrow and lend money to nance long-term investments. So in
an inationary environment, many ecient capital investments that would increase the future productivity of laborand increase future wagesnever get
made.

Avoid the Pork
Reduce pork-barrel spending: There can be no doubt that reducing pork-barrel
spending would increase real wages by increasing the productivity of the economy. A major portion of federal spending is motivated by the ability of particular congressional districts or organized interest groups to capture benets by
spreading the costs over the entire taxpaying public. With those receiving most
of the benets paying only a small portion of the cost, the pressure is expand
spending well beyond the socially ecient level. Resources are transferred from
higher-valued uses to lower-valued uses (for consumers), reducing the real value
of salaries and wages. Excess government spending is a negative externality,
just like excess pollution, and the former is no less to erode real wages than
the latter. If politicians worried about the negative externalities of pork-barrel
spending as much as they claim to worry about those of excess pollution, the
result would be less wasteful government spending and more high-paying jobs.
Eliminate the minimum wage: This would increase wages by increasing the
human capital that, for many young people, is best acquired through on-thejob training. Minimum-wage legislation clearly creates unemployment among
young people who, for a variety of reasons, including being trapped in dysfunctional public schools, don't have skills worth the legally imposed minimum
wage. The result is not just unemployment, which may be a short-term problem, but a reduction in the opportunities for many young people to acquire the
skills and attitudes that will make them more productive over the long run.
Even those who do get a job at the minimum wage are less likely to get one
in which the employer invests in them by providing training opportunities at
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the cost of some immediate output. The minimum wage prevents many young
people with little opportunity to continue their formal education to develop
the skills necessary to earn a good income in the future by working at a low
wage when they have few nancial responsibilities. Eliminating the law would
make it legal for our less-advantaged youth to have much the same opportunity for higher-paying future jobs as more fortunate youth get through college
subsidies.
Reduce the power of labor unions: Eliminating some of the legislative privileges that empower labor unions would be an eective way to increase wages.
Labor unions can, and do, increase the wages of some workers. But they do so
by reducing the wages of others by enough to reduce wages in general. Because
of legal privileges that unions receive, it is dicult (and sometimes impossible)
for workers to qualify for some jobs without being members of a union. Thus
unions can increase some wages by restricting entry into some occupations and
rendering those workers less ecient with rigid work rules.
All these practices reduce the productivity of the general labor force. Restricting entry into some occupations increases the wages of union members who
work in those occupations, but it increases the number of workers in other occupations where their skills are less valuable. This not only lowers their wages,
but reduces the productivity and wages of workers in general by preventing
them from moving into their highest-valued employments.

By reducing the

exibility of employers to shift workers from one task to another in response to
changing conditions, rigid work rules also reduce the productivity, and wages,
of workers.
Industry-wide labor unions have also lowered general economic productivity
through cartelization of workers. If the rms in an industry explicitly agreed
to reduce their output to increase their prices, they would be in clear violation
of antitrust law (from which unions are exempt) and subject to harsh penaltiesincluding prison time for senior managers. On the other hand, the rms
in an industry have little to worry about if output is reduced because of a strike
by its union. So both industry prots and union wages can be increased by the
ineciencies of a cartel agreement that remains within the law only because
it is brokered by a labor union. (I am not arguing for antitrust laws. Even if
antitrust laws could be rendered immune to political considerations, which they
have never been and never will be, they would still reduce the competitiveness
of the economy because of the static textbook notion of perfect competition on
which they are based.)
All these union-induced ineciencies reduce output below competitive levels
and therefore reduce real wages. These ineciencies would be reduced and the
real wages of workers would be increased by reducing the power of labor unions.
As I have noted, all the policies discussed have one thing in commonthey
would increase wages by increasing economic productivity. They also have another thing in commonthey would increase wages broadly, indirectly, and
gradually by establishing an environment in which people productively cooperate with one another through markets in ways that best serve their collective
interest. This means that the better jobs and higher wages will not be readily
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noticed, and even when they are, they will not be seen as the result of can-do
government actions for which politicians can easily take credit. So the eectiveness of these policies at creating the type of jobs that politicians are constantly
promising to provide does not translate into much political support for them.
Politicians would rather receive credit for appearing to create better jobs with
counterproductive policies than not get credit for policies that actually allow
better jobs to be created. We now consider some policies that are politically
popular because they give the appearance of increasing high-wage jobs while
actually reducing them.

Policies That Reduce Wages
Restrict imports: When politicians argue for increasing an import restriction or
against reducing a restriction, they invariably claim that they want to protect
high-paying jobs. An import restriction does protect some high-paying jobs,
but at the cost of reducing the emergence of other, even higher paying, jobs,
because of the general reduction in productivity that lowers average real wages.
But the protected jobs are currently held by relatively few identiable workers
who are typically well represented politically and are fully aware of the benets
they receive from politicians who vote for a trade restriction protecting them
from foreign competition.

The resulting loss of even more productive jobs

can be safely ignored by politicians since it is widely dispersed and not easily
noticedit is hard to miss what we never had. And even if the loss is noticed,
the causethe import restrictionis not easily seen.
Put corporations on the dole: Politicians oscillate between attacking business and praising it, depending on the political issue and climate. But they are
constant in dispensing large quantities of corporate welfare that the general
public pays for through higher taxes and lower economic productivity.

The

most common justication for this welfare is that it creates jobs. And indeed
it does, but only by destroying the chance for more productive jobs that would
have emerged if competition had not been restricted and consumers had been
allowed to spend the money paid in taxes to buy what they valued most instead
of paying for corporate welfare. Unfortunately, the jobs that are created are
visible and easily seen to be the result of government policy, while the higher
paying jobs that don't emerge are invisibleit is dicult to miss what never
was created.
Raise taxes: Politicians often call for higher taxes as the best way to promote economic growth and create more and better jobs.

Supposedly higher

taxes will reduce the budget decit, which will reduce interest rates by reducing government borrowing.

The popularity of raising taxes to increase good

jobs seems to contradict the thesis of this article. It suggests that politicians are
willing to take an unpopular actionraising taxesto provide a general benetwidespread economic growth and job creation. But raising taxes is not an
eective way to increase economic growth and create jobs. Even if raising taxes
did reduce the federal budget decit, it is not likely to have much eect on interest rates. Interest rates are determined in a worldwide capital market, with
rates often falling when the federal budget decit is increasing and rising when
177

it is decreasing. Second, increasing taxes seldom reduces the budget decit, at
least not for long. Even when higher taxes raise more tax revenue, the additional money is invariably used to expand government spending and pork-barrel
programs, with spending growth typically outpacing revenue growth. The effect is to substitute public spending guided by political inuences for private
spending guided by economic considerationsa sure prescription for reducing
productivity and lowering real wages. Also, with higher tax rates, special interests are willing to pay politicians more for tax loopholes, which introduce
more productivity-reducing distortions in the allocation of spending and investments.

The political cost of increasing taxes is more than oset by the

political benets from the plausible pretense that good jobs are being created
while securing more of the national income to buy more electoral support.
Increase government spending: The list of benets from more spending on
highway construction, recycling, education, agricultural subsidies, parks, airport expansion, water-diversion products, and so on always includes additional
jobs. But the jobs created are a major cost of these spending projects, not a
benet. The jobs necessary to build a road or recycle aluminum cans are lled
by workers who are not producing value in other activities. Unless this cost
is considered, the jobs created will be destroying wealth at the margin, since
the value created by workers on government-funded projects will be less than
the value (in terms of consumer preferences) they could be creating elsewhere.
Political incentives make this misallocation of labor inevitable.
Regulate labor markets: Politicians can take credit for protecting and creating jobs by imposing a number of productivity-reducing restrictions on labor
markets.

To list two: armative-action enforcement pressures employers to

hire workers on the basis of the racial mix of the communities in which they
operate and increases the diculty of dismissing unproductive workers; politically mandated employee benets reduce the exibility of employers to adjust
compensation in ways that attract the best mix of workers to their rms at the
least cost. (We've already discussed the minimum wage.)
The advantage of the policies that would create more high-paying jobs indirectly is that they do so by creating a positive-sum setting in which people
interact in increasingly productive ways.The same increase in productivity that
raises real incomes also increases the general level of wealth, enhancing our lives
in a host of ways. For example, as wealth increases, infant mortality decreases,
life expectancies (and the quality of life) increase at all age levels, poverty
declines, the environment becomes cleaner, access to the arts increases, more
leisure time becomes available, and jobs become safer, more pleasant and higher
paying.
The problem with policies that try to create more high-paying jobs directly is that they do so with government transfers and protections that are
negative-sum. Yet this negative-sum approach is politically compelling because
politicians receive much of the credit for the benets, while receiving little of
the blame for the larger losses.
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Just Wait Until It's Free
January 27, 2012
Dwight R. Lee and J.R. Clark

The quip If you think it's expensive now, just wait until it is free is funny
because of the unfortunate truth it contains. The truth is unfortunate less because it's impossible to provide benets without costs than because politicians
constantly try to convince voters otherwise.

To paraphrase Thomas Sowell:

The rst law of economics is that there's no such thing as a free lunch; the rst
law of politics is to disregard the rst law of economics.
Politicians convince only the naive that government can provide free benets, but the political process creates a lot of naivety.

This naivety in turn

allows politicians to enact policies that make it rational for consumers to act
as if they believe government has lowered the cost (often to zero) of goods even
when they know better. As the joke suggests, however, the more the as if  cost
of a good is reduced, the more its real cost is increased. This can be explained
by making use of the important distinction between the total cost consumers
pay for a good and the marginal cost they paythat is the additional amount
they pay to buy one more unit of the good.
The most obvious way the government can make people act as if the cost of
a good has been reduced is to lower its price. The most direct way to do that is
by imposing a price ceiling below the market price. We mention a price ceiling
briey only to explain why we do not consider it in detail. When the price of a
good is legally lowered, the amount supplied will decrease, so consumers cannot
act as if the cost has been lowered by purchasing more, despite their desire to
do so.

Also, it quickly becomes clear to consumers, once the aggravation of

longer lines, poorer service, and declining quality is considered, that the cost
of the good has become higher, not lower.
A more lasting way for politicians to give the impression they have lowered
the cost of a good is to subsidize its supply. This can be done by transferring an
amount covering all or part of the cost to suppliers for every unit of a good sold
to consumers. This per-unit subsidy would cause a corresponding drop in the
cost of production and thus in the price of each unit of the good. We assume

the supply curve is horizontalthat is, prices won't rise to oset increased
consumer purchases in response to the price subsidy.
For example, the entire cost of providing a year of K-12 government schooling is subsidized, and parents can send all their children to a government school
regardless of how many they have. There are, of course, restrictions on which
school parents can send their children to, and they have little control over who
teaches their children. Similarly, government medical care subsidies, whether
provided through Medicaid, Medicare, or tax advantages bestowed by not taxing employer-provided insurance as income, lower the price paid directly for
medical care.

Here again, relatively few restrictions on the amount of medi-

cal care people demand have been imposed, but this is likely to change rather
signicantly in the future.
If they give it any thought, most people recognize that any market prices
they pay directly for government schooling and medical care are far less than
the total amount they actually pay for these services. But they seldom know
how much they are paying over and above the direct out-of-pocket price, and
even if they did, it would not inuence how much of the subsidized services
they demand. This begins the explanation of why subsidizing goods increases
their cost.
When politicians subsidize the supply of a good, they reduce its marginal
cost to consumers by increasing the amount they pay in taxes to nance the
subsidy. The marginal costthe additional amount paid when another unit is
purchased, as determined by the now-lower priceis the only cost consumers
pay attention to. The total subsidized cost, in the form of higher taxes and/or
insurance premiums, also increases when a consumer buys another unit of the
service, but that increase is spread over all consumers, often many millions of
them.

So the increase in this cost is eectively zero to a consumer deciding

how much of a subsidized good to buy, and is therefore ignored.
In other words, subsidizing the supply of a good creates an external cost
of the type that is referred to as a market failure when it results from private activity (think of pollution, which is really the result of the absence of
markets), but is referred to as protecting consumers against market exploitation when intentionally created by government policy.

The subsidy creates

a situation in which each consumer can benet by shifting much of the cost
of her consumption to the rest of the populationthe larger the subsidy the
larger this external cost. The result is excessive consumption of the subsidized
good as each consumer expands her consumption beyond the point where the
marginal value she receives becomes less than the marginal cost of producing
the goodthat is, less value is received from additional units than is sacriced
to produce them.
Some argue that subsidizing certain goods is justied because their production and/or consumption generate external benets and would therefore be
underconsumed if not subsidized. It is possible that a government subsidy can
increase consumption of a good by exactly enough to oset the underconsumption due to an external benet that would otherwise exist. But a realistic view
of the knowledge political authorities possess, and the incentives they face,
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raises serious doubt that such goods can be correctly identied, or the right
subsidy applied if they were. For example, there are private rms that generate
both external costs (say in the form of pollution) and external benets when
producing a good. It is easy to model a situation in which eciency requires
that such a rm's production should be subsidized despite the pollution it creates. However, we challenge any government agency to determine when such
situations exist, as they surely do, and then accurately determine what the
ecient subsidies are. And even if such information were available, it would
be largely ignored since the political considerations that determine what goods
are subsidized, and by how much, seldom have much if anything to do with
economic eciency.
The point is that no matter why government subsidizes a good, whether to
improve economic eciency or, more likely, to satisfy some constituency under
the pretense of reducing the good's cost, the eect is invariably to increase its
cost. Even though the immediate eect is to decrease the good's price by the
subsidy's per-unit amount, with the per-unit cost (price plus the cost of the
subsidy) remaining the same, the lower price will quickly motivate an increase
in the amount demanded. This will cause the price, and therefore the per-unit
cost, to increase for at least three reasons, even if, as we have assumed, the
supply curve is horizontal.
First, consumers have little motivation to shop carefully because the price,
or direct cost, is often a small percentage of the total cost.

In some cases,

such as government schools (where the price is zero), consumers typically are
not allowed to compare alternatives, but are assigned to a particular supplier
(school). Even when consumers can choose their suppliers, they have little motivation to ask about the cost of the good, as is the case of medical carethe
direct cost of which is only about 13 percent of the total cost in the United
States. With consumers paying little attention to the cost of the goods they
consume, suppliers have less motivation to compete on price and greater latitude to direct their customers into costly options that add little if any value.
Second, the less of the total cost consumers pay directly for a good, the less
control they have over its quality or the convenience with which it is delivered.
The result is that the quality of subsidized goods declines relative to their
increased cost. Indeed, government schools provide a clear example of declines
in educational quality, particularly in the inner cities where parents are less
able to aord private schools, while cost has increased signicantly. By most
measures the quality of American medical care has improved, as access to
improved drugs and the availability of technically advanced medical devices
have increased, but at a greater cost than necessary. And the extra cost has
not resulted in life expectancies equal to those in some countries with lower percapita spending on health care, although there are many factors other than such
spending that aect life expectancy. And it should also be pointed out that in
countries where medical care is provided by the State, there are longer waits
for that care than in the United States.
What can be said with condence is that the control people have over the
medical care they receive is becoming more like the control pets have over the
181

medical care they receive. In both cases, the ones receiving the care are not
the ones paying directly for it.

Doctors consider those paying directly their

customers, and primarily cater to their desires (and instructions).We might
have some advantage over our pets in this regard since we still pay directly for
a portion of our care. But when considering our diminishing control over health
care decisions that aect our lives, we should ask ourselves: Are the bureaucrats
representing those paying for most of our medical care as concerned with our
well-being as we are for the well-being of our pets?
A third reason why subsidizing goods increases their cost is the burdensome
red tape that invariably accompanies the production and consumption of such
goods. It is customary for people to complain about the forms that have to be
lled out and records that have to be kept by teachers and their students, and
doctors and their patients. There is also the accompanying cost of the hoards
of bureaucrats necessary to formulate, enforce, and keep records on all the rules
and regulations, most of which have no obvious connection with doing a better
job educating and healing. But such complaints, and the promises of politicians
to reduce red tape, have no eect because there is a good reason for much if not
all of it. One of the unappreciated advantages of market exchanges is that when
consumers pay with their own money and suppliers have to compete for that
money by producing value, people are motivated to make decisions that benet
others. This market accountability is destroyed when suppliers are being paid
by third parties for most of the cost of making a good available to consumers.
Red tape is a poor substitute for market accountability, as is evident from the
fact that it does not prevent the cost of subsidized goods from increasing. But
if markets are not allowed to function, the alternative to red tape would be
an almost complete lack of accountability. The only way to reduce red tape is
to eliminate the subsidies and restore the eective and ecient accountability
that only a market can impose.
Even though most of the cost of a subsidized good is paid indirectly, it
commonly increases to the point where there is a noticeable and negative public
reaction. When this happens, the political response to public complaints about
the escalating cost is almost always to increase the subsidy, not to reduce or
eliminate it. This will be accompanied by political attempts to convince the
vast majority that a relatively few rich taxpayers will pay the subsidy thanks to
eorts to make them pay their fair share. The reality is that almost everyone
ends up paying more one way or another. The total cost continues to go up,
as do the inconvenience and red tape imposed on consumers and suppliers by
government, which then provides more jobs for both government and privatesector bureaucrats.
When the cost-increasing eects of ever larger subsidies overwhelm the ability of politicians to convince voters that the cost is being paid primarily by
others, political eorts are made to reduce the cost. But these eorts typically
involve more bureaucratic control, which imposes yet more restrictions on the
types of goods and services available, who is eligible to receive particular types,
and the amount of compensation received by suppliers.
This has clearly been the case with health care. Since government began
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to provide signicant health care subsidies, reform has consistently meant increasing the size and scope of the subsidies and the legislative detail imposed
on health care decisions. It is interesting to note that physicians experienced
large income increases with the big boost in medical subsidies beginning in
1965 with Medicaid and Medicare. Their increased compensation was part of
the general increase in medical costs as consumers became less concerned with
the cost of their care and demanded more of it. Not surprisingly, physicians are
less enthusiastic about the 2010 Aordable Care Act, which is threatening to
reduce their incomes. But consumers have the most to lose from increased government control over health care decisions. Without market prices determined
by free exchange and undistorted by government subsidies, goods will have to
be rationed by government authorities. They won't be called death panels, but
they will be making decisions that will result in shovel-ready action.
The experience in government education is dierent from that in medical
care for the obvious reason that it has long been nanced entirely by government subsidies. Therefore, cost increases in government education cannot be
obscured with increased subsidies. Also, school choice has been far more limited
than the choice of doctors and hospitals. This may be why providing consumers
more choice has been recommended as the best way to reduce educational cost
and improve its quality. Privatizing schools would be the most eective way of
achieving these improvements by insuring that people are paying the full cost
of education directly with their own money.

A clearly second-best approach

would be providing parents of school-age children educational vouchers that
could be used to pay for tuition at any school, private or public, that parents chose. Even this second-best approach has been eectively resisted by the
government-school lobby, which has so far been able to convince the public that
competition would reduce the quality of education. Fortunately, more people
are starting to see this lobby as the biggest obstacle to genuine educational
reform.
Most people would like to have their purchases subsidized by government.
Once we start down that road, however, it is hard to keep the subsidies from
spreading to a wide variety of things almost everyone purchases. The result is
we nd ourselves heading toward the situation described by Frédéric Bastiat,
the nineteenth-century economist, when he said, The state is the great ctitious entity by which everyone seeks to live at the expense of everyone else.
Such an attempt to reduce the cost to everyone is clearly a guaranteed way to
increase the cost of everything. If you think it is expensive now, just wait as
the politicians continue to disregard the rst law of economics.
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The Tyranny of Utility

October 3, 2012
Behavioral Social Science and the Rise of
Paternalism

It is clear from Saint-Paul's opening pages that he wants to prevent the
gradual elimination of individual freedom as `social science' makes progress
in documenting behavioral biases, measuring happiness, and [favorably] evaluating the eects of coercive policies, while information technology provides
ever more ecient tools of control to the government. But he argues that trying to make the case for freedom on instrumental, or utilitarian, grounds will
fail as new theories and evidence, such as those found in behavioral economics
and happiness research, undermine the unitary individual assumption on which
economic analysis rests. As the view of rational, utility-maximizing behavior
is undermined, it is replaced with support for paternalistic policies.
Throughout the book Saint-Paul provides examples of paternalistic policies
eroding freedom. He gives little hope, however, that this paternalistic trend can
be contained, much less reversed. I kept hoping to nd some discussion of Public
Choice to inject political realism into how paternalistic policies would actually
work. Only in the book's nal semi-optimistic pages is there a discussion of
political agency, followed up with reasons why such arguments are not likely
to be very convincing to the paternalists. Surely true, but maybe they'd be
convincing to others.
Saint-Paul recognizes that standard economics provides justication for a
liberal social order where social welfare is tied closely to individual welfare, and
even when markets are seen to fail, economics suggest they are best remedied
by policies that minimize restrictions on freedom. Yet in terms of protecting
freedom, he sees the fundamental philosophical aw of the economic approach
[as being] that it does not value individual freedom per se. His explanation
for this statement is the consequentialist approach of economics, according to
which economics only cares about the allocation of resources at the end, not
about the process by which resources were allocated (emphasis added).
This seems to me as if Saint-Paul is giving up the game as far as protecting

freedom is concerned. Again quoting him, Once the premises of consequentialism are accepted, we can only object to some government intervention on
instrumental grounds...This stands in contrast to principled objections, which
state that the intervention violates some fundamental principle upon which
society is built (emphasis in original).
Process is important in ethical arguments, but while freedom is a consequence of markets (not necessarily dened in terms of strict laissez faire), it is
also an essential ingredient in the market process. Moreover, it is a fundamental principle on which society is built and which paternalistic policies violate,
as Saint-Paul's discussion and examples make clear.

Indeed, at the end of

his book he sees hope in achieving [l]imits to government...not...from the fear
that excess government intervention might get out of control and have harmful
consequences but from the principle that one cannot interfere with freedom of
choice and individual responsibility.
But why shouldn't the ght for freedom also include an instrumental concern about, and attack on, the harmful consequences of excessive government?
After all, Saint-Paul's book is loaded with examples of instrumental arguments
for paternalistic policies that have apparently been eective.

As he states,

There are countless examples of a public debate about a law that would strip
people of their individual rights revolving around the existence or lack of academic studies showing that exercising that right has a statistical eect on undesirable outcomes. Saint-Paul reemphasizes this point after briey discussing
three examples with the comment, In all these cases the arguments are purely
instrumental.
It was known long before the work of behavioral economists and happiness
scholars that real-world markets failed to achieve textbook eciency. But as
Public Choice scholars began pointing out in the 1950s, the relevant question
with regard to this failure is: Compared to what? And when the realistic alternatives (primarily some type of political or collective process) are subjected to
the same analytical scrutiny that uncovers market failure, those alternatives are
found to generate their own failures. Of course that suggests a consequentialist
approach in which those failures must be compared against some measure of
good or bad. Again, despite his criticism of consequentialism early in his book,
Saint-Paul recognizes its potential in the ght against paternalism when he
states, [W]hile paternalism may help solve some behavioral biases on paper, it
ignores the actual workings of government. Thus the consequentialist approach
should also be applied...
Even though my comments have focused mainly on the concerns I have
with Saint-Paul's presentation, I recommend this book to anyone who, like
myself, appreciates insightful critiques of what seems to be an endless supply
of arguments in favor of expanding government to accomplish good, without
any consideration of the harm caused by the accumulating restrictions on our
freedom.
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Capitalism and Freedom

October 3, 2013
A 50th Anniversary Tribute to Milton
Friedman

It is dicult for younger people (those who reached college age after 1980) to
fully appreciate Milton Friedman's contributions in his 1962 book, Capitalism
and Freedom.

Friedman's proposals for relying less on government coercion

and more on market incentives and freedom to address problems have not been
shockingly outrageous to those who came of age at the beginning of the Reagan
administration or later.

Whether or not these younger people agreed with

Friedman's policy recommendations, most knew they were being taken seriously
by important people.

The older of us can more fully appreciate Friedman's

contributions today because we can recall that his ideas were either unheard
of or dismissed as ridiculous when put forth in Capitalism and Freedom.
For example, I majored in economics in college and took my rst principles
course (macroeconomics) in 1960. The course emphasized the Keynesian model
and how this model made it possible to moderate the business cycle with scal
policy. The role of money was hardly mentioned since the model suggested that
the real economy was unaected by the money supply and ination was entirely
explained by excess aggregate demand. Friedman probably was not mentioned
in this course. He probably came up in subsequent courses, in passing, as an
example of someone who continued to believe in things like the ability of market
forces to bring an economy out of recession or depression without government
intervention.
Never mentioned in any of my classes were proposals found in Capitalism
and Freedom, such as increasing reliance on market competition by eliminating
occupational licensing, replacing the draft with a market for military personnel,
and requiring government schools to face market competition for students by
providing parents with educational vouchers. In the principles and intermediate
microeconomics courses, the graphical presentations were accompanied with
comments noting that the material had little relevance to public policy.
In 1962 Friedman was a voice in the wilderness making the case for markets

and freedom when the vast majority of academic economists believed that the
best (if not the only) hope for economic progress was government spending
guided by Keynesian scal policy. Fortunately Friedman's voice was amplied
by the impressive logic and clarity of his arguments. But before 1962 his arguments were targeted exclusively toward academic economists, most of whom
tried to ignore or belittle them, though the best knew they had to pay attention
to Friedman whether they agreed with him or not.

Poking Holes in Keynes
In 1941, before Friedman became well known to leading economists, he considered himself a Keynesian. But at the University of Chicago, where he taught
from 1946 to 1976, he started seeing problems with Keynes's model that were
overlooked by the rest of the profession.

In 1957 he published A Theory of

the Consumption Function using longitudinal data to show that the marginal
propensity to consume did not decrease as national income increased, as Keynes
had argued, and Friedman provided a theoretical explanation for this empirical result.

This book undermined the popular Keynesian argument that as

a country's income increased, more government spending would be required
to maintain aggregate demand and prevent underconsumption from causing
persistent unemployment.
In 1963 Friedman published an article and a book that created further
skepticism about the validity of Keynesian economics. With David Meiselman
he published The Relative Stability of Monetary Velocity and the Investment
Multiplier in the United States, 18971958, which estimated a Keynesian multiplier of zero,
meaning that an additional dollar spent by the federal government would simply substitute government spending for the same amount of private spending,
doing nothing to stimulate economic activity.

That year, 1963, also saw the

publication of A Monetary History of the United States: 18671960 by Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, the fruit of 15 years of data collection and careful analysis. Despite the best eort of Keynesians to discredit this book, its
powerful empirical and theoretical case made it embarrassing for economists
to continue dismissing the importance of money supply changes on short-run
economic activity and the long-run price level.
Friedman's 1967 presidential address to the American Economic Association (published in the American Economic Review under the title The Role of
Monetary Policy) examined an empirical nding known as the Phillips Curve,
which indicated high ination was associated with low unemployment and low
ination with high unemployment.

This seemed to support the Keynesian

position that the only way to reduce unemployment is by accepting more ination and the only way to reduce ination is by accepting more unemployment.
Friedman acknowledged that the Phillips Curve eect existed in the short run
but used monetary theory to explain how both ination and unemployment
can simultaneously increase (or decrease) in the long run, something the Keynesian model cannot explain. Within a few years of this address, the American
economy was suering from both escalating ination and unemployment, and
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it became increasingly apparent that Keynesian economics had been seriously
damaged by Friedman's intellectual assault.

Reputation and Fame
These examples of Friedman's destruction of the Keynesian consensus are but
a small sample of his contributions to our understanding of economics.

But

they are enough to explain the towering professional reputation Friedman had
achieved by the mid-1970s, a reputation demanding that his recommended
policies in Capitalism and Freedom be taken more seriously than they were in
1962. But they also suggest another factor in his inuence on public policy.
As impressive as Friedman's professional reputation was by the mid-'70s,
the stagation (economic stagnation with increasing unemployment and ination) that characterized the American economy in the last half of the decade
extended his reputation among the general public.

Friedman established a

public following in the 1960s, primarily through his Newsweek column, which
started in 1966.

This was surely a factor in the increased recognition that

came his way in the form of talks on campuses, talks to business groups (he
was invariably critical of business's seeking political protections against competition), and a well-publicized 1973 interview in Playboy.

But this public

recognition made a quantum leap with his receipt of the Nobel Prize in economics in 1976, followed by the widespread recognition that he had explained
and anticipated the stagation that was dominating the economic news and
puzzling Keynesian economists. In addition to columns and interviews in magazines, Friedman appeared on highly rated television shows such as the Phil
Donahue Show. Friedman was probably the only economist in the world who
could attract a large audience when there were only three TV networks, each
aimed at a mass viewership.
The point is that when stagation undermined condence in Keynesian policies, public attention turned to Friedman and the alternative economic policies
he had spent years developing and popularizing. Friedman recognized this as a
critical factor in his inuence when he stated in the preface to the 1982 edition
of Capitalism and Freedom: Only a crisisactual or perceivedproduces real
change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas
that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically
impossible becomes politically inevitable.
In 1979 Paul Volker, the new Federal Reserve chairman, knew that curing
economic stagation required something other than Keynesian policies, and
he followed Friedman's advice by attacking stagation with tight monetary
policy. As Friedman (and the Phillips Curve) predicted, the initial eect was
to increase unemployment.

But as Friedman also predicted (as opposed to

the Phillips Curve), after a lag needed to erode inationary expectations, both
ination and unemployment started falling and the rate of economic growth
increased.
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Keynes's Enduring Appeal
This is not to argue that Friedman won the battle against Keynesianism in
the political arena.

Just because Keynesian economics is in retreat among

academic economists does not automatically reduce its appeal to politicians.
Few politicians can resist policies that give the supercial appearance of addressing problems quickly in ways that generate political support even if they
are counterproductive. Keynesian policies satisfy these conditions. Keynesians
consider aggregate demand to be the primary force driving economic growth,
and they believe that people can increase their demand quickly in response
to government spending that increases their incomes.

This spending can be

targeted to concentrate immediate benets on particular interest groups in
ways that save the jobs of identiable people who will be aware, and appreciative, of the politicians who supported the spending. It is far more dicult
to trace the widespread reductions in spending by othersand the jobs lost or
simply never createdto those politicians, much less to the Keynesian policies
they supported. In contrast, Friedman's policy recommendations work through
markets by eectively increasing the economy's productive capacity with the
understanding that consumption comes before production only in the dictionary. But these policies work indirectly, over the long run, to provide dispersed
and incremental improvements in our wealth.

Thus this benet goes largely

unnoticed, and politicians cannot easily take credit for it even if it is noticed.
This takes us back to the importance of Friedman's observation on the
importance of alternative policies being available when events make it clear
that existing policies aren't working. The failure of Keynesian policies during
the Great Recession rst eroded public support. It is doubtful that a majority
of American politicians today would claim to be Keynesiansmany advocate
reduced federal spending despite high unemployment. How eectively this will
translate into action remains to be seen, but events have clearly shifted the
center of political gravity in Friedman's direction.
His proposals extend to more concerns than macroeconomics, and when
they have succeeded politically it typically has been because events made them
politically salient. One of the most politically successful of the policies proered
in Capitalism and Freedom is the all-voluntary military, a policy enacted in
January 1973 and catalyzed by the unpopularity of the Vietnam war.

One

of the book's least politically successful attacks on public policy is against
occupation licensure, even in medicine, which Friedman argued is inconsistent
with the principles of a free society. Arguably this lack of success is explainable
by the absence of any event that focused public concern on the problems with
occupational licensure, not any deciency in the power of Friedman's argument.
The second-longest chapter in Capitalism and Freedom is devoted to education and school choice.

No one can deny that school choice has become

an important political movement in the United States, having gone from being completely ignored by the government school lobby to being considered a
serious threat. On the other hand, the movement has met with powerful political opposition and numerous setbacks. Government education (K-12) has not
reached a crisis point, instead declining incrementally. Its biggest victims have
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been the relatively poor, whose votes can be taken for granted by political representatives who consistently cater to the special-interest demands of teachers'
unions.
Space prevents me from giving additional examples to show that the political success of Friedman's proposals is determined largely by events that impact
the public. This is not to deny that the power of Friedman's ideas has been
critically important to their political success. But when ideas run as counter to
political incentives as Friedman's do, they face enormous diculty in getting
a political hearing, no matter how brilliant they are. Yet the brilliance with
which Friedman made his arguments in Capitalism and Freedom was essential,
if not sucient, to achieving political success.
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International Trade

Free Trade to Benet the Many

October 1, 1997
Free Trade to Benet the ManyNot Fair
Trade to Benet the Few

When asked, most politicians claim that they favor free trade.

But they

quickly add the qualication that it must also be fair trade, which generally
means that we should open our markets to another country's products only
if their markets are equally open to our products.

This qualication makes

sense politically because people are easily convinced that it makes sense economically.

Why should we give other countries the opportunity to increase

their employment at our expense unless they reciprocate? Unfortunately, this
view misses entirely the real advantages of international trade. Furthermore, it
reects a serious political bias that distorts government decisions over a wide
range of issues.
The advantage from trade with other countries does not come from selling
more to them than they sell to us so we can create more jobs.

The key to

a successful economy has never been simply the creation of jobs. The ability
to consume always exceeds the ability to produce, so there is never a lack of
work to do. The key to a successful economy is directing people into the most
productive jobs, those that create the most value for consumers. This is the
real advantage of international trade.

We create more productive domestic

jobs both when we sell and when we buy from other countries, and the more
open the international trade arrangements the better for all countries. When
country B restricts the import of American products it reduces its productivity
as well as ours.

But we only add to our productivity loss if we respond by

restricting the ability of our citizens to buy products from country B.
Consider the fact that, despite political rhetoric, when we buy foreign products we create American jobs. It would actually be better for Americans if this
weren't true. When Americans buy products from, say, Japan, we end up with
products we value more than the dollars spent could have bought elsewhere,
and the Japanese end up with more dollars (actually the one who sells yen to
American importers to pay for the Japanese products ends up with more dol-

lars, but this doesn't meaningfully alter the story). What do the Japanese do
with these dollars? It would be nice if they treated them as collector's items,
to be kept and admired. Then Americans could obtain valuable products by
doing nothing more costly than printing up dollars, something so easy that
even the federal government does it well. But the Japanese produce goods for
Americans not because they want dollars, but because of what dollars can buy.
Those dollars eventually come back to America as claims on goods produced
by American workers, or as investments in America that create domestic employment opportunities. They may not all come back directly from Japan, but
they do come back.
I don't deny that by restricting foreign imports we can save some American
jobs. But because these jobs, by denition, cannot survive the demands of international trade they obviously don't create as much value as those American jobs
that would have been created without the import restrictions. Foreign trade
eliminates only those jobs that are producing goods which domestic consumers
can import cheaper by shifting their eort into more productive employment
elsewhere in the economy.
Unfortunately, the general benets from unrestricted imports (lower prices
for consumers and a more productive economy) are largely ignored by the
political process, which sees imports as a threat to existing jobs. The problem
here reects a distortion inherent in the political process.

Relatively small

groups organized around a common concern, such as protecting prots and
jobs in a particular industry, are well positioned and strongly motivated to
communicate through the political process with a loud, clear voice.

On the

other hand, the general consuming public is too large and too diverse in its
concerns to communicate a clear and consistent message through the political
process. If something threatens to concentrate a cost on an organized few while
spreading a benet over the unorganized many, politicians will hear from the
few but not from the many.
This bias in favor of special interests over the general interest explains a host
of political perversities. It explains, for example, the diculty politicians have
cutting spending programs, which tend to concentrate benets on organized
interest groups, in order to reduce the burden on the general taxpayer. And
it certainly explains the political perspective on free trade, which emphasizes
the advantage in protecting existing jobs over the far greater, but much more
general, advantage of better choices for consumers and improved economic
productivity.
If politicians could feel the gain of the unorganized many as intensely as they
feel the pain of the organized few, a large number of government restrictions on
our economic choices would be quickly eliminated. Restrictions on our ability
to buy the best products at the lowest prices, whether produced at home or
abroad, would be among the rst to go.

193

Politics and Foreign Trade

December 1, 1999

The case for free trade is overwhelming, both theoretically and empirically.
My last two columns developed the theoretical case, which is based on the
concepts of opportunity costs and comparative advantage. Even if the people
of a country have an absolute advantage in producing everything, they still
gain from foreign trade because they cannot have a comparative advantage in
producing everything.
Ample empirical evidence backs up the theoretical arguments in favor of
free trade. The more that countries permit international trade to direct their
productive eorts into their comparative advantages, the more they prosper
relative to those that restrict trade.

Despite this evidence, almost no coun-

try has followed a policy of free trade.

With rare, and typically short-lived

exceptions, governments reduce economic productivity and their citizens' prosperity by either taxing or imposing quotas on imports. Why? Answering that
question is the purpose of this column.

Cooperation vs. Conscation
Given the advantages of free trade, no government would erect barriers to
imports if the political process allowed the same degree of social cooperation
as the market process. When trade restrictions are eliminated consumers gain
but some workers and investors lose, most temporarily but some permanently.
Even those who would lose permanently from eliminating their industry's trade
protections would still be better o living in an economy with completely free
trade than in one where all domestic industries were protected. Even though
individuals may benet from their industry's protection, they would lose far
more as consumers from the protections of everyone else.
Those in an industry subject to intense foreign competition will want government to protect them if they don't have to consider the costs it imposes
on others. But protectionism would not occur if an industry had to pay these

costs because the burden to consumers is always greater than the benets to
the protected industry.
Unfortunately, when people obtain benets from government they do not
have to pay prices reecting their costs, as they do for benets received in
the marketplace. The cooperation of the marketplace comes from the market's
ability to collect, aggregate, and communicate costs that are widely dispersed
over many people so that they are taken into consideration by those responsible for them.

In sharp contrast, when the costs from politically provided

benets are dispersed over many people, those costs are likely to be ignored.
So government commonly becomes the means by which people can gain private
advantage through conscation rather than through cooperation.

Weakness of the Many
A trade restriction concentrates benets on the few in the protected industry
at costs that are thinly dispersed over the entire consuming public. With the
cost of a trade restriction spread over millions of consumers, few if any will be
aware of the little extra they are paying for the protected product. After all,
consumers buy hundreds of dierent products, and a little increase in the price
of one product typically has little impact on the well-being of any one of them.
Even if a consumer is aware of the extra cost, she will seldom know that it is
caused by a trade restriction. And if by some chance she does know the reason
for the extra cost, she has little motivation to respond politically. Even if she
could eliminate the trade restriction, the eort might cost as much as or more
than the restriction. While the total benet from eliminating the restriction
is huge, most of it would go to other consumers whether they took political
action or not. But her political action is unlikely to do any good if she acts
alone.
Of course, if a large percentage of the consumers act in unison they would
surely have a decisive political inuence. But because the number of consumers
is so large, with each having such a small stake in the outcome, it is almost
impossible to organize them for political action. As is often the case, the larger
the number of people harmed by a policy, the weaker their political inuence.

Power of the Few
On the other hand, because a relative few benet from a trade restriction,
they will be eective in lobbying for it.

The benet to each person will be

signicant, and each will be aware of both his own gain and the source of that
gain. Also, because of the small number of beneciaries, they are relatively easy
to organize for political action. Indeed, they will generally be organized already
through industry and occupational associations. So when a trade restriction is
being considered, politicians will hear plenty from those favoring the restriction
and little if any from those harmed by it. The result is a bias toward providing
concentrated benets and ignoring much larger, but dispersed costs. Therefore,
it is often the case that the smaller the number of people beneting from a
policy, the more powerful their political inuence in its favor.
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With small, organized groups able to capture benets at the expense of the
general public through restrictions on trade (and many other special-interest
policies), little social cooperation is achieved through the political process. For
that reason, government is a constant threat to the social cooperation that
comes from free-market activity.

Considering Some Costs
The costs of trade restrictions are more dicult to identify than indicated
above. Consider restrictions on steel imports. Few people buy steel directly.
Rather they pay for it indirectly when they buy products made from steel. Also,
when an import restriction increases steel prices, employment opportunities
are reduced in industries relying on steel as an input.

Those who don't get

jobs because of a trade restriction will seldom know the reason. It has been
estimated that limiting steel imports to 15 percent of the U.S. market would
cost American consumers $189,000 a year for each steel job saved, and that for
every U.S. steel job saved, over 3.5 U.S. jobs would be destroyed because of
higher steel prices.

1

If such costs were revealed, rather than concealed, by the political process,
we would never reduce our prosperity with trade restrictions. The advantage
we all receive from free trade is that it forces industries to consider the full
opportunity costs of their productive activity.

It's too bad that they aren't

required to consider the full cost of their political activity.

1 See

Arthur Denzau, American Steel: Responding to Foreign Competition, Center for

the Study of American Business, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., February 1985.
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Social Welfare

The Political Economy of Educational Vouchers

July 1, 1986

Public nancing of education means political control.
The crisis in public education is real. As judged by any reasonable measure,
the quality of public education is declining as the cost of public education is
increasing. The desire for reform in public education is genuine. Parents want
a good education for their children, and taxpayers want an honest return for
their dollars. Unfortunately, a realistic appraisal of why meaningful reform in
public education is so badly needed also points to why meaningful reform is so
unlikely to occur.
The underlying problem with public education is, quite simply, that it is
public.

As long as education is provided publicly, it will be controlled by,

and for the benet of, public education professionals.

The reason for this is

straightforward.
As opposed to market decisions where each consumer exerts direct and decisive control over the services he chooses to purchase, no one individual has
decisive control over the political decisions which determine the publicly provided services all consumers are required to purchase. Seeing no advantage
in becoming informed and active in pursuit of objectives over which he has no
direct control, the typical citizen-consumer quite rationally devotes little eort
to inuence public education policy. In contrast, suppliers of public education
have signicant political inuence over public education policy by virtue of the
fact that they are organized through professional associations, have a concentrated interest in decisions aecting public education, and are widely perceived
as education experts. The political dominance of supplier interests over consumer interests gives public education professionals the opportunity to control
the policy of the public schools. The special interests that comprise the public
school lobby have taken full advantage of this opportunity to promote their
private purposes while neglecting the public's desire for the ecient provision
of quality education.

The implication here appears to be clear.

Achieving genuine educational

reform would seem to require a policy which shifted control of education from
suppliers of education to consumers of education. It is this view of the crisis
in public education that has motivated the call for educational vouchers.

1

The

idea behind educational vouchers is straightforward. Instead of government nancing education by actually supplying educational services, publicly funded
vouchers would be given to the parents of school-age children to spend at the
school of their choice (as long as the choice is approved by government). As
envisioned by its proponents, this voucher system would transfer control to
the consumers of education.

Educators would be forced to compete for the

consumers' educational vouchers and therefore cater to the consumers' educational demands. Only those schools providing quality education, as determined
by the consumer, at low cost would survive. It is also predicted that the variety of educational approaches would increase to reect the range of educational
preferences among the public. Also, with diversity replacing uniformity in education, market choice would replace political combat as the means of expressing
2

educational preferences.

Educational Vouchers and Political Realism
This case for educational vouchers would be sound if it were indeed true that
the root of the problem lay in the control of public school policy by professional
educators. But this is not the case. Educator control of public education policy
is a symptom of a more fundamental problem: the public funding of education.
The aw with the voucher system is that it attacks the symptom of the problem
without addressing the source of the problem. Under the voucher system public
education remains public education, and nothing fundamental has changed.
Proponents of educational vouchers have assumed a benign political setting
for their proposalone which if it indeed existed would largely eliminate the
need for vouchers in the rst place. Once vouchers were issued by government,
consumers would supposedly be in complete control, as the public school lobby
would somehow have been politically neutered.

The only political inuence

that would be in evidence is the restriction that vouchers be used to purchase
education only from approved schools. And presumably this inuence would
be exercised in a politically impartial way. The political arena would suddenly
become a setting in which the education consumer is in control; the public
school lobby is dormant; and quality education is provided eciently because
it is in the public interest to do so.

Obviously in such a political setting

educational vouchers would perform as advertised.
The prognosis for vouchers is completely dierent, however, when a realistic
view of politics is accepted. As long as education is funded publicly, decisions
on educational policy will be made politically.

As long as decisions on ed-

1 For the purpose of this paper there is no advantage in distinguishing between educational
vouchers and educational tax credits, and henceforth we will refer only to vouchers.

2 Milton

Friedman, the leading proponent of educational vouchers, rst made the case for

vouchers in The Role of Government in Education, in Robert Solow, ed. Education and
the Public Interest, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1955.
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ucational policy are made politically, the interests of consumers will remain
diused and unorganized, and dominated by the focused and organized interests of the public school professionals. Given this fact of political life there are
only two possibilities for educational vouchers. The rst possibility is that educational vouchers will be benign because they never will be considered seriously.
The second possibility is that educational vouchers will become politically acceptablein which case they will be no better, and probably worse, than the
educational approach they replace.
Consider a voucher proposal which, if enacted, would indeed be in the best
interest of the public as consumers of education. In other words, the voucher
proposal would accomplish exactly what proponents of educational vouchers
envision: the transfer of control over education to consumers from suppliers.
One does not have to be clairvoyant to predict how the public school lobby
would respond to such a proposal. They would oppose it for the obvious reason
that their power and privileges would be undermined by a voucher system which
worked the way it is supposed to work. This opposition is sure to be eective
for the same reason that lies behind the case being made for vouchersthe
ability of education professionals to control education policy when that policy
is determined through the political process. What the voucher proponents have
not yet recognized is that they are confronted with a Catch-22. They want an
eective voucher system for the very reason that it is impossible to have one.
Unfortunately, this is not the end of the story.

If it were, the idea of

educational vouchers would be a rather harmless one. The problem is that there
is a real danger that educational vouchers will become politically acceptable.
How will vouchers become politically acceptable if they pose such a threat
to the professional educators who control the political agenda on educational
policy?

It has to be recognized that the public school lobby faces a second

threat. That threat is public education's inferiority to the private education
alternative, but this is a threat that the public school lobby can neutralize with
the creative use of educational vouchers.
Compelling evidence of the inferiority of the public schools is found in the
fact that private schools, charging full price for their services, are competing
successfully against the fully subsidized public schools.

And the number of

parents who remove their children from the public school system is likely to
increase. The public schools are surely not going to get better, and are very
likely to get worse. The recent call for reform and the political rhetoric about
excellence in education will do nothing to improve public education. Indeed,
the pre tense of reform has satised the political demand that something be
done while leaving such educationally destructive forces as the National Education Association with more control than ever. On the other hand, the private
demand that something be done will continue to nd expression in parents'
rejection of public schools. This rejection will surely increase as per capita incomes increase, even if the decline in the quality of public education is somehow
arrested.It should not go unnoticed that increased wealth represents a major
threat to the public education establishment. The wealthier parents become,
the greater their demand for quality education for their children, i.e private
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education for their children. The NEA's advocacy of economic policies calling
for economically stiing regulations and taxes is not completely irrational from
their perspective.

The Response of the Public School Lobby
The public school lobby will respond to this threat of consumer rejection, but
how? It will not, indeed cannot, respond by improving the quality of education
and becoming competitive with private schools. This is not to be taken as a
criticism of the individuals who teach in our public schools. Many of these individuals are competent, hard working, and personally dedicated to educational
excellence. The problem is one of the awed incentive structure that plagues
the provision of all publicly nanced goods and services.
If suppliers are to direct their eorts eciently and persistently to the satisfaction of consumer demands, they require accurate information on what those
demands are, and compelling motivation to respond to this information. There
is only one arrangement whereby this information and motivation can be provided. That arrangement is the private market where consumers, by virtue of
the fact that they are spending their own money as they see t, communicate
their preferences through changes in prices and patronage in a way that conveys wealth gains to those suppliers who respond appropriately, and imposes
wealth losses on those who do not. By breaking the connection between the
demand for education and the ability of consumers to control their own money
in expressing that demand, public education has made it impossible for the
public schools to provide quality education eciently.
But the public school lobby does not have to concern itself with providing
better education at lower costs in order to beat back the threat it faces from the
private school option. If the move to purely private schools begins to accelerate,
the public school lobby can, and surely will, protect its privileged position
against this competition by embracing educational vouchers. As strange as it
will sound to advocates of educational vouchers, if the voucher approach to
education ever becomes a serious political possibility, it will be as a means of
1

reducing competition in education, not increasing it.

The advantage the public school lobby will see in educational vouchers
comes from the ability of vouchers to entice students back into publicly nanced education. Consider the situation in which a large number of parents
have taken their children out of the public schools.

These parents will have

the control over their children's education that can come only from private
education, but they will be paying dearly for the privilege; paying for both
the private education they have chosen and the public education they have
rejected. Given this burden, parents of children in private schools will be susceptible to a proposal for educational vouchers. As presented by the advocates
of vouchers, which will now include public school professionals, the promise
will be continued freedom of choice in education without the obligation to pay

1 This

point was rst recognized by Gary North in his article, Educational Vouchers:

The Double Tax, The Freeman, (May 1976): 259-75.
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twice. Such a voucher proposal will also sound appealing to the proprietors of
private schools, who will mistakenly see it as a way of expanding the demand for
their product by eliminating the discriminatory nancial burden being placed
on their customers.
Unfortunately, the reality of educational vouchers will be far dierent from
their promise. Vouchers or no vouchers, as long as education is nanced publicly, control over education will be exerted through political power, not through
consumer choice. Educational vouchers may, for a time, give the appearance
that consumers are exercising genuine choice. But consumer choice can, and
will, be circumscribed by restrictions on the vouchers; restrictions that will
reect the interests of the politically organized public school lobby, not the
interests of the politically unorganized public. One can predict with condence
that the choices educational consumers will have under any voucher system
that is politically acceptable will in no way threaten the privileged position of
the public school establishment.
This conclusion is based on more than just idle theorizing. We have experience with Federally funded educational vouchers at the experimental level. The
Federally funded voucher experiment that ran the longest and has been deemed
most successful was conducted in Alum Rock, California. As one would predict,
restrictions were placed on these vouchers which minimized the competitive
pressures they imposed on public school professionals, and which attempted to
promote social objectives that had little to do with education. Teachers, for example, did not have to worry about loss of income if their enrollments declined.
They were given priority in teaching jobs at other schools and were paid for
makeshift work until such jobs became available. On the other hand, teachers
who succeeded in attracting additional students were not rewarded with higher
salaries. Those schools which parents preferred were not able to expand to meet
the extra demand. Those students who did not get their rst choice were simply assigned to other schools. A local employee certication council required
that any private school had to satisfy a host of standards on such things as
teacher education requirements, pay and fringe benets, and faculty-student
ratios. This control over entry was used to make it eectively impossible for
any private school to enter into competition for the vouchers. The Alum Rock
vouchers did nothing to threaten the suppliers of public education by passing
genuine control to the consumers of education.
If educational vouchers become politically viable it will be because they can
be used to reverse the expansion in genuinely private education. The public
school lobby will see educational vouchers as the means to entice those who are
attending private schools back into a public education system that will be no
better than the one which they have rejected.

Conclusion
The special interests that comprise the public school lobby have been able to
subvert educational policy to their narrow advantages with the same political
inuence that will be used to frustrate any reform that threatens those advantages. These special interests would be emasculated by a system of educational
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vouchers that worked in the way envisioned by the advocates of vouchers. It
is for this reason that we will never get a voucher system that is worth having.
If educational vouchers are in our future it will be because the public school
lobby will see them as the best vehicle for maintaining or enlarging their special interest advantages. Educational vouchers will never serve to increase the
range of freedom in education, and may do much to restrict it.
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Government Redistribution Impoverishes the Poor

March 1, 1994

Only the most ideologically blinded continue to argue that socialism can
outperform capitalism in the production of wealth. Yet the assertion that government programs are required to reduce the income inequality generated by
capitalism is widely accepted as revealed truth. Market competition motivates
productive activity by threatening with poverty those who use resources unwisely, and carrying out this threat without mercy.

So, it is argued, in the

absence of compassionate government transfer programs, a large percentage of
the population would be left behind, impoverished, without hope, and made all
the more miserable by the audacious wealth of their more successful neighbors.

The Benets of Failure
There is just enough truth in this view to obscure the fact that it grossly distorts reality.

Market competition can be harsh.

But the particular failures

dispensed by market competition provide the information and motivation that
are indispensable to the general economic success of any economy. When failures in the marketplace are viewed in isolation from the success they make
possible, they are commonly depicted as unfair.

In fact, in the marketplace

failure and fairness go hand in hand. When people suer failure in the marketplace they are making a necessary contribution to the general productivity of
the economy- -a contribution that enhances the opportunities of all to produce
wealth, in an economic system that distributes that wealth far more widely and
equally than most people realize. Each person would, of course, prefer to be
protected against failure while continuing to benet from the contribution that
the failures of others make to economic progress. The fundamental fairness of
the market lies in the fact that it gives no one a free ride on the contribution of
others. In the unfettered marketplace everyone has to contribute to the general
prosperity by accepting the fail ures as well as the successes that come his way.
Yet, because the failures that result from market competition are commonly
seen as unfair, arguments calling for government to help the poor nd sympa-

thetic ears.

Government action to help the poor is seen as the only way to

overcome the perceived unfairness of the marketplace. Invariably what people
have in mind when considering government help for the poor are government
programs that supposedly transfer income from the rich to the poor. Seldom do
those who favor such transfer programs question whether they actually reduce
income inequality.
While most people recognize realistically that income is distributed in the
marketplace in response to competition between people interested primarily
in private advantage, they somehow believe that income is distributed in the
political process in response to broad social goals such as reducing income
inequality.

The unstated assumption is that when people shift from market

activity to political activity they experience a moral metamorphosis, overcoming considerations of private interest in order to advance the public interest.
Yet, there is no convincing evidence that people in their roles as politicians,
bureaucrats, members of special interests, and voters are any less driven by
self-interest than they are as investors, workers, and consumers in the private
sector.

A Major Unsupported Assumption
Once the importance of political competition is recognized, an important, but
seldom considered, question presents itself: Why should we expect the income
distribution resulting from political competition to be any more equal than the
income distribution resulting from market competition? Unless one is prepared
to argue that (1) the skills necessary for successful political competition are
dierent from those necessary for successful market competition and (2) the
poor possess relatively more of the politically relevant skills than the nonpoor,
then there is no reason to believe that government transfer programs will help
the poor.
The evidence fails to support the hope that the poor can compete successfully against the nonpoor for political largess. Little of the income distributed
by government is from the rich to the poor.

Studies of the distribution of

after-tax/after-transfer income over the last several decades nd little, if any,
change in the equality of that distribution. Based on these studies, economist
Robert Haveman of the Institute for Research on Poverty of the University of
Wisconsin has concluded, In spite of massive increases in federal government
taxes and spending, we were about as unequal in 1988 as we were in 1950.
There are government programs, of course, that transfer income to the poor.
But programs that transfer income to the poor receive political support through
a process of legislative logrolling that disproportionately favors programs that
transfer income to the nonpoor. The poor end up receiving no greater share of
existing wealth transferred by political competition than they do of new wealth
created by market competition.
There is no debate over the fact that transfer programs reduce economic
growth by discouraging productivity and encouraging dependency. By reducing
the overall size of the pie without increasing the share of that pie going to the
poor, government transfer programs have reduced the absolute income of the
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poor. The inescapable conclusion is that government transfer programs have
made the poor worse o.
Free market capitalism excels at producing wealth and at distributing it
widely.

Even those left behind by market competition benet from the pro-

ductivity of the marketplace. It is far better to be poor in California than in
Calcutta. There are those, however, who disparage the market economy on the
grounds that market competition unfairly distributes income. This view has
been used eectively to justify transferring more of the nation's income through
governmental pro grams. The result has been unfortunate for the poor. Substituting negative-sum political competition for positive-sum market competition
reduces the size of the economic pie without increasing the share of that pie
going to the poor.
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The Perversity of Doing Good at Others' Expense

September 1, 1997

Assume your 45-year-old friend is critically ill and will die by tomorrow
morning unless something extraordinary is done.
possible for you to save your friend.

Miraculously, it becomes

But to do so you have to shorten the

lives of all other Americans by a small amount. By taking away ten seconds of
life from someone else, you can extend the life of your friend by ve seconds.
When this transfer is made from all 260 million Americans, he will receive
approximately an additional 41 years and four months of life, thus achieving
an enviable life span of over 86 years.
Will you use your power to save your friend? Almost surely the answer is
yes. Will saving your friend be an act of virtue? The answer to this question
is more complicated.

Saving your friend's life will be widely perceived as a

virtuous act, but a strong case can be made that it would be a harmful act
of callous self-interest. The sharp contrast between perception and reality in
this fabricated example is unfortunately relevant to the world of politics, and
explains why organized interest groups can capture small private gains at great
social costs through political actions widely seen as virtuous.
I readily admit that if a good friend of mine were desperately ill, I would
save him by shortening the life of everyone in the general population by a few
seconds if I had the power to do so. Although the gain in life for him would
be less than the total loss of life for others, the gain would be dramatically
visible, greatly appreciated, and easily associated with my act of kindness,
while the loss would be so diused that it would go completely unnoticed. Even
if the others were aware of their cost for saving my friend, a large majority of
them would probably vote in favor of making their individual sacrice (and
obligating others to do the same) to extend his life, since that sacrice was so
low. We could all feel the warm glow of compassion over our virtuous sacrice
for the good of another.
There is a problem here, however. If it is so noble to save my friend's life by
transferring a few seconds from everyone else, then it must also be equally noble

to extend this benet to others. But consider the destructive consequences of
each of us having the power to add years to our best friend's life (which in most
cases would be our own) by reducing the life of everyone else by a few seconds
(but with the total life lost being twice that gained). With everyone trying to
lengthen his or her life at the expense of others, the result would be an early
death for everyone. Generalizing the earlier example of a two-second loss for a
one-second gain, if everyone attempted to capture 41 years of additional life by
transferring seconds from others, everyone would have his or her life shortened
by 41 years. For someone my age this would, at best, mean instant death, and
more likely a retroactive one.
So if the ability to extend one person's life by shortening the lives of others
were immediately generalized to everyone, the consequences would be quickly
recognized as disastrous. But if only a few had this ability initially, and it was
expanded to more people very gradually, it would take a while for the harmful
1

consequences to be noticed.

And probably people would be unaware of the

connection between the reduced life expectancy of most and the longer life
span of the few, the result being a clamor to expand the method prolonging
the lives of the few. Even when the connection between the expanded transfer
process and the ever-shortening life expectancy began to be recognized, no one
would willingly cease attempting to benet from the transfers. The person who
unilaterally refused to transfer years from others to himself would lose twice
the life expectancy as before, as others continued to transfer life from him to
themselves. Of course, there might be a movement to stop the transfer process
if anyone were left alive to initiate it.
But what if the destructive eect of the transfer process were masked by
medical advances that caused a slight increase in life expectancy? Then the life
lost because of the transfers might go largely unnoticed. Some would understand the harm being imposed by the transfers, but they would nd it dicult
to get people exercised by the loss of what they never had, which exists only in
a counterfactual setting with which they are not familiar. Also, any attempt
to get people to oppose the transfers faces a serious free-rider problem. Why
should an individual incur a private cost in an eort that, even if successful,
provides general benets to everyone regardless of his or her contribution to
the eort? For each person the advantage is in devoting the eort necessary
to benet from transfers, an eort that concentrates a benet entirely on him
or her, rather than in making the far less decisive eort to achieve benets for
the general public.

Real-World Transfers
Of course, my example of extending the lives of some by reducing the lives of
others is fortunately a fanciful one. Unfortunately, it describes all too well the
type of transfer that increasingly dominates the political process. The coercive
power of the federal government to perform its few legitimate functions has
always been a source of temptation for those who see the possibility of solving

1I

assume here that there is a strict limit on how much life can be transferred from others.
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their problems through transfers from others.

The case for yielding to this

temptation is supercially appealing because government transfers could create concentrated and visible benets for politically organized and appreciative
groups while spreading the costs so widely that they go largely unnoticed.
Fortunately, for approximately the rst 100 years after the ratication of the
U.S. Constitution, the prevailing understanding was that the role of government
was a limited one.

Government was not intended to solve the problems of

individuals; rather it was to establish a setting in which they could best solve
their own problems in productive cooperation with each other.

That view

was exemplied by Grover Cleveland's 1887 veto of a bill passed by Congress
to provide $10,000 to drought-stricken farmers in Texas. In his veto message
Cleveland stated, A prevalent tendency to disregard the limited mission of [the
government's] power and duty should be steadfastly resisted, to the end that
the lesson should be constantly enforced that, though the people support the
Government, the Government should not support the people.

1

Unfortunately, as Cleveland was vetoing seed bills, U.S.
Supreme Court decisions began opening the door for increased government
regulation of the economy.

2

Regulation, supposedly aimed at protecting the

general public against abuse by business and other organized interests, is invariably controlled by those interests to reduce the competition they face. That
amounts to a transfer from the general public to those being regulated, in
the form of higher prices and a less productive economy. The growth of such
transfers began rather modestly. Resistance to it was well entrenched, but the
concentrated benets appeared larger than the diused (but actually larger)
costs. As the number of beneciaries increased with little apparent cost, the
case for including more beneciaries seemed compelling. Even when the costs
of government transfers were noticed, they were seldom associated with the
transfers that caused them.

Indeed, the costs created by the transfers were

commonly cited as problems that justied government solutions in the form of
yet further transfers. The most egregious example of hoping the cause can be
the cure was the expansion of government control in response to the depression
of the 1930s, a depression prolonged, if not caused entirely, by a combination
of federal tari increases and Federal Reserve mismanagement of the money
supply.
Soon government transfers were going beyond protective regulation and
increasingly taking the form of direct payments and subsidies.

In 1900 the

entire federal budget amounted to only about 3 percent of the nation's GDP,
with little of it devoted to transfers. By 1962 federal transfers to individuals
(not including interest payments) amounted to 27 percent of federal outlays and
to 5.2 percent of GDP. By 1993 federal payments to individuals had increased to
56 percent of federal outlays (85 percent when interest payments and national

1 Quoted

in Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan:

Critical Episodes in the Growth of

American Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 84.

2 Higgs

discusses many of these decisions and their consequences in ibid. Also see Terry

Anderson and Peter J. Hill, The Birth of a Transfer Society (New York: University Press of
America, 1989).
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defense are excluded) and to 10.5 percent of the GDP.

Noble Objectives
These budgetary transfers are almost always rationalized in the name of some
noble public objectivehelping the poor, protecting American jobs, saving the
family farm, making the American economy more competitive. The reality is
that the benets from these transfers are concentrated primarily on organized
interest groups and do little to achieve the noble objectives. Indeed, progress
toward the goal is invariably retarded as the costs of transfers spread ineciencies throughout the economy.

Poverty programs have increased the number

and dependency of the poor, trade restrictions and export subsidies have destroyed more productive jobs to save less productive ones, farm subsidies have
done more to help large corporate farms than small family farms, and corporate
welfare has hindered American competitiveness by subsidizing failure.
Those failures are rooted in the fact that, just as in my life-extending example, government transfers add less value than they destroy.

Government

transfers systematically reduce the productivity of the economy, productivity
essential for solving the social problems the government claims to be addressing. The wastefulness of government transfers is inherent in the very process
that explains them.

Because the benets of transfers are concentrated, they

are magnied by the political process, while the dispersed costs are devalued.
The result is that the political benet-cost comparison continues to show gains
from transfers long after the social benet-cost comparison is decisively negative.

The ratio of losses to gains from many political transfers is far larger

than the 2-to-1 ratio assumed in the example of life-expectancy transfers. For
example, in California taxpayers are paying for water-diversion projects that
provide water at $212 per acre-foot to farmers who pay for it at a rate of $3.50
2

per acre-foot.

Or consider amendments to the Clean Air Act that protected

Eastern coal producers against competition from Western coal by imposing
scrubber requirements on electric generating plants to remove sulphur even if
they burn low-sulphur Western coal. It has been estimated that this requirement costs electricity consumers approximately one dollar for every nickel it
transfers to coal producers, not to mention the resulting reduction in environmental quality.

3

Yet, attempts to point out the failure of an ever-expanding government
role in the economy are typically met with complacency and often hostility.
Again, as with the example of transferring life expectancy, it is easy to see the
concentrated benets from government transfers. It's even easier to ignore the
generalized costs and see them as unrelated to the benets. The economy, after
all, has continued to grow. It would be dicult for anyone to know just how

1 These

gures come from Herbert Stein and Murray Foss, The New Illustrated Guide to

the American Economy (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1995), p. 212.

2 See

Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press,

1996), p. 11.

3 See

George Daly and Thomas Mayor, Equity, Eciency and Environmental Quality,

Public Choice, vol. 51, no. 2 (1986): 141-59.
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much greater that growth could have been, and most people are unaware of
how costly even a slight reduction in economic growth is over time.

1

And even

if people were aware of the general costs of government transfers, no individual
would see the advantage in opposing them in general since the private advantage
lies in getting more transfers for your group.

Those who do suggest cutting

back on transfers will encounter hostility from the beneciaries, who realize
that the amount they have to pay for the transfers to others is independent of
whether or not they continue to receive theirs. Even many of those paying for
a benet going to others often respond negatively to advocates of reducing, or
eliminating, that benet because of its visible virtue and the lack of a detectable
2

cost to any individual.

The dynamic of government transfers is an insidious one that invariably
leads to the disastrous situation Bastiat predicted:

the state becomes that

great ctitious entity by which everyone seeks to live at the expense of everyone
else.

3

Both the fanciful possibility of helping some people with transfers of life
from others, and the factual possibility of helping some people with government wealth transfers from others, illustrate the perversities that result when
people attempt to do good at others' expense. Such attempts always give the
appearance of promoting virtue while destroying the discipline and accountability that make real virtue possible.

1 It

should be noted that the larger government involvement in the economy, the more the

ocial national income statistics overstate the national income. The growth in the private
sector is determined by the amount people voluntarily pay for goods and services.

Since

there is generally no market for government-provided services, they enter into the national
income accounts at the cost of providing them, which is almost always greater than their
value. So GDP can, and often is, increased by government transfers that reduce the total
value of economic output. To bring my example of transferring life expectancy in line with
government transfers, the additional life one received from a transfer would have to be counted
for more than it actually is.

2 Because

the inuence of any individual voter on a political decision to make a transfer is

eectively zero, the opportunity cost of favoring a transfer is also eectively zero, even if the
transfer is known to be individually costly. Therefore, if a person has been led to believe that
a transfer is virtuous and he places even a modest value on the sense of virtue that comes
from supporting the transfer, he will vote for it regardless of the personal cost if it passes.
See Georey Brennan and Loren Lomasky, Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of
Electoral Preference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

3 Quoted in George Roche,

Free Market, Free Men: Frederic Bastiat, 1801-1850 (Hillsdale:

Hillsdale College Press and The Foundation for Economic Education, 1993), p. 150.
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Social Cooperation and the Marketplace

July 1, 1998

The primary insights of economics come from explaining how individuals
pursuing their own interests make choices that best enable others to pursue
their interests as well.

This social cooperation is not inevitable.

It requires

rules that motivate people to consider the concerns of others. The rules that
accomplish this amazing feat dene the free-market economy.

1

Free-market economies vary in their particulars owing to cultural variations.
But the fundamental rules can be stated in terms of private property. Property
is owned privately, and private owners have the right, within broad limits, to
use their property as they see t; rights to property are transferable on any
mutually agreed-on terms. Before considering how these rules motivate social
2

cooperation, let's see how remarkable that achievement is.

Sounds Impossible
Full social cooperation would require that every person have information about
the preferences of everyone aected by his decisions and on the constantly
changing conditions that alter the relative scarcity of resources. For example,
everyone considering using cotton products would have to be informed if a
fad has Brazilian teenagers increasing their desire for denim clothing, or if the
supply of cotton needed to produce denim is reduced by poor weather in Mississippi, or if new evidence suggests that respiratory problems may result from
working in cotton elds. People would have to know literally millions of things
that aect the consumption and production of thousands upon thousands of
products to know enough to adjust their decisions in mutually accommodating

1 Adam

Smith famously discussed social cooperation in terms of his invisible hand. See

The Wealth of Nations (New York, Modern Library, 1937 [1776]), p. 423.

2 Readers are encouraged to reinforce the discussion in this section by reading F.A. Hayek,

The Use of Knowledge in Society, in his Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980 [1948]). In my opinion, this is one of the most important
economics articles ever written.

ways. One might throw his hands up at this point and consider that requirement impossible to satisfy.
Transmitting information is only part of the problem. Even if it is communicated, people would still have to be motivated to act on it appropriately, to
respond as though they were as concerned with everyone else's well-being as
they were with their own.
But before concluding that social cooperation requires an information network far superior to anything even remotely available, and a level of compassion
seldom practiced by ordinary mortals, consider that every day we benet from
exactly that type of social cooperation.

Indeed, it is so common that most

people take it for granted.

How Does It Happen?
What harmonizes the pursuits of billions of individuals who have little direct
information about, or interest in, one another's circumstances? The answer is
found in the information and incentives that emerge when people pursue their
objectives in accordance with the marketplace rules of private property and
voluntary exchange.
When property is privately owned and transfers are voluntary, the prices
that emerge from the interaction of buyers and sellers communicate a tremendous amount of information. The price you observe for a product reects how
much value other consumers place on an additional unit of it. If the value that
Brazilian teenagers place on denim clothing increases, their additional purchases will communicate this information throughout the world in the form of
slightly higher prices for cotton products. Everyone who is considering buying
these products will be immediately aware of their increased value to others.
Prices also indicate the relative availability of dierent products, and the cost
of producing more of them.
Market prices motivate people to respond as if they are as concerned with
the interests of others as they are with their own. Consumers will respond to
the higher prices caused by Brazilian teenagers as if the consumers are thinking,
Teenagers in Brazil tell us they value additional cotton in denim clothing by a
little bit more than we value it in the cotton products we use; so we will reduce
our consumption so Brazilians can increase theirs. Or in the case of evidence of
health damage to cotton workers, consumers will respond to the higher prices
as if they are thinking, We will reduce our consumption of cotton products to
reduce the number of people exposed to the risk in the cotton elds, and we
will pay a little more to compensate those willing to take that risk.
Of course, it is primarily self-interest that motivates consumers to respond
that way, rather than concern for people they will never meet. Indeed, higher
prices tell consumers nothing about why cotton products have become more
valuable.

(Important information, of course, is also communicated through

lower prices.) Market prices are ecient precisely because they do not overload
consumers with irrelevant information.
Prices also motivate suppliers to respond to the interests of others.

Ob-

viously, higher prices tell suppliers that consumers want more of a product.
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Suppliers are strongly motivated to respond appropriately. But consumers also
communicate information disagreeable to suppliers when they decide they want
less of a product.
Consumers communicate to suppliers indirectly through the
prices for labor, land, machinery, semi-nished goods, and raw materials (inputs). The prices textile producers, for example, pay for inputs reect the value
consumers place on other products that could be produced with those inputs.
If those other products become more valuable to consumers, textile producers
will receive this information through higher prices for their inputs, which are
bid away by the other industries. Textile production will be reduced, and some
textile manufacturers may go bankrupt. When a supplier reduces his output,
or goes bankrupt, it is as though he is saying, Consumers are telling me that
the resources I am using are more valuable in other employments, so I will use
fewer of them so others can put them to better use.

Blaming the Market for Its Success
The social cooperation that results from the information and incentives communicated through the market is not perfect. But no other economic system
comes remotely close to the market in allowing people to achieve their objectives in productive cooperation with each other.
mostly for its success rather than for its failure.

The market is criticized

It is commonly blamed for

delivering news about scarcity. No one likes scarcity, but it is not caused by
markets. Indeed, the wonder of markets is that they call to action those in the
best position to respond. Blaming scarcity on markets makes no more sense
than blaming res on re alarms.
The problem of scarcity will always be with us. But the social cooperation
that is realized only through the marketplace permits us to push the limits of
scarcity back farther than is possible under any other system.
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Creating Jobs vs. Creating Wealth

January 1, 2000

Government policies are commonly evaluated in terms of how many jobs
they create. Restricting imports is seen as a way to protect and create domestic jobs. Tax preferences and loopholes are commonly justied as ways of increasing employment in the favored activity. Presidents point with pride to the
number of jobs created in the economy during their administrations. Supposedly the more jobs created the more successful the administration. There probably has never been a government spending program whose advocates failed
to mention that it creates jobs. Even wars are seen as coming with the silver
lining of job creation.
Now there is nothing wrong with job creation. Working in jobs is an important way people create wealth. So the emphasis on job creation is an understandable one. But it is easy for people to forget that creating more wealth
is what we really want to accomplish, and jobs are merely a means to that end.
When that elementary fact is forgotten, people are easily duped by arguments
that elevate creation of jobs to an end in itself. While these arguments may
sound plausible, they are used to support policies that destroy wealth rather
than create it. I shall consider a few of the depressingly many examples in this
column and the next.

Creating Jobs Is Not the Problem
The purpose of all economic activity is to produce as much value as possible
with the scarce resources (including human eort) available.

But no matter

how far we push back the limits of scarcity, those limits are never vanquished.
Scarcity will forever prevent us from securing all the things we desire. There
will always be jobs to do far more than can ever be done. So creating jobs is
not the problem.

The problem is creating jobs in which people produce the

most value. This is the point of the apocryphal story of an engineer who, while
visiting China, came across a large crew of men building a dam with picks and
shovels. When the engineer pointed out to the supervisor that the job could

be completed in a few days, rather than many months, if the men were given
motorized earthmoving equipment, the supervisor said that such equipment
would destroy many jobs. Oh, the engineer responded, I thought you were
interested in building a dam. If it's more jobs you want, why don't you have
your men use spoons instead of shovels.
As I tell my students at the University of Georgia, I will employ every person
in our college town of Athens if they'll only work for me cheaply enough, say
a nickel a month.

Lower the wage a bit more and I'll hire everyone in the

entire state of Georgia. If I hired workers at those wages, I could make a prot
having them build dams with spoons. Of course, the students recognize that
my oer is silly since they can make far more working for other employers,
which reects the more important reason my oer is silly: concentrating on the
number of jobs ignores the value being created, or not created. More value will
be produced in the higher-paying jobs my students can get than in the ones
I am oering. A big advantage realized from the wages that emerge in open
labor markets is that they attract people into not just any employment, but
into their highest-valued employment.
Another advantage of market wages is that they force employers to consider
the opportunity cost of hiring workers their value in alternative jobs and to
remain constantly alert for ways to eliminate jobs by creating the same value
with fewer workers. All economic progress results from being able to provide
the same, or improved, goods and services with fewer workers, thus eliminating
some jobs and freeing up labor to increase production in new, more productive
jobs.

The failure to understand this source of increasing prosperity explains

the widespread sympathy with destructive public policies.

Dynamiting Our Way to More Jobs
In the 1840s a French politician seriously advocated blowing up the tracks at
Bordeaux on the railroad from Paris to Spain to create more jobs in Bordeaux.
Freight would have to be moved from one train to another and passengers
would require hotels, all of which would mean more jobs. (This proposal was
discussed and demolished by the nineteenth-century economist and essayist
Frederic Bastiat in Economic Sophisms, pp. 94-95, available from FEE.)
This proposal is even more absurd than my oer to hire people for a nickel a
month. At least I would employ workers to produce something of value, rather
than to partially undo damage that is inicted needlessly. Unfortunately, absurdity does not prevent economically destructive policies from being proposed
and implemented. Using the jobs-creation justication, politicians commonly
enact legislation that increases the eort required to produce a given amount
of value.
One of the arguments for restricting imports is that it will create (or protect)
domestic jobs.

True, it will create some domestic jobs, just as destroying a

section of a rail line will create domestic jobs. But also like a break in a rail
line, import restrictions make it more costly to obtain valuable products. The
only reason a country imports products is that it is the cheapest way to acquire
them; it takes fewer workers to obtain the imported products through foreign
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trade than by producing them directly. In this way trade is like a technological
advance, freeing up workers and allowing them to increase the production of
goods and services available for consumption. Import restrictions create jobs in
the same way dynamiting our railroads, bombing our factories, and requiring
that workers use shovels instead of modern earth-moving equipment would
create jobs. Always keep in mind that creating jobs is a means to the ultimate
end of economic activity, which is creating wealth.

Creating Government Jobs
Because people tend to think of jobs as ends rather than means, they are
easily fooled into supporting government programs on grounds that jobs will
be created. We have all heard people argue in favor of military bases, highway
construction, and environmental regulations on business on these grounds. To
justify spending, government agencies commonly perform benet/cost studies
in which the jobs created are counted as benets.

This is like counting the

hours you work to earn enough money to buy a car as one of the car's benets.
The jobs created by a government project represent a cost of the project: the
opportunity cost.

The workers employed in government activities could be

producing value doing something else.

The relevant question is not whether

a government project creates jobs, but whether the workers in those jobs will
create more wealth than they would in other jobs. This is a question advocates
of government programs don't want asked. If it were, there would be far fewer
low-productivity government jobs and far more high-productivity private-sector
jobs.
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Spreading the Work to Create More Jobs

February 1, 2000

Last month I emphasized that job creation is not a sensible objective for
economic policy.

The purpose of economic activity is not to do work for its

own sake. What's the point of creating jobs to produce goods or services that
consumers don't want as much as other things that could have been produced?
Yet there is a widespread view that having government create more jobs is the
best way to promote economic progress.

Wrong.

Relying on government to

create jobs invariably retards economic progress.
Productive jobs are created when people have the freedom to communicate
and cooperate through markets. Consumers communicate the value they place
on dierent jobs by how much they are willing to pay for products. Anytime
a rm employs workers to produce a more valuable good than workers are
producing at other rms, consumer purchases tell that rm: We will make it
protable for you to expand output by oering higher wages and bidding workers away from less valuable jobs. Workers end up cooperating with consumers
by moving into the production of more desirable products until all gains from
such a move are exhausted.
Similarly, rms communicate how much it costs to produce dierent products (including the cost of hiring workers) by how little they are willing to
charge for those products. When rms can lower production costs by making
more valuable use of workers, they communicate that fact to consumers through
lower prices. This motivates consumers to buy more of the industry's product
and motivates the industry to hire more workers.

Again, workers cooperate

with consumers by moving into those jobs where they produce what consumers
are most eager to have.
When government tries to create jobs it always interferes with market cooperation between workers and consumers. So even when jobs are created, people
are directed into jobs in which they are producing less value for consumers than
they could be producing. Government attempts to create domestic jobs by restricting imports is an example of undermining the market cooperation that

creates the most productive jobs. By preventing people from buying products
from the most ecient producers, import restrictions prevent the cooperation
that guides workers into those jobs in which they have a comparative advantage; that is, where they produce the most wealth. Unfortunately, there are
many other examples of how government job creation destroys wealth by distorting market interaction between consumers and workers. Consider one way
that government attempts to expand employment.

Spreading the Work
France is currently attempting to reduce its high unemployment rate by making
it illegal for any employee to work for more than an average 35 hours a week.
That policy would make sense only if there existed a xed amount of work and it
was being done by fewer than the available workers; in that case, more workers
could be hired only if the amount of work done by each were limited. If this is
true in France, then it has pulled o an amazing feat. The French must have
all the goods and services they want, with work and toil being the only scarce
things remaining. But if work rather than desirable goods is what the French
lack, there is a better way of taking care of the problem than restricting the
hours of work. They could simply destroy a percentage of everything produced.
This would create more jobs for people to replace the destroyed output, plus
additional jobs to do the destroying.
Unfortunately, neither the French nor anyone else has overcome the problem of scarcity. If more of the things people value are produced, people will
be anxious to consume them as long as market communication is undistorted
by government restrictions. Imagine a technological breakthrough that allows
one person to produce everything currently being produced in a country. Does
anyone believe that the country would be worse o or that everyone but the
one person would be unable to nd work? Of course not. The country would
become incredibly wealthy as millions of workers were freed up to produce additional products that consumers had been doing without. And in the absence
of market distortions, the extra output would be consumed since it would result
from consumers' communicating their desire and willingness to purchase it.
Interestingly, it was the nineteenth-century French economist Jean-Baptiste
Say who explained why expanding output should be no problem. Say's explanation is often distorted as meaning that supply creates its own demand,
which has become known as Say's Law. But this is a straw man. Neither Say
nor any other sensible economist believes that the production of any particular product, or bundle of products, will create the demand for it. Producing
something that no one wants will not create a demand for it. What Say explained is that when market prices are free to respond to changing production
costs and consumer preferences, then the decisions of suppliers and consumers
are coordinated and there is no need to worry about unemployment caused by
gluts of unwanted goods.
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Drilling More Holes
Trying to reduce unemployment with government restrictions on the number of
hours that people are allowed to work is like trying to sober up with more drinking. Such restrictions add to existing government policies (such as minimumwage laws, regulations on dismissal, and mandated benets) that are already
reducing cooperation between consumers and workers.

Also, enforcing these

restrictions employs workers, who could be responding to consumer desires, to
make sure that other workers don't respond to those desires. For example, the
French government hires work police to enforce the work restrictions. They
do such useful things as note how long cars are parked outside businesses. This
snooping is not merely a total waste of time. It is worse than that, having led to
the detection of renegade executives who have committed the crime of working
the extra hours required to negotiate complex deals that, if culminated, would
lead to more productive jobs.
The more distortions governments impose on market communication and
cooperation, the more problems they createproblems they can use to justify
more distortions.

It is as if you are on your boat and a government ocial

comes aboard, announces he is there to help, and drills a hole in the bottom.
But don't worry. As your boat takes on water and starts to sink, the ocial
reassures you that he is going to drill some more holes so the water can run
out.
Government's attempt to create jobs is almost always the economic equivalent of drilling holes in the bottom of a boat. The problem is that the costs
are greater than we realize and commonly disguised as benets.
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Sacricing Lives for Prots

Nov 1, 2000

pointed out in my last column that despite what people commonly say
about how human life is priceless, they put a price on their lives every day with
their actions.

People take chances that shorten their life expectancies to do

things that are fun, and for the convenience and savings of not taking every
precaution possible. When people willingly accept risks to acquire things they
value, they are putting a price on their livestelling us with their actions that
the marginal value of their lives is less than the often quite low value they
realize from overeating, not exercising, driving too fast, and so on.
Unfortunately, when people take chances they sometimes have regrettable
accidents. Nothing is more natural than feeling sorry for those who have suffered serious injury or death because they exposed themselves to risk.

But

our sympathy for them should not blind us to the fact that we would not be
doing adults a favor by interfering with their ability to take risks that, given
their preferences and circumstances, make sense to them. Yet such policies are
condoned and encouraged every day by well-meaning people who (1) fail to
recognize that, at the margin, human life is not priceless and (2) don't understand how prices and prots empower people to communicate eectively their
desires to business rms.

These are people who are quick to express moral

outrage when they hear the charge that corporations sacrice lives to increase
their prots by making unsafe products.
People are accidentally injured and killed every day because products are
not as safe as they could be. More than ever before, the prevailing legal environment encourages those harmed in these accidents to sue manufacturers of
unsafe products to compensate for their pain and suering. An obvious inducement for these suits is that the payo to plaintis and their lawyers can be
high, occasionally outrageously high. For example, in 1999 a $4.9 billion judgment against General Motors was awarded to six people severely burned when
their 1979 Malibu caught re after being hit by a drunk driver going between

50 and 70 miles per hour.

1

The charge that sways juries and oends public

sensitivities, and helps explain the large awards, is that greedy corporations
sacrice human lives to increase their prots.
Is this charge true? Of course it is. But this isn't a criticism of corporations; rather it is a reection of the proper functioning of a market economy.
Corporations routinely sacrice the lives of some of their customers to increase
prots, and we are all better o because they do. That's right, we are lucky to
live in an economy that allows corporations to increase prots by intentionally
selling products less safe than could be produced. The desirability of sacricing
lives for prots may not be as comforting as milk, cookies, and a bedtime story,
but it follows directly from a reality we cannot wish away.
The reality is scarcity. There are limits to the desirable things that can be
produced. If we want more of one thing, we have to do with less of other things.
Those expressing outrage that safety is sacriced for prot ignore this obvious
point.

For example, trac fatalities could be reduced if cars were built like

Sherman tanks. But the extra safety would come at the sacrice of gas mileage,
comfort, speed, and parking convenience, not to mention all the things you
couldn't buy after paying the extraordinarily high price of a Tankmobile. Long
before we increased automotive safety to that of a Tankmobile, the marginal
value of the additional life expectancy would be far less than the marginal value
of what would be given up. It simply makes no sense to reduce trac deaths
as much as possible by making automobiles as safe as possible.

Communicating with Prots
But how much safety is the right amount? The answer varies among individuals.
Some people get so much enjoyment out of riding motorcycles, for example, that
they do so even though the chances of surviving an accident are 17 times greater
in a car. People typically purchase more safety as their incomes increase and
when more people are dependent on them. When I was in graduate school, I
drove a battered Volkswagen Bug with a door that wouldn't close completely.
I chose more education at the cost of less safety. Now that I have a family and
more income, I am willing to pay for more safety, so I drive a Suburbannot
quite a Sherman tank, but close.
How do people communicate their demand for safety to automobile manufacturers? Through the prices they are willing to pay for dierent types of cars
and the prots generated by these prices. There would be no prot in making
a car as safe as a Sherman tank because nobody would buy it. Car companies
make more prot as they get closer to incorporating the inevitable tradeos
in automobile designs to the liking of consumers. So when car manufacturers
compromise on safety to increase prots, they are doing what we want them
to doresponding to our preferences.

1 The

actual settlement will be less, though still much higher than justied by how much

people value the marginal safety involved in the case. As of March 2000 the plaintis have
oered to settle for $400 million, but General Motors has refused so it can continue appealing
the case.

222

This is not to say that mistakes aren't made. Prices and prots don't allow
consumers to communicate every aspect of their preferences for cars with surgical precision. But the advantage of prots in motivating auto safety is that
when a car company doesn't give consumers what they want, prot opportunities increase for car companies that do. And although this market process
doesn't work perfectly, it works better than any other process.
Unfortunately, with any reasonable level of product safety, people will be
killed and injured in accidents.

The cost and carnage of these accidents are

easily seen, as is the fact that the damage would have been less if only more
safety had been built into the product being used. Not as easily seen are the
advantages millions of people realize from not having to pay for more safety
than they wantadvantages like more money to spend on education, medicine,
clothing, and housing.

And more education, better medicines, and improve-

ments in the clothing and housing available are all associated with longer life
expectancies. Those whose lives are cut short by accidents are obviously identiable, while we will never know who avoided a premature death because of
the prosperity generated by an economic system guided by market prices and
prots. But there can be no doubt that the latter far outnumber the former.

223

The Cure Can Be Worse than the Disease
March 1, 2002

Last month I discussed the prisoners' dilemma, in which everyone is motivated to behave in a way that leaves everyone worse o. One can appreciate
market exchange by understanding how private property and voluntary exchange eliminate a destructive prisoners' dilemmaone in which the best choice
for everyone is to try to live at everyone else's expense. The result is general
poverty, coupled with the loss of freedom to a repressive state justied in the
name of overcoming the prisoners' dilemma.
But even when a country has a well-functioning market system, some government action is commonly justied as necessary to overcome serious prisoners' dilemmas.

For example, making sure that people obey the rules of the

market (respecting the property rights of others and abiding by contractual
agreements) can be thought of as overcoming a prisoners' dilemma. If everyone
else obeys the rules of the market, the economy will be extremely productive,
but an individual can do better by stealing and defrauding others (without
sanctions against this behavior) than by being productive.

As a few violate

the rules of the market, obeying the rule becomes less benecial to others, and
a few more will begin to violate the rules, which can lead to an unraveling as
increasing numbers steal and defraud. Engaging in productive eort becomes
foolish. The only way out of this prisoners' dilemma is by imposing suciently
severe penalties on theft and fraud so that they pay less than productive effort.

Most people believe that only government can eectively impose such

sanctions.
Government is also widely believed necessary for overcoming the prisoners'
dilemma in providing what economists call public goodsgoods that, once provided to one person in a community, are available to all. Flood prevention is
the standard example. The benet you receive from preventing a ood does
nothing to reduce the benet your neighbors receive.

With most goods, the

same unit cannot be consumed by more than one personthe apple you eat is
one that I cannot eat; the clothes you wear are clothes that I cannot wear, at
least not at the same time. These goods are called private goods.

One might think that public goods are greatjust provide enough for one
person and you have provided enough for all.

But public goods present a

serious problem when, as is sometimes true, it is dicult to exclude people from
beneting from the good once it is provided. Again, ood prevention comes
to mind. If my neighbor is protected against a ood, so am I. The problem is
that it is dicult to get people to voluntarily pay for a non-excludable public
good because each person can hope to free-ride from the payments of others. In
other words, a non-excludable public good puts people in a prisoners' dilemma.
To pick a simple example, assume that 100 people live in a ood plain and
each would realize $500 worth of benet from building a levee along the nearby
river at a cost of $250 for each person. Clearly everyone would be better o
contributing the $250 to build the levee.

But no matter what each person

believes others will do, he is better o not contributing.

If enough others

contribute, the levee will be built and he receives the benets for nothing,
but it would be useless for him to contribute if few others do. With everyone
responding to the same incentives, no one contributes and everyone is worse o
than they could be.
Supposedly, by being able to force people to pay taxes, government makes
everyone better o by eliminating the prisoners' dilemma we would otherwise
face.

By requiring that everyone either pay $250 in taxes or go to jail, the

prisoners' dilemma has been eliminatedand assuming the government uses the
revenue to build the levee, everyone comes out aheadthe value they receive is
greater than the taxes they pay.

Few Public Goods
However, there are far fewer public goods than claimed that really justify taxation and wealth transfers.

There is hardly an organized interest group in

existence that hasn't argued that its activities are vital to national defense and
therefore the government should take wealth from others for its benets: wool
subsidies (soldiers wear clothes), agricultural subsidies (soldiers eat), import
restrictions on shoes (soldiers wear shoes), special tax breaks for mining (provides raw material for weapon production), programs for storing feathers (to
insure the availability of down for jackets if we are involved in an arctic war),
and the list can be continued. None of these things are public goods, and even
if important to national defense, they are best provided in markets undistorted
by government subsidies and transfers.
Also, even when a good is a public good, it is often possible to exclude
nonpayers and provide it more eciently through private markets than through
government.

For years economists have used the lighthouse to illustrate a

public goodthe benet that one ship received from the beacon did not reduce
the benets other ships could receive.
economist Ronald Coase

1

But in 1974 the Nobel prize-winning

pointed out that many lighthouses were privately

provided in eighteenth-century England, with owners collecting payment from

1 Ronald

Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, Journal of Law and Economics, October

1974, pp. 357-76.
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ships as they docked at nearby ports. A television program, once it has been
broadcast, is a public good, but it can be (and generally is) privately provided
by getting viewers to pay either indirectly by watching commercials or directly
through pay-TV arrangements.
Arguments are often made for government expansion to solve problems
that aren't problems at all

1

.

Of course, some interest is always served by

government solutions to nonproblems, and not surprisingly government often steps in when it is not needed with actions that create real problems,
whichsurpriseare used to justify yet more government action. Even when a
prisoners' dilemma prevents the private market from working with textbook
perfection and it is theoretically possible for government action to improve
things, it is seldom justied. Government action is invariably poorly informed,
guided by motivations that have little to do with solving genuine problems, and
almost always makes the problems it is supposed to solve worse.
One explanation for government's poor performance is that although it can
sometimes solve some prisoners' dilemmas, it does so only by creating other,
and commonly worse, prisoners' dilemmas.

This will be the subject of next

month's column.

1 Strong

arguments have been made that private arrangements would arise without gov-

ernment coercion to establish and enforce the laws necessary for the proper functioning of
markets. See Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State (San Francisco, Calif.: Pacic Research Institute for Public Policy, 1990), and David Friedman, The
Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989),
chapters 28-31.
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Social Security Can Be Good for Your Health

September 1, 2005

Until recently I took every opportunity to inform my students about the
nancial fraud of Social Security. Given demographic realities and the Ponzischeme nature of Social Security, those about to enter the work force will receive
an anemic return on their investment, assuming they receive any return at
all. They would be far better o, and so would the economy, if they put the
amount that will be taken from them by the Social Security Administration
into a real investment, such as a broad-based mutual fund.
But I'm having second thoughts about presenting only the negative side
of our national retirement program to the youth of America.

I'll be eligible

to begin collecting Social Security payments in a few years, so I've decided to
take a more positive attitude. The Social Security taxes I have already paid are
sunk costs, and therefore are not costs at all. Only the future taxes and income
from Social Security are relevant to my return on the program, a return that is
getting better all the time. What a shame to jeopardize that return by turning
the taxpayers of the future against the Social Security program, which can also
be there for them some day if only they consider the bright side of the nancial
mugging heading their way. In the hope that the young people of today can be
encouraged to stay the course with their Social Security contributions, I am
writing them an open letter telling them the rest of the story. You see, Social
Security is about more noble objectives than achieving nancial success.

DRL
Dear Young People,

There simply is no better feeling in the world than sacricing for the benet
of others. That is particularly true when your sacrice benets me. I want you
young college students to keep that in mind the next time you hear someone
criticizing the Social Security system.

I will be retiring about the time you

are paying large sums into Social Security, and your tax payments, I mean
contributions, will be sent directly to my buddies and me so we can aord to
drive enormous motor homes to the local shueboard courts. None of it will
be invested into your own personal account for your retirement.
Some of you may be asking, but then what kind of nancial return can I
expect from Social Security? That is the type of question we have to expect
from those who, because of the damaging eects of natural selection, insist on
thinking of themselves rst. But let me consider the return a college graduate
about to enter the work force can expect from Social Security.

The news is

better than some of you believe, especially those of you who believe an invasion
by the space aliens who kidnapped Elvis Presley is more likely than Social
Security being solvent when you retire.

Let me give you my unwritten, but

completely unenforceable, guarantee: you will receive Social Security checks
when you retire. That is assuming you live past age 67, which you probably
will because of a wonderful incentive built into the Social Security program for
your benet. Because of this incentive, your rate of return can be far better
than the experts are now predicting. Let me explain.
Assume you work from age 22 to 67 and make only the median family
income during your career. In this case your Social Security contribution will
be about $3,000 a year, recognizing that you will generously help your employer
with his contributions to your Social Security by accepting wages lower than
you would otherwise have received. These contributions will make you eligible
for Social Security payments at age 67. How much will you get? The maximum
you can receive (as I write this) is $23,868, which assumes that your spouse is
still alive, or at least appears to be, and also 67 or older. When you are 67,
45 years from now, the payments will be higher, assuming they keep up with
ination (your Social Security contributions will also increase with ination,
but let's ignore that minor inconvenience).

Let's be optimistic and assume

they will. Assuming a 3.1 percent ination rate (the average over the last 70
years), then your annual income from Social Security will be $91,453 at age 67.
And you thought Social Security was a lousy deal.
I'm tempted to rest my case right here, except someone is probably asking,
But how better o would I be if, instead of contributing to Social Security, I
put the $3,000 a year into the stock market for the next 45 years? At the risk
of encouraging people to think of Social Security only in crass nancial terms,
I will answer this question.
Over the last 70 years the stock market (as measured by the Standard &
Poor's 500 index) has grown at an average annual rate of 10.9 percent.

At

that return, your $3,000 a year will be worth $3,182,779 when you are 67.
With that amount of money, you could buy a lifetime annuity that pays over
$356,000 a year. So a cynical, but completely accurate, conclusion is that the
Social Security system will bamboozle you out of over $264,547 a year (the
dierence between $356,000 and $91,453) during your retirement.
But why be so negative?

After 45 years of 3.1 percent annual ination,

$264,547 will be worth only about $69,000 in today's dollars. Also, think of the
incentive Social Security gives you to take good care of yourself. You can make
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Social Security pay if you live long enough. The present value of your Social
Security income will be worth the $3,182,779 your private investment would
have provided, if you simply refuse to die until you are 125 years old. (This
assumes that your annual Social Security income of $91,453 grows at 3 percent
a yeargood luckand you discount the future value of that income stream
by 5 percentask your favorite nance professor why discount is necessary.)
So Social Security is right up there with conferences on global warming as
a way of promoting long life. I'm certainly keeping myself in peak condition
in anticipation of beneting as long as possible from your Social Security contributions. I don't want to go face down in my oatmeal until you young folks
retire.

Sincerely,

Dwight R. Lee
Ramsey Professor of Economics
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Libertarian Paternalism: A Test
July 1, 2007

Behavioral economics is a growing subeld of economics based on the nding
that people are not as rational as economic models have traditionally assumed.
Numerous experiments have shown that people's choices are systematically
altered in response to changes in how those choices are framed, even though
the framing is irrelevant to the consequences of those choices.
Some behavioral economists now seem intent on bringing their own rationality into question by advocating what appears to be a loopy ideagiving
government more power over our decisions to make us better o, and doing
so in the name of libertarianism.

This libertarian paternalism sounds like

an oxymoron, but two of its leading advocatesCass Sunstein and Richard
Thalerassure us it is not.

(Their 2003 University of Chicago Law Review

article is titled Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron.)
Their argument is supercially plausible. But on closer examination it becomes clear that a big leap of faith in the integrity of the political process is
required to embrace libertarian paternalism as a reasonable proposal. Fortunately there is a test of the compatibility of the political process with libertarian
paternalism. I shall argue that this test should be given, and must be passed,
before taking libertarian paternalism seriously. But, rst, let's consider what
it means and the arguments for it.
The case for libertarian paternalism begins with a nding by behavioral
economists of what can be described as the default bias.

In many circum-

stances, most people will accept a default option rather than choose another
even when the stakes are high and the other options seem far better. A commonly mentioned example is a matching, tax-deferred 401(k) plan at work.
When employees have to explicitly decide to join, typically more than half accept the default of not participating even though signing up is easy and, with
the employer's contributions, assures an attractive return. On the other hand,
studies show that if employees are automatically signed up unless they opt out,
most remain in the program.

The next step in the case for libertarian paternalism gets us to the paternalism. Since in every choice there is a default option, it is a good idea, say
advocates of the principle, to make it the option that is best for most people.
And fortunately it is often possible for impartial experts with training in behavioral economics to know what the best option is. Therefore, if government
frames the choice by requiring that the best option be made the default option, then the default bias would result in most people accepting this choice.
But the libertarian part of the argument acknowledges that what is best for
most people is not best for all, so anyone may choose something other than the
default.
For example, an employee who is independently wealthy, or who isn't expected to live long enough to retire, or who just doesn't want to start a savings
program can choose to have her name removed from the 401(k) plan. No one
is forced to bend to the will of an authoritarian paternalist. The government
experts, under the guidance of libertarian paternalists, will behave like libertarians by leaving the ultimate decision to the individual, but they will also be
paternalists by exploiting the default bias and framing the decision in a way
that makes people better o (in their view).
The obvious leaps of faith behind this proposal are in believing 1) that
the political power required to implement libertarian paternalism would be
limited to setting default options when the best default for most people is
known and 2) that the choice of default will be guided only by the interest of
the people whose choices are being aected. Without this faith in the political
process the case for libertarian paternalism is wholly unconvincing.

Can we

actually expect that the political process will know what option is really best
for most people in dierent situations and how a dierent default would aect
decisions? Maybe behavioral economists are convinced that they know when
they cannot pick a better default than already exists and what the best default
is when they can. But even if this is true, behavioral economists will not be
doing the picking. They may be brought in as advisers to the politicians and
bureaucrats in charge of designing and implementing libertarian paternalism,
but their advice will not always be taken. Others with more political inuence
and more narrowly focused interests than behavioral economists will also be
giving adviceand will be doing so aggressively.
For example, if the authority to set the default on 401(k) plans is transferred to government, the nancial industry will quickly recognize the potential
prots in inuencing how that authority is exercised. Indeed, the legislation
giving that authority to government will be drafted with help from the nancial industry.

And there are ways to put some devil in the details of such

legislation. The legislation could cover workers who, because they are young,
part-time, and receive low pay, would not normally be oered 401(k) plans.
Opting out could be made to require more eort than the libertarian paternalists have in mind. The type of investment people are put in if they accept
the default option would be subject to political inuences that have little to do
with what is best for the employee. And, assuming the behavioral economists
are correct and most people stay with the default, the political clout of nancial
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rms (likely with the help of political restrictions on competition) could result
in higher nancial fees.

(Concern over high nancial fees was one argument

used by those who successfully opposed President Bush's attempts to partially
privatize Social Security.)

Placement of Food
Libertarian paternalists use examples other than savings plans to illustrate
what they have in mind. They often mention the placement of food in cafeterias, buets, and grocery stores. Again they argue that the food items have
to be placed somewhere, and behavioral economics has apparently shown that
choices of what to eat are inuenced by where food is placed. So food encountered sooner in cafeterias and most conveniently located in grocery stores can
be thought of as default optionsit is still possible, of course, for people to
choose other options. As far as I know, no advocate of libertarian paternalism
has yet recommended that government regulate the location of food in cafeterias and grocery stores. But if the principle achieves political traction, there
are sure to be pressures in that directionthough maybe cautious and subtle
at rst. Who would have thought not long ago that governments would soon
be imposing restrictions on where and how cigarettes are displayed in stores or
what type of fat is permitted in fast food?
If government began moving toward using libertarian paternalism to encourage people to choose healthier diets, political competition among suppliers
of grocery-store products would intensify.

The fruit and vegetable suppliers,

along with the organic-food farmers, would lobby regulators to have their products moved to the front of the store. The producers of soft drinks, candy, chips,
bean dip, and a host of other processed foods would use their signicant political inuence to maintain their locations. Even the magazine publishers would
join the fray.

No one knows how this political competition would play out.

But don't expect that fruit, vegetables, tofu bars, and maybe cigarettes made
with organically grown tobacco would soon dominate the shelves at the checkouts, with the candy and gum there now being moved as close as possible to
the loading dock.

Or that you would nd serious reading material such as

The Economist, Barron's, The Nation, National Review, and The Chronicle of
Higher Education in the checkout racks, with the magazines on dieting, fashion
tips, and the latest activities of Hollywood celebrities relegated to where the
tofu used to be.
Of course, a move in this direction cannot be ruled out. What we can be
condent of is that more resources that could have been used to produce goods
and services valued by consumers would be devoted to inuencing political decisions. The nancial well-being of government regulators and lobbyists would
certainly be improved more than the dietary well-being of the public.
Some may think that this depiction of an overreaching political process powered more by organized interest than by the public interest is overstated. And
perhaps even if the political process does possess the special-interest tendencies just discussed, an idea like libertarian paternalism has so much potential to
serve the public interest that the ability of narrowly focused interests to sabo232

tage it will be severely limited. If libertarian paternalists believe this, then they
should not object to a test of the political process's anity for implementing
libertarian paternalism primarily to benet the public. There is such a test,
and libertarian paternalists should require the political process to pass it as a
prerequisite for their continued advocacy.

The Test
The test requires considering the many paternalistic regulations that governments now enforce in unlibertarian ways and recognizing that they could be
made consistent with libertarian paternalism. A political process compatible
with new regulations in the spirit of libertarian paternalism should be able to
pass the test by modifying existing regulations to make them consistent with
that spirit. Several examples of existing regulations and policies that can be
used in this test come to mind.
First, the Bush administration's plan to partially privatize Social Security
would be a move in the direction of libertarian paternalism. The current Social
Security system would remain the default option, but workers could reduce
their payroll tax up to some specied amount that would increase over time by
an amount equal to each dollar they put in a private savings programwith
restrictions on accessing the savings before a certain age. There are obviously
transitional issues involved in such a policy shift, but if libertarian paternalists
and others cannot convince the federal government to establish even a limited
private option to Social Security, it will not be an encouraging sign for the
political feasibility of libertarian paternalism.
Second, taxpayers are now required to help the poor by having a certain
percentage of their tax dollars transferred to them (a smaller percentage than
most people believe) by various levels of government.

Instead of requiring

that those transfers be made through governments, we could make government
transfers the default option, but with taxpayers allowed to reduce their tax
payments by some signicant percentage of the money they donate to private
charities dedicated to helping the poor. This libertarian-paternalism approach
has real potential for improving the way the poor are helped, since private
charities are better than government agencies at assisting the poor without
inducing dependency. But this potential depends on government's being willing
to accept competition from private organizations by allowing people to reject
the default option. If governments reject this shift to a libertarian-paternalism
approach, it would have to be seen as a failure on the test of governments'
willingness to properly implement libertarian-paternalism policies.
Third, smoking regulations suggest another way of testing governments'
willingness to exercise the tolerance for alternative approaches required of libertarian paternalism.

An increasing number of state and local governments

have outlawed smoking in privately owned establishments that serve the public.

The purpose is to protect people against being involuntarily subjected

to secondhand smoke. Of course, many people who frequent restaurants, bars,
pool halls, bowling alleys, and other establishments enjoy their experience more
if they can smoke, with secondhand smoke being an unobjectionable and triv233

ial supplement to rsthand smoke. The preferences of these people are largely,
if not completely, ignored by existing antismoking regulations. This situation
would be improved by the libertarian paternalism approach. No-smoking could
be the default policy, but the owner of a restaurant, for example, could opt out
of that policy by making it clear to potential patrons that smoking is allowed.
Plenty of options would remain for people to dine out in nonsmoking restaurants, but there would also be options for those who enjoyed smoking while
dining, drinking, shooting pool, or bowling. If governments are suciently libertarian to oer this alternative to the default policy of no-smoking, it would
be an encouraging sign for libertarian-paternalist policy. If governments resist
options that let people enjoy smoking while in the company of other smokers
and those who don't mind secondhand smoke, it has to be considered a failure
on the test.
Fourth, regulations against insider trading are another area where libertarian paternalists should be able to get government to liberalize its approach if
their principle is in harmony with political incentives. The purpose of insidertrading prohibitions is to prevent outsider investors in corporate stock from
being harmed by the trading of those with inside information. The objective is
a good one, but prohibiting insider trading may not be the best way to achieve
it in all cases. For example, regulation against half the perceived problem is
unenforceable, since prohibitions against using insider information to decide
not to trade cannot be enforced. Also, the price information created by insider
trading can be useful to outsiders and can increase the general eciency of
nancial markets.

Instead of an outright prohibition, no trading on insider

information could be the default policy for corporations, but they could opt
out in favor of a policy allowing insider trading by making that policy clearly
and widely known. This libertarian-paternalism approach would allow corporations and investors greater choice in how they operate and invest. In particular,
outside investors could protect themselves against any harmful eects they perceived from insider trading by not investing in the rms that allowed it. And
to the extent that investors did perceive harmful eects from insider trading,
the relative price of stocks would compensate for those eects.

How willing

the Securities and Exchange Commission is to move to this approach would
give useful information on how appropriately libertarian-paternalist policies in
general would be implemented by government.

Organ Sales
A nal example of a political libertarian-paternalism test (out of the many
that could be considered) involves increasing the supply of organs for transplant. Currently in the United States people can choose to donate their organs
on their death by indicating a willingness to do so, usually when they obtain
or renew their driver's licenses. Not making the donate choice means that a
person has automatically chosen the default option not to donate. As behavioral economists predict, most people choose the default option.

Libertarian

paternalists don't think this is the best choice for most Americans, and so they
want to switch the default option to donate. Being the libertarians they are,
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however, libertarian paternalists would allow people to opt out by explicitly
choosing not to donate.
As evidence from other countries suggests, this would signicantly increase
the number of Americans who choose to donate their organs. But one would
think that real libertarians would want to allow people to sell their organs
as another nondefault choice.

This is more libertarian (indeed a policy re-

stricting our choices to either keeping our organs or giving them away is not
even remotely libertarian) and would probably increase the number of organs
available to those who need them. Another advantage libertarian paternalists
should see in adding the selling choice is that it would provide another measure
of how much the political process could be trusted not to sabotage the other
applications of the principle they are recommending.
None of these libertarian-paternalist alterations would bring perfect policies.
But how good would they have to be to be better than what they replaced?
And certainly they would result in policies more in the spirit of libertarian
paternalism. If anything, libertarian paternalists should want to change some
of the defaults from what is required by existing policies to options that would
be paternalistically superior. But this is a test, and leaving the defaults where
existing policies have placed them surely makes it easier for government to pass.
If those recommending libertarian paternalism really want to improve public policy, they should be anxious to subject governments to this and other
libertarian-paternalism tests. If the governments pass, existing policy will be
improved by bringing them more in line with libertarian paternalism. On the
other hand, if governments consistently fail, this will provide libertarian paternalists with important information. Governments unwilling to alter existing
regulations and programs so they conform to libertarian paternalism are unlikely to create new ones that satisfy the principle's requirements. Far more
likely is that the rhetoric of libertarian paternalism will be used to justify the
expansion in government's authoritarian paternalism.
Of course those claiming to be libertarian paternalists may object to the
test because they think the existing regulations are acceptable as they are. But
this would suggest that they are really authoritarian paternalists trying to pass
themselves o as libertarian paternalists. So my test is not only a test of the
political process's compatibility with libertarian paternalism. It is also a test
of the libertarian paternalists' commitment to libertarianism.
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Making Social Security More Harmful

October, 1 2008

Social Security is a fundamentally awed system. If a private rm oered
such a retirement system and made the same claims for it that the federal
government makes for Social Security, that rm would quickly become a poster
child for corporate fraud, and its managers would soon be convicted of criminal
charges.
There are two fraudulent claims the federal government makes about Social
Security that deserve special attention. By considering how these two claims
interact with each other, it becomes clear that the politicians and pundits who
defend Social Security are increasing the harm it is imposing on American
workers.

Two Fraudulent Claims
Consider rst that ever since Social Security was enacted in 1935 Americans
have been told that their contributions are being deposited into their own
account to pay for their retirement benets.

This claim has become more

implicitly suggested than explicitly stated in recent Social Security brochures,
but not in the statements of politicians when opposing any attempt to partially
privatize the program. Al Gore, in his 2000 presidential campaign, assured the
public that if he were elected our Social Security contributions would remain
secure in a lockbox until our retirements. It was never made entirely clear
whether we each had our very own lockbox or all the money was in one big
lockbox.
We cannot nd any serious study that estimates how many people really
believe that the taxes they pay to Social Security are being saved and invested
to nance their retirement, instead of being spent immediately by politicians,
as is actually the case. But it is clear that many do believe that they have a
personal Social Security account containing the money to fund their retirement
benets. Alan Greenspan recounts in his recent book, The Age of Turbulence,
a story told by former House leader Tom Foley. When Foley tried to inform his

mother that there were no lockboxes containing the money to pay for Social
Security, she told him, I hope you will not be oended at how surprised and
shocked I am to nd that the majority leader of the House of Representatives
knows nothing about Social Security.
The other fraudulent claim made about Social Security (again, from the
very beginning of the program) is that employees pay only half the cost, with
employers paying the other half. This claim is widely seen as plausible because
the legislation authorizing Social Security clearly stipulates that the required
payments are to be split evenly between employees and employers.

If this

were true, then employees would now be paying 6.2 percent of their before-tax
income up to $102,000 a year; employers would match that amount.
As any good student in an economic-principles course should learn, however,
the amount of a payroll tax actually paid by employees and employers has
absolutely nothing to do with what politicians mandate in legislation.

It is

true that each worker has 6.2 percent of his after-tax income deducted from
his paycheck and sent to the Social Security Administration (SSA) and his
employer sends in the same amount. But by altering the wages employers pay
and workers receive, these payments change the supply and demand schedules
for laborat a given nominal wage, dierent amounts of labor will be supplied
and demanded than before. (In the lingo of economics, the supply and demand
curves shift.)

Until we know how wages and salaries change in response to

these shifts, we cannot tell how much of the Social Security cost is paid by
the employees and how much is paid by employers. For example, if a worker's
salary is reduced by exactly the same amount that the employer sends to the
SSA for her, then the cost to the employer is nothing (what he pays for the
worker's Social Security is oset by the lower salary) and the worker ends up
paying the entire cost.
We are not going to work out the details for determining how the Social
Security cost is divided between workers and employers. But having worked
this out with graphical analysis in an October 2006 article in Economic Inquiry,
we can provide a simple verbal explanation of how those who defend Social
Security are adding to the harm it inicts on American workers.
The employer requirement to send a check to the SSA for each worker equal
to 6.2 percent of salary revises downward the rm's demand schedule for labor
according to the amount of this check. This reduction in demand, considered
by itself, obviously reduces the salary the rm is willing to pay each worker.
Similarly, the Social Security deduction from each worker's paycheck reduces
the labor supply by revising upward the supply schedule by the amount of this
deduction, assuming that there is no expected benet from Social Security.
But this overstates the reduction in labor supply if workers believe they are
going to receive some benet from Social Security. The more benet workers
expect to realize from Social Security (in present-value terms), the less the labor
supply will decline. And indeed, if they expect to receive more in Social Security
benets than the amount deducted from their checks, then labor supply will
increase out from the original level.
But this means that even if workers are receiving benets greater than the
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amount being deducted from their paychecks, they are not necessarily better o.
The decrease in labor demand and the increase in labor supply can result in a
salary reduction greater than the amount Social Security benets are expected
to exceed paycheck deductions. In fact, as we show in our Economic Inquiry
article, workers are made worse o by Social Security unless the benets they
expect and actually receive are at least equal to the total amount paid for Social
Security by both the workers and their employers.

Defrauding Workers
We are now able to nail down our main pointthat advocates of Social Security are defrauding American workers in two ways. First, claims which leave
the impression that money paid into Social Security is being saved for our
retirements lead workers to believe their benets are more secure than they
are.
Second, persistent claims that workers pay only half the Social Security tax
lead them to believe their benets cost them less than they really do.
These fraudulent claims clearly increase the political viability of Social Security by misleading workers into expecting larger benets than they will receive.
But it is worse than this.

By generating exaggerated expectations of Social

Security benets, the two claims are actually reducing the net benets workers
receive by increasing the amount they are paying for them with lower wages.
It is ironic that those pundits and politicians who oppose even the most
timid moves to privatize Social Security by downplaying, or denying outright,
its Ponzi-scheme nature are widely seen as protectors of American workers.
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Market economies motivate positive-sum activities in which people become
rich by creating more wealth for othersboth in the form of higher-paying jobs
and improved goods and services at lower prices. That doesn't mean everyone
will earn the same, but it means improved conditions for everyone, even the
least well o. It is far better, after all, to be poor in Cleveland than in Calcutta.
Yet when people talk about increasing income inequality, they almost always
discuss the topic as a market failure calling for government correction. They
invariably ignore the possibility that increased income inequality has resulted
from things few people would want to correctnamely, individual freedom
and the success of markets in satisfying the needs and wants of the masses.

Four such successes come to mind.
To begin with, the returns on education have increased signicantly in recent
years, as reected in the increased salaries and wages that come with more education. This increased return is exactly what we should want as technological
progress increases the productivity of those who acquire more knowledge and
improve their abstract reasoning skills relative to those who do not.
Second, profound social, economic, and political changes have combined to
remove barriers to market access by women. Half the population now has full
participation in a marketplace that had for generations been closed to them.
More women than ever are taking advantage of the market's opportunities, often building on advanced degrees. Among those women, more are now majoring
in elds that yield the highest returns. This choice goes a long way toward explaining why income inequality between men and women in the United States
has declined in recent decades.

In many eldsonce factors such as dier-

ences in major, career selection, and duration of employment are controlled
forincome disparities between the sexes evaporate.

Despite this relatively

equality between the genders, we should expect to nd increasing income inequality among women as more women ascend to high-salary positions.

Third, the day has long passed in most countries when marriages were
arranged without the consent of the betrothed. This freedom, along with the
increased mobility people enjoy in wealthy countries, means that marriage markets in those countries are highly competitive, with each participant putting
his or her looks, personalities, and prospects on oer to compete for someone
who best satises what he or she is looking for in a partner. With more women
getting advanced degrees and working alongside high-earning colleagues, marriage markets have generated more matches between individuals who each have
high earning potential.
Fourth, spurts of technological progress create big winners. But the resulting technological improvements leave everyone better o by making possible
what has always been required for sustainable improvements in our general
living standards: the production of more value with less eort and fewer resourcesall while increasing the economically relevant resource base.
For example, technological progress has recently made it possible for almost
everyone in wealthy countries to enjoy the performances of the very best athletes, musicians, singers, talk-show hosts, comedians, etc., wherever they are,
with visual and audio clarity that rivals and often exceeds that of live performances. Between those who entertain and those who bring the entertainment
to our eyes at relatively low cost, we are bound to nd high earners. In other
words, technological access explains why people such as Tiger Woods, Britney Spears, and Oprah Winfrey have earned incomes that comparably skilled
athletes and entertainers could not have imagined a few decades ago. Those
entrepreneurs who develop ways to provide the most value to consumers at
the lowest costs, such as Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerman, Michael Dell, and Je
Bezos, also become billionaires at young ages.

These achievements are con-

sistent with other periods of rapid technological progress. One ambitious and
intelligent individual, willing to take a big risk, can come up with the sorts
of products and services that improve the lives of millions by oering them
low-cost opportunities to be entertained, enlightened, and connected.
It is dicult to imagine how anyone interested in improving the welfare
of the least advantaged would want to lessen income inequality by reversing
any of the four socioeconomic trends above.

The increased prosperity these

trends have made possible for the most successful among us is obvious. The
increased prosperity and well-being for the poor is no less real, but these gains
are commonly ignored in discussions of income inequality.
Although creating more wealth is the most eective way of reducing povertyand
happens also to be a great way to become fabulously wealthyone standard
argument is that the poor would be better o if government reduced income
inequality simply by transferring more money from the rich to the poor.
The serious problem with this argument is that government transfers have
never been very eective at reducing income inequality or improving the conditions of the poor. Ironically, most government transfers go to those who are
not poor. The two largest federal transfer programs, Social Security and Medicare, are targeted to the elderly, most of whom are not poor (medical care for
the poor is provided by Medicaid). Many seniors are poorer than they would
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otherwise be, though, because these programs reduce the incentives for people to save for their old age.

These two transfer programs make up close to

one-third of all federal spending, and there are many billions of other federal
transfer dollars going to politically inuential recipients who are not poor and
are often quite wealthy (e.g., large agribusiness concerns, defense contractors,
pharmaceutical giants, etc).
Of course, some government transfer dollars and in-kind benets do go to
the poor, but they often perpetuate poverty among the most economically
disadvantaged. When the poor make an eort to improve their skills and work
hard to increase their incomes, the government money and benets they receive
are reduced by a large percentage of their additional earnings. Sometimes it's
more than 100 percent, leaving them with less take-home income than before.
The result is that many poor people see little benet in making the eort to
earn more income, or any income at all. They are trapped in poverty by the
very programs that were supposed to help them escape it.

(We'll pass over

the army of administrators who skim a percentage of these transfers and enjoy
lavish benets.)
Relative economic freedom, despite the income inequality that results, has
done far more to help the poor than government transfer programs have ever
done. Indeed, government attempts to reduce income inequality would do little
to reduce inequality but a great deal to hamper economic growth and reduce
economic opportunities for the poor to improve their lives with productive
eort.
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The Problem of Environmental Protection
April 1, 2001

A common belief is that economists don't care much about the environment
because they are preoccupied with money, markets, and material wealth. And
when economists do consider ways to protect the environment, they emphasize
benets and costs, trying to express all values in terms of cash.

This view

is angrily expressed by mountaineer-philosopher Jack Turner, who decries the
economists' approach to the environment as [reeking] of cynicismas though
having failed to persuade and woo your love you suddenly switch to cash.
[Economists] think they are being rational; I think they treat Mother Nature
as a whorehouse.

1

While Turner's comment is harsher than most, it is repre-

sentative of many statements that can be found claiming that economists are
environmentally callused.
In truth, economists are just as concerned about environmental quality as
most people, maybe more so. All sensible people value the quality of the natural environment, and would like to maintain and improve that quality. Also,
economists have thought a lot more than most about the source of our environmental problems and have developed important insights into the best ways to
solve them. Unfortunately, it is easy for non-economists to misunderstand the
economic approach to protecting the environment, causing them to underestimate the eectiveness of that approach and the genuine environmental concern
that economists have.
The typical reactions to pollution are to blame it on the greed of those
who put prots ahead of protecting the environment and to have someone in
authority stop it.

The perspective of economists is dierent.

They do not

automatically conclude that pollution is always a problem that demands a
solution. When they do conclude that pollution is a problem that should be
addressed, they seldom suggest having government demand that the pollution

1 See Jack Turner,

Economic Nature, in Deborah Clow and Donald Snow, eds., Northern

Lights: A Selection of New Writing from the American West (New York, Vintage Books,
1994), p. 121.

be stopped altogether. Finally, economists see blaming pollution on self-interest
as unproductive, if not downright silly.
Because of scarcity, attempting to eliminate all harm caused by pollution
makes no sense.

Sure, it would be nice to eliminate pollution, but reducing

pollution always requires doing less of something else that is desirable, and
long before we reduced pollution harm to zero, the marginal benet would be
less than the marginal cost.

Of course, in many situations it is desirable to

reduce pollution. While people may seldom agree on how much to reduce, they
should agree that any reduction ought to be achieved as cheaply as possibleat
the least possible sacrice of value. But having a government agency command
polluters to reduce pollution is the most costly way to protect the environment.
And economists see no advantage in blaming self-interest for pollution because
that leads to inecient pollution reduction. Indeed, the cheapest way to reduce
pollution is by taking advantage of self-interest.
In this column I shall begin a discussion of how the concepts of scarcity and
marginalism provide important insights into the problem of pollution and how
best to address it.

Environmental Protection versus Environmental Protection
Few things are more aggravating to those professing great concern for the environment than economists' insisting on considering the cost of reducing pollution. The environment is seen as too important to be thought of as just another
commodity, so costs simply aren't relevant. Pollution harms the environment
and should be reduced drastically regardless of the cost. Economists nd these
comments either hilarious or depressing, depending on their mood. The environment is important, but we get silly environmental policies when we ignore
the costs of environmental protection. This would be true even if environmental quality were all we cared about, since protecting the environment in some
ways requires sacricing it in others. Consider some examples.
Environmentalists want to protect and expand wetlands, which are the habitat for a wide variety of ora and fauna. They are also concerned about global
warming, which is supposedly resulting from the emission of greenhouse gases.
But wetlands are one of the biggest sources of methane, a major greenhouse
gas. So a cost of expanding wetlands is the release of more greenhouse gas. Is
this a cost environmentalists think we should ignore?
Environmentalists also want to save forestland and eliminate the use of
chemical pesticides and fertilizers in agriculture. Preventing starvation in poor
countries without using chemical pesticides and fertilizers would require clearcutting millions of acres of trees for agricultural use.

So fewer trees are one

of the costs of reducing chemical pesticides and fertilizers. Finally, and more
generally, since waste products have to go somewhere, one cost of reducing
water pollution is an increase in either air pollution or waste-disposal sites.
These costs are the direct result of scarcity and require facing up to some
tough questions. Is protecting wetlands more important than preventing global
warming? Is protecting rivers, lakes, and oceans against the runo of chemical
fertilizer more important than maintaining our forests (which absorb carbon
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dioxide, another greenhouse gas)? Which is more valuable, clean air or clean
water? Environmentalists like to argue that environmental concerns are more
important than anything else, but they can't argue that every environmental
concern is more important than every other environmental concern.
There is a way around these questions by accepting some insights from
economics.
The only sensible way to determine whether clean air is more or less valuable
than clean water is by making the comparison at the margin. If the water is
extremely dirty (dysentery in every drop) and the air is extremely clean, then
the marginal value of clean water (the value of an incremental increase in
water quality) is greater than the marginal value of clean air (the value of an
incremental increase in air quality). In this case, it is sensible to improve water
quality even though the cost is reduced air quality. And the improvement in
water quality should continue as long as the marginal value of clean water is
greater than the marginal cost of dirtier air.

1

Those who read my January column will recognize this as an example of
equating at the margin: doing the best we can by not doing anything as well
as we possibly could. Only by accepting this marginal principle can we deal
sensibly with the tradeos that scarcity forces us to confront. As I will discuss
next month, the implications of equating at the margin for environmental policy
are too sensible for some environmentalists to feel comfortable with.

1 This

assumes that the only cost of improving water quality is reduced air quality. More

accurately, water quality should be improved until the marginal value of doing so equals
the marginal cost, where cost reects all sacriced value, not just the sacriced value of air
quality.
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The Ecient Amount of Pollution
May 1, 2001

When environmentalists argue that the costs of protecting the environment
should be ignored, they quickly nd themselves in a box. The only way to protect environmental quality in some ways (say, reducing water pollution) is by
harming it in other ways (say, increasing air pollution). To say that we should
protect the environment without considering the cost is the same as saying that
we should protect the environment without considering the damage done to the
environment. When environmentalists take a break from silly rhetoric and get
serious about improving environmental quality, they have to compare the value
of alternative environmental goals; for example, clean air versus clean water.
Doing this requires recognizing that, rst, decisions are made at the margin
(a little more clean water at the cost of a little less clean air), and, second,
the marginal value of everything eventually begins to fall as we get more of it.
Without these two insights from economics, an environmentalist can never get
beyond providing comic relief for those who think seriously about environmental problems, which, I want to emphasize, includes some environmentalists.1
But accepting the insights of marginal analysis leads to logical conclusions that
many environmentalists do not like.
Once we recognize that it's marginal values that are relevant to our choices,
and that the marginal value of all goods declines as we use more of them, it
follows that environmental values don't always trump other values. Sure, we
value environmental quality.

But we also value lots of other things such as

warm homes in the winter; cool homes in the summer; life-saving drugs; stylish
clothes; fast food; hot showers; large, roomy vehicles; jet travel; hair spray; disposable razors, diapers, and grocery bags; fast-acting detergent; contact lens
solution; chemically treated lawns; and so on. The production and consumption of all these things damage the environment, but it makes sense to increase
our consumption of them as long as their marginal value is greater than the
marginal environmental cost. And this means consuming trinkets, gadgets, and
conveniences to the point of signicantly damaging the environment if environ-

mentalists are right when claiming that maintaining environmental quality is
a serious problem.

The Ecient Amount of Pollution
We can illustrate the tradeo between environmental quality and other desirable goods with a diagram. Beginning with no pollution, the marginal value
of polluting would be extremely high. Imagine not being able to discharge any
bodily pollution for a few hours and think about how much satisfaction would
be realized by polluting a little bit (a minute or two would be sucient, since
you discharge carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas, with every breath).

But as

you increase your pollution by doing things that are less and less urgent, the
marginal value of polluting declines. This decreasing marginal value of pollution is shown in the gure with the downward-sloping curve MV (the marginal
value of pollution).

At some point, P' in the gure, we have done all the

polluting that creates value and the marginal value of pollution is zero.
Polluting is costly, of course, because it reduces environmental quality, at
least beyond some point. Perhaps the assimilative capacity of the environment
is so great that we can pollute a lot before there is any loss of environmental
quality, in which case the marginal cost of pollution is zero over a wide range of
pollution.2 This situation is shown with the marginal cost of pollution curve,
MC. When pollution rst begins harming the environment, the marginal cost
will be quite low, little more than aesthetically unpleasant. But as it increases,
the marginal cost will also increase, with additional pollution beginning to
harm plant and animal life. So the MC curve is upward sloping, as shown in
the gure.
Given the values represented by curves MV and MC, what is the ecient amount of pollution (the amount that maximizes the total value derived
from polluting)? When pollution is less than P, the marginal value realized
from more pollution is greater than the marginal value sacriced, or marginal
costadditional pollution adds more value than it destroys. But beyond P,
the marginal value from more pollution is less than the marginal cost, and additional pollution destroys more value than it creates. The most net value is
clearly realized when pollution is P. At P the marginal environmental damage is given in the gure by D, and the total environmental damage is given
by the area A (the area under MC from 0 to P).
Many environmentalists will argue that pollution is a more serious problem
than suggested by the marginal cost curve MC, with the real marginal cost
curve more like MC', showing greater cost at every pollution level.

If true,

then the ecient amount of pollution is reduced to P*, but the marginal environmental damage is given in the gure by D*, and the total environmental
damage is given by the area B (the area under MC' from 0 to P*). The more
vulnerable the environment to the damaging eects of human activity, the more
environmental damage we are justied in doing.3
Regardless of whether the ecient amount of pollution is P' or P*, we will
increase our pollution to P' (where its marginal value is zero) without some
process for making us consider the cost that our polluting activities impose on
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others. Our pollution problems should make all of us, especially environmentalists, appreciate the advantages of private property and market exchange,
which require us to pay prices for goods and services that reect their marginal
cost. If this were the case with polluting activities, there would be no pollution problems, since pollution would be expanded only up to the ecient level,
where its marginal value equals its marginal cost.
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The Ecient Amount of Pollution
June 1, 2001
Are People Pleased with the Ecient
Amount of Pollution?

It is clear that zero pollution is not a reasonable goal once we recognize that
polluting creates benets as well as costs. Long before we reduced pollution to
zero, there would be so much environmental quality and so few manufactured
goods that the marginal value gained from increasing pollution would be greater
than the marginal cost. There is an ecient amount of pollution that maximizes
the value realized from all the things we enjoy, of which environmental quality
is but one. The ecient amount of pollution occurs where the marginal value
of pollution equals the marginal cost (see my column last month).
Economists are so enthusiastic about eciency that one might believe that if
we ever got to the ecient amount of pollution, everyone would be pleased with
it. This is not true. Indeed it is likely that nobody would be pleased with the
ecient level of pollutioneveryone would prefer a dierent level. But why?
How can economists get so excited about the ecient amount of pollution if
nobody likes it? Good question, and the answer provides important insights
into why we have a pollution problem in the rst place.
Most goods are like food, clothing, housing, and entertainment, which can
be consumed in dierent quantities and qualities by people in the same community. This is not true of environmental quality.
Environmental quality is what economists call a public good.

A given

amount of environmental quality provided for one person in an area is simultaneously provided for everyone in that area. An additional person can benet
from a cleaner environment without reducing the benets to others. This may
sound like an ideal situation, but it creates serious problems. It is often dicult, if not impossible, to exclude people from the benets of a public good; so
some can benet without paying. If too many people attempt to free-ride, less
than the ecient amount of the good will be provided. Also, since everyone in
a community has to consume the same quantity and quality of a public good,
it is dicult to accommodate diverse preferences.

For example, people who

enjoy outdoor activities, such as jogging, will want extremely high air quality,
while those who prefer bowling in smoky bowling alleys will hardly notice a
smog alert.
The only way to harmonize dierent preferences for a public good is by
charging people dierent prices for the same good.

For example, since the

jogger values clean air more than the bowler, the only way to satisfy both with
the same air quality is to require the jogger to contribute more to providing
clean air than the bowler. But there is a problem in charging for a public good.
Even if a charge is imposed to pay for cleaner air, say, through taxation, there
is no easy way to get people to reveal their preferences honestly to determine
the right charge. People will claim little desire for clean air if higher charges
are imposed on those receiving higher benets. Of course, tax burdens are not
determined from surveys on preferences but by the value of property holdings,
income, and the whims of legislators.

The clean-air-loving jogger may be a

struggling graduate student who pays no taxes and the bowler may pay very
high taxes. So even if we had the ecient level of air quality, the jogger and
the bowler would be unhappy with it. The jogger would want much more spent
on cleaning up the air, and the bowler would want much less.

I'll Pay You Not to Pollute
Next consider a situation involving only the bowler and the jogger, with the
bowler having the right to any level of air quality he wants, but with it possible for him and the jogger to negotiate an agreement over the pollution level.
Before the negotiations start, the bowler wants more pollution than is ecientan amount where the marginal cost of pollution is greater than the
marginal valuesince he receives little of the marginal value from reducing
pollution but pays all of the marginal cost. With negotiations, however, the
bowler will consider the marginal cost the jogger suers from pollution because the jogger is willing to pay an amount equal to that marginal cost to
reduce pollution. As long as the marginal cost of pollution is greater than the
marginal value, the jogger is willing to pay enough to motivate the bowler to
reduce pollution. When pollution is reduced to its ecient amount, the jogger
is no longer willing to pay enough to compensate the bowler for more pollution
reduction, and both have done as well as possible because of the exchange.
Similarly, if the jogger had the right to clean air, negotiations would still
lead to the ecient level of pollution.

The bowler would be willing to pay

an amount equal to his gain from more pollution to the jogger for accepting
more pollution. Consequently, the jogger nds it to his advantage to consider
the value the bowler receives from having more pollution as well as the value
he receives from less.

So again, as long as the marginal value of pollution

is greater than its marginal cost, both can gain through exchange that will
increase pollution to its ecient level.
We see that everyone will be content with the ecient level of pollution
as long as the costs of negotiating and enforcing an agreement are zero. Unfortunately, many people are typically aected by pollution, and it would be
extremely costly, if not impossible, for them to reach a mutually acceptable
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agreement on the pollution level and side-payments, and then enforce that
agreement. This inability to cooperate on pollution decisions through exchange
explains why there would be widespread dissatisfaction with environmental
quality even if we achieved the ecient level of pollution.

It also explains

why achieving (or even determining) the ecient amount of pollution is almost
impossible.
If people in the same area could consume dierent levels of environmental quality depending on their preferences, eciency could be easily achieved
through market exchange. Each individual would pay for the cost of improving
his private environmental quality to the point where the marginal cost equaled
the marginal value. There would be no free-riding, no controversy, and no pollution problems, since everyone would have the environmental quality he was
willing to pay for. But even with the problems that exist because we have to
consume environmental quality commonly, we can use market incentives to do
a far better job than we are doing to reduce pollution. After considering what
it takes to reduce pollution as cheaply as possible in my next column, I shall
begin discussing the advantages of market incentives in controlling pollution.
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Reducing the Cost of Reducing Pollution

July 1, 2001

As we discussed last month, the ecient amount of pollution is not likely to
please many. The problem is that everyone in an area has to consume the same
amount of environmental quality while the value of that quality and the price
paid for it vary from person to person. Some will want less than the ecient
amount of pollution; some will want more; and almost no one will want the
same amount.
The ecient amount is what everyone would want if there were no cost
to negotiating and each individual faced payments that honestly reected the
value he receives from pollution reduction. Unfortunately, reaching agreement
on and enforcing such a payment scheme is impossible when many people are
involved. The result is that we cannot determine the ecient amount of pollution or reach agreement on the desirability of any amount of pollution.
But a pollution policy requires a decision on how much pollution to reduce.
And even if we cannot all agree on the desirable pollution level, we should all
be able to agree on one thing: no matter what pollution level is decided on,
we want to achieve it at least costat least sacrice of other things we value.
Equivalently, we can all agree that no matter how much cost we incur, we want
to reduce as much pollution as possible.
What does it take to reduce pollution at least cost?
seem.

More than it may

Clearly, it requires that every polluter reduce pollution as cheaply as

possible. There are many ways to reduce pollution, and doing so in the least
expensive way requires a lot of local informationinformation available only to
those familiar with local conditions and circumstancesthat is dicult, if not
impossible, to communicate to others.
For example, there are many ways to reduce the emission of sulfur dioxide
from an electric generating plantsubstitute low-sulfur western coal for highsulfur eastern coal, substitute natural gas for coal or petroleum, install a stack
scrubber to lter out some of the sulfur dioxide, substitute more costly but
nonpolluting pump-storage generation (see my March column) to serve peakload demands, or shut down the plant. The costs associated with each of these

actions vary among generating plants. A plant in Kansas may nd it less costly
to switch to western coal, while a plant in New Jersey is more likely to nd it
cheaper to install a stack scrubber. The cheapest way to reduce emissions by
a small inecient generating plant that is barely covering its costs may be to
shut it down, something that would be very costly for a large ecient plant
that is producing electricity worth far more than it costs to generate. Or the
least-cost action may be some combination of approaches, such as relying more
on pump-storage generation for peak load demand and substituting natural gas
for coal. The possibilities are endless for every type of polluting activity, and
the only hope for choosing the least-cost reduction in demand requires the use
of information known only to those closely involved in each situation.
But even if every polluting rm were reducing its pollution at least cost,
pollution would not necessarily be reduced at least cost. Having everyone reduce pollution as cheaply as possible is clearly necessary for least-cost pollution
control, but it is not sucient. We also need the right pattern of pollution reduction over all polluters. Some polluters can reduce pollution at a lower cost
than others. Clearly, those who can reduce pollution at low cost have to reduce
by more than those who can reduce only at high cost if we are to achieve the
least?cost pattern of reduction. But to determine exactly what this least?cost
pattern is, we have to consider the marginal costs of pollution reduction.

Equating at the Margin
It does not tell us much to say that one rm can reduce pollution at low cost
and another at high cost.

If this were true at all levels of reduction, then

the rst rm should reduce its pollution all the way to zero before the second
begins any reduction at all. But as a rm reduces more of its pollution, the
marginal cost of reduction will begin to increase (it makes sense to start with
the pollution easiest to reduce and then move to that which is progressively
more costly), and long before the low-cost rm has reduced its pollution to
zero, its marginal cost of reduction will exceed the high-cost rm's marginal
cost of its rst unit of reduction. Clearly, reducing another unit of pollution at
minimum cost requires that it be reduced by the rm with the lowest marginal
cost. But this increases that rm's marginal cost, and soon additional reduction
is more cheaply done by another rm. No matter what the level of pollution
reduction, it is not occurring at least cost unless the marginal cost of reduction
is the same for all rms.
For example, if the marginal cost of reducing pollution is $50 in one rm and
$25 in another, then the rst rm could increase pollution by one unit (saving
$50) while the second rm reduces pollution by another unit (costing $25).
This would result in the same amount of reduction at a saving of $25. This
increase in pollution by the rst rm and osetting reduction by the second
continues to reduce the cost of a given amount of pollution until the marginal
cost of reduction is the same for both.
It obviously requires a lot of information to reduce pollution at least cost,
and this information is widely dispersed. Each polluter knows more than anyone else about how to reduce his pollution as cheaply as possible. Even if this
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information could be communicated to a central authority, it would soon be
rendered obsolete by changing circumstances. There is simply no way remote
government authorities can acquire the knowledge necessary to dictate to rms
how each should reduce pollution and how much each should reduce to protect
the environment eciently and eectively.

Furthermore, even if policymak-

ers had all the information necessary for reducing pollution at least cost, they
would have little motivation to use it appropriately.
But the current centralized command-and-control approach assumes government can do those things.

I'll discuss this approach in my next column,

emphasizing why it often does more to protect special interests than to protect
the environment.

254

The Perverse Popularity of Command and Control

September 1, 2001

Most government attempts to protect the environment involve imposing
detailed regulations on how, and how much, pollution must be reduced. This
command-and-control approach does reduce pollution, but as I explained last
month, it does so at high cost.
I now consider why the command-and-control approach is so popular politically. One possibility is that though command and control is a costly way to
reduce pollution, there is no less costly way. Just because a policy is costly does
not mean it is inecient, unless there is a cheaper way of realizing the goal.
So it may be that Congress and the EPA are concerned only with protecting
environmental quality and have embraced this approach because, as costly as
it is, it is cheaper than feasible alternatives.
We are about to see that this is not the case. The political popularity of
command and control has far more to do with protecting special interests than
with protecting the environment.

Next month I shall discuss an alternative

approach to environmental protection using market incentives, one that is resisted politically because it would do far more to protect the environment than
to protect special interests.
I hope I don't sound outrageously cynical when I say that employees of the
EPA are willing to sacrice environmental quality for personal gain. I hasten
to add that I am not singling out EPA employees for special criticism. They
are just like the rest of us.

We all do things for personal benet that harm

the environment (almost everything we do causes some environmental harm).
It shouldn't be surprising that EPA employees do the same. Command-andcontrol policies are not the best for protecting the environment, but they are
great for protecting (and expanding) EPA budgets and jobs.

The EPA has

more to do when it is involved in the details of pollution control than it would
if decisions were shifted to those with more information on local conditions. As
The Economist pointed out, The EPA exists to regulate things, not to see the

market do the job for it.

1

Few things are easier than convincing yourself of the social virtue of things
that serve your interest, so most EPA ocials are likely convinced that commandand-control policies are justied.
But even if they are motivated by civic virtue, EPA ocials benet by
reducing pollution through detailed regulation. And since they are well organized and considered experts on pollution control, their views have signicant
inuence on environmental policy.
Another political advantage for the command-and-control approach is its
public appeal. If big businesses are polluting our environment, then nothing
seems more appropriate than for government to step in and make them stop.
Discussions about local knowledge and least-cost reduction are far too subtle
to capture the attention of the public. Also, the market approach, which (as
we shall see) allows people to pollute as much as they want as long as they are
willing to pay a price, is easily dismissed with bumper-sticker phrases like it's
a license to pollute.

Don't Throw Me in the Briar Patch
The public may believe that the command-and-control approach is the best
way to get tough on big-business polluters, but businesses are among its most
enthusiastic and politically inuential supporters.
True, businesses often object to environmental regulations, but most of
these objections are like Br'er Rabbit's begging the fox not to throw him into
the briar patch. True, businesses don't like all environment regulations (they
don't want to be thrown just anywhere in the briar patch), but some types of
regulation are just ne with them, especially big businesses.
Command-and-control regulation typically increases the costs of doing business. But those costs are often easier for a big business to handle than a small
business, because large rms already have legal departments to deal with the
inevitable litigation that comes with environmental regulation, and they can
spread the costs of pollution control over more units of output.
Also, pollution-control regulation often reduces an industry's output. This
can increase industry prots by allowing rms to raise prices and act like a
monopoly cartel, something that is normally illegal. For example, EPA regulations for reducing sulfur in gasoline have recently improved the prot outlook
for reners by causing them to shut down some plants.

2

Sometimes command-and-control policies are intentionally used to protect
an industry against competition at the expense of the environment. One blatant example involves air-pollution policy. The 1970 Clean Air Act established
acceptable levels of several pollutants, including sulfur dioxide (SO2), the primary pollutant of coal-red electric generating plants. While requiring those
generating plants to reduce their SO2 emissions, the Act did not specify how.
The cheapest way to reduce SO2 emissions is often to shift from high-sulfur

1 William
2 Peter A.

Reilly's Green Precision Weapons, The Economist, March 30, 1991, p. 28.
McKay, New EPA Rules May Fuel Reners' Prots, Wall Street Journal,

February 2, 2001, p. C-1.
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eastern coal to low-sulfur western coal, and that is exactly what many coal-red
plants did, even some in the east. The alternative is to install stack scrubbers
that remove much of the sulfur from the ue gas, but they are expensive, consume large amounts of energy, and often do less to reduce SO2 emissions than
simply burning western coal.
Unsurprisingly, the eastern coal industry and the United Mine Workers
Union were unhappy about the shift to western coal. (It requires little labor to
mine and the labor is not heavily unionized.) So they were prepared to lobby
for the elimination of the competitive advantage of western coal when the Clean
Air Act was amended in 1977, even if it meant dirtier air and higher electricity
bills. They backed amendments requiring that all new (or substantially modied) power plants install the best available control technology, which meant
scrubbers, regardless of the sulfur content of the coal used. Furthermore, they
pushed through a local coal amendment that outlawed importing western
coal if it threatened jobs in eastern coal-mining states.
This command-and-control policy mandating how pollution has to be reduced means that coal-red power plants have neither the incentive nor, in
many cases, the legal right to reduce pollution as cheaply as possible.

This

mandate had nothing to do with protecting the environment, but a whole lot
with protecting an organized interest group. Because of these amendments to
the Clean Air Act, the price of electricity increased in all parts of the country
(power plants in the west continued to use western coal but still had to install
expensive scrubbers) and the environment was actually harmed in many parts
of the country.

1 For

1

a more detailed discussion on the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, see Peter

Navarro, The Politics of Air Pollution, The Public Interest, Spring 1980, pp. 3644.
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Maximum Cooperation Means Minimum Cost

November 1, 2001

There are two big advantages to a pollution-control policy that relies on
transferable pollution permits. First, rms can reduce pollution any way they
choose, which will be the cheapest way possible. Second, rms will coordinate
their reduction with one another so that the pollution target is achieved as
eciently as possible. In last month's column, I explained how that coordination causes rms to adjust their pollution so that the greatest possible value is
created by the allowable pollution. I now emphasize the other side of the same
eciency coinreducing pollution to the allowable level at least cost, or the
least sacrice in value.
With pollution permits any rm (or any polluter) can legally discharge
a specied amount of the designated pollutant only if it owns the required
permits.

As long as the rm's marginal cost of pollution reduction is less

than the market price of a permit it will reduce pollution rather than buy the
necessary permits. As the pollutant is reduced, however, the marginal cost of
reduction increases and at some point will become equal to the permit price.
Reducing pollution another unit below that point will cost more than buying
a permit allowing the unit to be discharged into the environment. So the rm
will reduce pollution until the marginal cost of reduction equals the permit
price, with enough permits being purchased to cover the remaining pollution.
Thus the market price of pollution permits will tend toward the marginal
cost of reduction. If the price is higher, rms will do more to reduce pollution
so they can sell permits, driving the price down.

If the price is lower than

marginal reduction cost, rms will buy more permits so they can reduce less,
driving the price up.
Because rms have to pay to pollute, they will be alert to cheaper ways to
cut their discharges. When they are successful they will sell permits, causing
their price to fall. But some rms will be facing increasing demands for their
products, and they may have to pollute more to meet that demand even with
better reduction techniques, which can increase their marginal cost of pollution
control. These companies will be buying permits, increasing their price.

Firms communicate and cooperate through the price for pollution permits.
The rm whose marginal cost of control increases communicates that information by bidding up the permit price a little bit with its purchases. Other rms
respond to this information by selling a few permits. They act as if they are
saying, Another rm is telling us that its marginal cost of pollution control is
higher than ours, so we will reduce our pollution a little more so it can reduce
its pollution a little less.
Conversely, the rm that can lessen its marginal cost of reduction communicates that information by putting downward pressure on the permit price
by selling some permits. Other rms, by buying a few more permits, will be
acting as if they are saying, Another rm is telling us that its marginal cost
of pollution control is less than ours, so with it polluting a little less we can
pollute a little more and still keep pollution within the allowable limit.
Since the price of permits is the same for all rms and it pays each to reduce
pollution until its marginal cost of doing so equals that price, the marginal cost
of control is roughly the same for all.

This equating at the margin means

that all opportunities to lower costs by reallocating pollution reduction among
the rms have been exploited through a process of mutual adjustment.

The Evidence
The argument for pollution permits doesn't tell us how much the cost advantage is relative to the command-and-control approach. Numerous studies have
estimated the actual cost of pollution reduction for dierent air pollutants and
locations under current EPA policy and then compared those costs to what the
same reduction would have cost with a pollution-permit approach.
Those studies all show that the permit approach is cheaper than the commandand-control approach, usually much cheaper.

For example, the reduction of

particulate air pollution over St. Louis is six times more costly than it needs
to be; the reduction of sulfur dioxide from the air over the four corners region
of Utah, New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona is 4.25 time more costly than it
needs to be; and the reduction of nitrogen dioxide air pollution over Chicago
1

is 14.4 times more costly than it needs to be.

With pollution control cost-

ing tens of billions of dollars annually, the possible cost reductions would save
tremendous amounts of money, with more done to reduce pollution.
Also important are the motivation and freedom that permit prices give
each polluter to decrease pollution cheaply.

In the few cases where permits

have been experimented with the price of the permits is typically far lower than
anticipated because polluters found ways to reduce pollution more cheaply than
anticipated. When Wisconsin Power and Light started trading sulfur dioxide
permits with Duquesne Light of Pittsburgh as part of a test case, the permits
were expected to sell for $600 to $700 per ton of pollutant.
around $150 instead.

They sold for

2

1 These and similar studies are summarized in Tom Tietenberg,

Environmental Economics

and Policy, 3rd ed. (Boston: Addison Wesley, 2001), pp. 27073.

2 Gregg

Easterbrook, A Moment on the Earth (New York: Viking Penguin Books, 1995),

pp. 17778.
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Reducing Bad Taxes
If the government sells o pollution permits, it will raise lots of money: tens
of billions of dollars or more.

This is not necessarily desirable.

Sure, if the

government has more money it can do more good things. The problem is (1)
the government often spends money on things that destroy rather than create
wealth (for example, imposing trade restrictions, enforcing silly regulations,
controlling prices, and subsidizing unproductive activities), and (2) even if the
money is spent to create value, it comes out of the private sector where it would
have probably produced more value.
But there will be a net gain if the government uses the revenue from permits
to reduce taxes by the same amount.

Most government revenue comes from

taxing desirable activities, such as working, saving, and consuming. This is the
reason for the dead-weight cost of taxation that I explained in my March 2000
column.

Reducing this revenue by substituting revenue from a tax (the sale

of permits) on an undesirable activity like polluting would reduce the deadweight cost of taxation without reducing government revenue.

The danger

here is obvious: Government will take the revenue from selling permits without
reducing other taxes.
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Energy Production versus Conservation

December 1, 2001

One of the most important insights in economics was made by F. A. Hayek
in a famous article titled The Use of Knowledge in Society (American Economic Review, September 1945). Hayek's insight was simple, but powerful: the
information necessary for making sensible economic choices is far too dispersed
and dicult to articulate ever to be possessed by any one person or group of
experts. Hayek emphasized in his article that only through market prices can
people become suciently informed to direct resources into their most valuable
uses. Eliminate market prices, or distort them with politically imposed ceilings
or oors, and you systematically destroy the information that people need to
avoid wasting resources.
Unfortunately, most people seem immune to Hayek's point.
nity is particularly strong among politicians and journalists.

This immu-

The prevailing

view seems to be that when an economic problem arises, the solution lies in
ignorance.
The most recent example of this view concerns the production-versus- conservation debate over energy policy. It is widely accepted that the decision on
the right mix of production and conservation is best made by Congress after it
has imposed market-based price caps on important energy prices. Consider
an editorial comment in the May 28, 2001, Business Week: No one, except for
a handful of eco-extremists, believes that conservation is the only answer to
the energy crisis. But few believe that conservation plays no role either. It is
up to Congress to negotiate a balance in the weeks ahead. (Emphasis added.
I should point out that price controls were not recommended in this editorial.)
If politicians could only resist the urge to control energy prices, there would
be no need for them to worry about negotiating a balance between energy
production and conservation. But having yielded to the urge to control those
prices, neither politicians nor anyone else can have the foggiest idea how much
production and conservation is appropriate.
Every time we get worried about the availability of energy, a debate breaks
out over conservation versus production. It happened in the 1970s and early

'80s in response to the export restrictions of OPEC and then again earlier this
year in response to less drastic OPEC cutbacks coupled with the politically
induced electricity shortages in California.

One side argues that we should

drive smaller cars, make more use of mass transit, buy more energy-ecient
appliances, do a better job insulating our homes and oces, and keep them
warmer in the summer and cooler in the winter; the list of possibilities goes
on. The other side argues that we can't conserve ourselves to prosperity, so we
should produce more energy by drilling for more oil, mining more coal, building
more electric generating plants, and bringing more nuclear plants on line.
Of course, on both sides of the debate reasonable people acknowledge that
some mix of conservation and production is necessary. But all insist that their
policy recommendations will result in the right mix, or that the other side's
recommendation will result in the wrong mix.
Which side is right? What is the best combination of production and conservation? The answer is, no one knows. No one! No individual or group of
experts in Washington, D.C., or anywhere else, has a clue about how much
energy we should conserve or produce.

But We Can Find Out
But the information necessary for determining the best balance between conservation and production does exist, partly in the form expert knowledge on
the technical details of recovering energy resources, converting those resources
into usable energy, and transporting it to users. This information is possessed
by tens of thousands of people scattered all over the world, few of whom have
direct contact with each other.

Yet somehow, if energy decisions are to be

sensible, it all has to be collected, given proper weight, and communicated to
those who can make the best use of it.
Equally important information has nothing to do with expert knowledge
and is even more widely scattered:

the information that millions of people

have about their circumstances and preferences, and the tradeos they are
willing to make.

Some can easily take the bus to work, while others live in

areas or have jobs that make taking the bus extremely dicult. Some wouldn't
mind shifting to smaller cars, while others with growing families and special
needs would. Some would suer little discomfort from a wider range of inside
temperatures, while those with certain health concerns would suer more than
discomfort. Some people are simply afraid of the dark and are willing to sacrice other things to keep the lights on at night. This information is not only
more fragmented and dispersed than the expert information, it is highly subjective and impossible to articulate precisely, if at all. This information may
seem rather mundane, but it is just as essential to sound energy choices as is
the scientic knowledge possessed by experts.
Fortunately there is no need to collect all this information in one place so it
can be run through a computer to determine the right amount of conservation
and productioneven if all the information were collected, no computer could
process it alland even if it could, by the time the processing was done, the
information would have changed.
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The only way that the information needed to make sensible energy decisions can be communicated by those who have it to those in the best position
to respond appropriately to it, and communicated in a way that motivates appropriate responses, is through market pricesassuming these prices are not
distorted by politically imposed caps.
Market prices allow consumers to inform producers, and one another, how
much they value dierent energy uses, and allow producers to inform consumers
how much it costs to provide dierent types of energy. In response consumers
will decrease their energy use in ways that minimize their inconvenience when
that inconvenience is less than the value of the energy saved. And producers will
expand production of energy sources that provide the most value to consumers
for the cost required, and will expand those sources as long as consumers value
the additional energy by more than the value sacriced to produce it.

The

result is a combination of conservation and production that best harmonizes
the interests of us all.
Price communication doesn't work perfectly, and even without price caps
it can be argued that markets don't guarantee exactly the right amount of
energy conservation and production.

But energy decisions made in response

to the information provided by market prices are far better than those that
will be made by politicians and bureaucrats in the informational vacuum they
create by imposing price caps.
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Thank You, Internal-Combustion Engine

October 1, 2007
Thank You, Internal-Combustion Engine,
for Cleaning up the Environment

The internal-combustion engine is widely believed to have been an environmental disaster.

It has been accused of harming our health by reducing air

quality and contributing to what is currently claimed to be the most threatening of all environmental problems, global warming. But long before carbon
dioxide was declared a major pollutant, a car was smashed with sledgehammers by students in Seattle during the rst Earth Day on April 22, 1970. Al
Gore called for eliminating the internal-combustion engine within 25 years in
his 1992 book Earth in the Balance (only ten years left). Others, not worried
about oending voters in Detroit, are less restrained in the criticism. Someone named Royce Carlson states in an Internet posting that because of one
hundred years of gasoline and diesel internal combustion engines...our air is
polluted, ...and we are destroying the environment. A 2006 article in the Vancouver Sun reported that more than half of British Columbia drivers believe
that cars are destroying the environment.
In fact, everyone concerned with a clean and healthy environmentand
that includes far more people than those vocally claiming to be environmentalistsshould be enthusiastic fans of the internal-combustion engine because of
the important contributions it has made to environmental quality. The environmental benets we realize from the engine have long been clear to anyone who
bothered to notice. And these benets have become more obvious because of
an article in The Independent, a respected British newspaper (http://tinyurl.
com/ys5srd). The article was based on a study by the United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organization (Livestock's Long ShadowEnvironmental Issues and Options), which found, quoting the newspaper, that livestock are
responsible for 18 percent of the greenhouse gases that cause global warming,
more than cars, planes and all other forms of transport put together. The
problem begins in the digestive systems of livestock and ends up as atulence.
The internal-combustion engine began improving the environment, however,

long before global warming became a concern. Consider the fact that in 1900
a large percentage of the available horsepower really was horse power, or mule
power, or ox power.

As the power of the internal-combustion engine began

to be substituted for animal power in the early 1900s, we began to substitute
the emissions coming out of the tailpipes of cars and trucks for those coming
out of the tailpipes of animals. The result was that the environment started
becoming far cleaner and healthier.
Consider horse manure's eect on the environment and health of New Yorkers in 1900. Robert Fogel, a Nobel Prize-winning economic historian, writes:
We complain a lot about air pollution today, but there were 200,000
horses in New York City, at the beginning of the 20th century defecating everywhere.

And when you walked around in New York

City, you were breathing pulverized horse manurea much worse
pollutant, than the exhausts of automobiles. Indeed in the United
States, the automobile was considered the solution to the horse
problem because pulverized horse manure carried a lot of deadly
pathogens.
No serious person denies that photochemical smog from gas-powered vehicles is a health risk. It would be silly to do so. It would be even sillier, however,
to deny Fogel's observation that the air and water pollution from horse manure
was a far greater health risk than the pollution from cars and trucks. Diseases
such as cholera, typhoid, typhus, yellow fever, and diphtheria were responsible
for the deaths of tens of thousands of Americans in the early twentieth century.
As cars and trucks began replacing horses and other beasts of burden, these
deaths began to decline dramatically. Medical improvements get some of the
credit, but most of the credit during the early decades of the twentieth century
goes to the reduced lth in the environment from animal waste.
The environmental benets from the internal-combustion engine have not
been conned to towns and cities.

Before the power of internal combustion

was harnessed, beasts of burden were adding greatly to the pollution generated
by meat-producing animals, such as cows, pigs, and chickens in agricultural
communities. By eliminating the need for horses, mules, and oxen on farms,
tractors, trucks and other types of gas-powered farm machinery limited the
problem of animal waste from agriculture almost entirely to feed lots that
environmentalists, with justication, still complain about. It would be nice to
hear them acknowledge that they would have even more to complain about
without the internal-combustion engine.
Another environmental benet that internal combustion seldom receives
credit for is that it eliminated the need to grow food for millions of farm animals.
It has been estimated that in 1910 about 25 percent of U.S. acreage devoted to
growing crops was being used to grow food for the farm animals that were soon
replaced by motorized farm equipment. Much of that land is now forestland,
with the number of trees absorbing the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide much
greater than it would have been without the internal combustion engine.
Based on the animal waste and the diseases that have been eliminated by
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the internal-combustion engine, plus the additional forestland it has made possible, environmentalists should be celebrating motorized vehicles on Earth Day
instead of destroying them with sledgehammers. And the reason for celebrating
internal combustion is even stronger now that we have evidence that by eliminating all those barnyard animals, the engine has also eliminated vast amounts
of methane from animal atulencea gas with far more greenhouse potency
than the carbon dioxide produced by gasoline engines.

No Credit Given
Yet with respect to the UN report, the mainline environmentalists are not giving the internal-combustion engine any credit for reducing greenhouse gases.
Instead, they are pointing their ngers at meat eaters, with some recommending vegetarianism as the best way to combat global warming. From a report
written for EarthSave International, we read, Arguably the best way to reduce
global warming in our lifetimes is to reduce or eliminate our consumption of
animal products (quoted in the February 20, 2007, Christian Science Monitor,
http://tinyurl.com/3997wc). What is not mentioned is that if the vegetarian
solution were taken seriously, it would increase the environmental benets provided by the internal-combustion engine.

Imagine the extra animal manure

and methane that would be discharged if we had to grow all those additional
vegetables without motorized farm equipment.
The internal-combustion engine is certainly not pollution freeas is always
the case, there is no such thing as a free lunch.

Before criticizing anything

for being costly, however, one should always ask the questioncompared to
what? When this question is taken seriously, the environmental record of the
internal-combustion engine is impressive by virtue of its being far less polluting
than the animals it replaced. Furthermore, gasoline-powered engines are less
polluting today than they were a few years ago, and they will be less polluting
in a few years than they are today. And the less intrusive government is with
yet more commands and controls in response to every problem, real or imagined, the sooner an even-less-polluting power technology will replace internal
combustion. Until then, let's give the internal-combustion engine the respect
it deserves for its contribution to a cleaner and healthier environment.
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